1991 PLP 63 (PLC)

S. 2(i) & S.O. 12(3)

Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S.2 (xxviii)

Termination of service of workman

No explicit reasons for termination of service having been given in the termination order of workman, same was held to be illegal and not sustainable. (e) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)

Ss. 25-A & 38(3)

Grievance application

Termination of workman

Back benefits

Workman's deposition, that he was without any earnings right from the date of termination from service, was not rebutted on behalf of employer

Back benefits were, thus rightly allowed by Labour Court. S.M. Naeem for Appellant. Shamsher Iqbal Chughtai for Respondent. Date of hearing: 15th May, 1990. This is an appeal emerging from the decision dated 4-2-1990 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. V11I, Bahawalpur whereby the respondent has been directed to be reinstated in service with all back benefits.

2. The facts are that the respondent was employed vide Exh.P.1 as part time employee. The date of the order of appointment is 2-12-1987. Vide order copy of which is Exh. P.2 his services were terminated. The date of this order is 15-4-1989. In both the documents the respondent is mentioned as part-time employee.

3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Labour Court at Bahawalpur had no territorial jurisdiction inasmuch as the Head Office of the appellant is located at Islamabad. On the face of it the argument has no force. Admittedly the respondent was employed at Bahawalpur and from there he was terminated from service. The place of work was situated at Bahawalpur and the order of termination was received by the respondent there therefore, the Labour Court at Bahawalpur had territorial jurisdiction.

4. The other point argued by the learned counsel for the appellant is that the order of termination was not mala fide. This may be so, but if otherwise the order is not legal the mere fact that it was not mala fide, is not sufficient. The case of the appellant is that the respondent was a part-time employee and thus had no guaranteed right. No doubt, in the order of appointment Exh. P.1 and the order of termination Exh. P.2, the nature of the work of the respondent is mentioned as such but the statement of the respondent that he worked as regular employee and had been daily working for eight hours stands unrebutted. The duty hours of a part-time person cannot be equal to the duty hours of a regular employee because a part-time employee is free to work elsewhere also after he gives duty as part-time employee. Since the respondent had been working for full eight hours, the nature of his employment was that of a regular worker and the mere fact that he was described as part-time, is not sufficient. The learned lower Court has thus rightly held that the respondent was a regular worker.

5. The nature of the work of the respondent shows that his duties were t manual and thus he is covered by the definition of `workman' given in section 2(i) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. This is not the case of the appellant that the respondent was employed in a managerial or supervisory capacity, therefore, he is covered by the definition of workman given in section 2(xxviii) of the industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 also. The perusal of the termination order Exh.P.2 shows that no ground for termination has been given, According to Standing Order 12(3) of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 explicit reasons for the termination of service should be given. Order Exh. P.2 therefore, contravenes the provisions of Standing Orders 12(3) and thus is illegal and not sustainable, and thus was rightly set aside by tire learned lower Court.

6. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondent that the appeal is time-barred and there is no application for condonation of delay giving any cogent reasons. The date of the judgment of the learned lower Court is 4-24990. Application for copy was lodged on 10-2-1990 and the copy was delivered on 24-2-1990. Excluding the date of the announcement of the judgment, the application for copy was made after wasting five days. The period from 10-2-1990 to 24-2-1990 is to be excluded. So the time of limitation re-started from 25-2-1990. There being 28 days of the month of February, 4 days in the month of February and 20 days of the month of March were wasted since the appeal was lodged on 21st. Adding 9 days which the appellant wasted in the month of February, the appeal brought on 21st was on the 30th day and thus was within time.

7. So far as back benefits are concerned, the respondent deposed that he was without any earnings right from the date of termination from service. This evidence was not rebutted by the solitary witness RW-1 examined on behalf of the appellant. Thus back benefits have also been rightly allowed by the learned lower Court.

8. As a result of the discussions made above, the appeal fails and is dismissed. Nemo for the parties. A.A./728/Lb. P Appeal dismissed.