P L D 1960 (W (PLP)

In June 1956, the petitioner filed an application under section 10 of the Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, against the above‑mentioned respondent, before the Rent Controller, Karachi, for an ejectment certificate on the grounds mentioned in the application. The Rent Controller, by his order dated 7‑6‑1957 rejected this application. Dissatisfied with this order, the petitioner filed revision application on 27‑7‑1957 under section 15 of the Act, before respondent No. 1 who is the Chief Judge, Small Causes Court, Karachi. The respondent No. 1, by his order, dated 3‑3‑1958, rejected the revision application on the preliminary ground that it was time‑barred. It is against this order that the present writ petition is filed. The main ground on which this petition is based is that the respondent No. 1, while computing the period, has not excluded the time spent in obtaining the certified copy of the order of the Rent Controller. According to Mr. Fakhruddin, who appears for the petitioner, the respondent was, under law, required to exclude the time. For this proposition, the learned counsel relies on sections 29 and 12 of the Limitation Act. According to me the provisions of sections 29 and 12 of the Limitation Act do not apply to the facts of this case. Sub section 2 (a) of section 29 which is relevant for the purpose of this case, reads as under "(2) Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application, a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule, the provisions of section 3 shall apply, as if such period were prescribed there fore in that schedule, and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law. (a) the provisions contained in section 4, sections 9 to 18, and section 22 shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law." There is no doubt that Karachi Rent Restriction Act, 1953, is a Special Act, section 15 of this Act prescribes 30 days for filing revision application against the order of the Rent Controller. Subsection (2) (a) of section 29 _ inter alia provides that for the purpose of determining any period of the limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in section 12 of the Limitation Act will apply. Subsection (2) of section 12 on which Mr. Fakhruddin has based his case, reads as under :‑ "In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an appeal, an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment com plained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded." It is clear that this subsection will be available only in cases where there is an appeal, an application for leave to appeal or an appli cation for a review of a. judgment. This subsection nowhere mentions revision application. This is made further clear by the expression `appealed from or sought to be reviewed' employed in the subsection. The omission of revision application from the subsection, in my opinion, is not accidental. While sub section (1) employs the word application without any qualification, subsection (2) restricts it to merely two kinds of applications namely an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of a judgment. There was nothing to prevent the Legislature to mention revision application in the subsection if they so intended. I am clear in my mind that subsection (2) of section 12 of the t Limitation Act was not intended to apply to revision applications. Extending the provisions of section 12 (2) to revision applications, will, therefore amount to enlarging its scope, for which, in my opinion there is no justification. The petitioner therefore ‑cannot avail of these provisions. That being so, the time spent in obtaining the copy of the impugned order, cannot be excluded when computing the period of Limitation. The provisions of section 15 of the Rent Restriction Act prescribing period of limitation are unqualified. In this view of the matter; the decision on the point whether respondent No. 1 acted as a Court, will not be necessary. The argument which can reasonably be advanced against the treatment of respondent No. 1 as a Court, will be that since the Central Government which has delegated the powers to respondent No. 1, is itself not a Court, the latter cannot be treated as such. There is a judgment of this Court in the case Muhammadi Steamship v. Underwood Type Writers & Co., in which it is held that the Chief Judge exercising powers delegated to him under section 20 of the old Act (now section 15 of the Rent Restriction Act, 1953) is not a Court. In the result, the order passed by respondent No. 1 does not call for any interference. The petition stands dismissed with costs. This judgment will dispose of Writ Petitions No. 202/59 and 203/59, the point being the same. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.