P L D 1967 Dacca 778 (PLP)

MURSHED, C. J.‑This appeal arises out of the following circumstances: An application was made under section 15(2) of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") to claim certain relief under subsection (3) of the said section for payment of arrears of wages and for compensa tion. The applicant's case rests on the following allegation: Applicant was, at the relevant time, an employee of the East Pakistan Railway. He was employed as a Guard. He claims that he was illegally discharged from service on 21‑4‑

53. Thereafter, he instituted a suit and obtained a declaration that the said order of discharge was illegal and it was further declared that he was still in service of the said Railway. The aforesaid decree was passed on 16‑6‑

59. Petitioner, therefore, applied to the Authorities of the said Railway in order to resume his duty in the said Railway. He was, however, asked to appear for the Medical Examination as to his physical fitness. He was again asked to resume his duties by a letter dated 23‑1‑61 and was informed that the period during which he remained unemployed, would be treated as leave without pay. Petitioner protested against this order which was communicated by the said letter. He did not join the Railway service under the aforesaid cir cumstances. He was thereafter asked to show cause as to why he should not be discharged on the ground of physical unfitness. He had shown cause but nothing had been done in respect of the aforesaid notice. He then filed the present application on 24‑4‑62 claiming wages which have fallen due to him, as indicated above, and for various other reliefs under the aforesaid section 15 of the Act. The application was heard by a Munsif of Chittagong who dismissed the same on the ground that the applicant, being a servant of the Government of East Pakistan, was not competent to prosecute the application, having regard to the fact that wages or salaries received by a Government Servant are treated as a bounty bestowed upon him. Against the dismissal of the aforesaid application by the learned Munsif, applicant preferred an appeal which was heard and disposed of by an Additional District Judge of Chittagong. The appeal was marked as Misc. Appeal No. 304 of 1963. The appellate Court below took the view that the application was made under a special statute claiming a special relief provided by such statute. It has, therefore, held that the aforesaid theory of "bounty" has no application to the Act which creates a special right and provides for special remedies, claimed under the provisions of the Act itself. Such reliefs are obtainable under the said Act itself and they are not amenable to the bar which are sought to be imposed by importing the doctrine that payment of wages to Government servants is regarded as bounties paid to them. The appellate Court below has relied on the case of Divisional Superintendent, N. W. R., Lahore v. Muhammad Sharif, Booking Clerk, N. W. R., Gujrat (P L D 1963 S C 340), to support the aforesaid proposition. The appeal was allowed and it was directed that the case be remanded back to the trial Court for disposal of the application in accordance with law. Against the aforesaid appellate order, this appeal has been preferred, on behalf of the Province of East Pakistan, re presenting the Pakistan Eastern Railway. At the hearing of the appeal we were taken through the judgment pronounced by the Courts below. Mr. Md. Jani Alam, learned Senior Government Pleader, has not canvassed the proposition that an application under the said Act would be barred on the principle that wages given by the Government, whether Central or Provincial, are treated as a bounty bestowed by the latter. He has conceded that a right is created by the Act and the remedy provided by it would be governed by the Act itself. He has, however, drawn our attention to Article 102 of the Limitation Act and has submitted that a substantial part of the claim, made by the applicant, would be barred because the applicant has claimed an amount equivalent to the arrears of wages in respect of nine years. We do not think that this argument is tenable. Article 102 of the Limitation Act reads thus:‑ "For wages not otherwise expressly provided for by this Schedule. Three years. When the wages accrue due." The period of limitation under the said Article 102, is prescribed to be three years, which would run from the date when the wages accrue due. According to Mr. Jani Alam, the relief claimed is based on arrears of wages. He has, therefore, submitted that at least, the claim for six years out of the total claim for nine years, would be barred under Article 102, as stated above. We would like to observe that this argument is ingenious but untenable, Article 102 of the Limitation Act, as quoted above, is directed against a suit for recovery of arrears of wages. But, enforcement of a claim under the Payment of Wages Act, is a relief of a different nature altogether. It is true that the application is based on a claim of arrears of wages but it is not an application in respect of wages. Such an application is, specifically permissible under the Act, which Act creates special reliefs for a special claim. The application itself cannot be described as an application or suit for recovery of arrears off wages. Article 102 of the Limitation Act has no application to this case. Our attention has been drawn to the following provisions of section 15 of the Act which runs thus:‑ Provided that every such application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the deduction from the wages made or from the date on which the payment of the wages was due to be made, as the case may be: Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period." It will be clear, therefore, that section 15 of the Act imposes a special limitation with regard to the application which can be preferred under the said section. A period of six months' limitation has been prescribed and such period can be extended if the applicant can furnish satisfactory and sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. The aforesaid provisions of section 15 will apply to the application and it is' clear that the order passed by the appellate Court below is correct. The trial Court should remind itself of the provisions of the aforesaid section 15 of the Act which imposes a period of Limitation under the Act. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is dismissed with the modification made above. We make no order as to costs of this appeal. SAYEM, J.‑I agree. S. Q. Appeal dismissed.