1977 PLP 310 (PLC)

‑‑ S. 36‑D‑Limitation ‑ Delay‑Time spent on obtaining copy of impugned order‑Must be specifically explained with proof‑No certifi cate regarding date of application for copy of impugned order pro duced‑Delay, in circumstances, not condoned. (b) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968)‑-- ‑‑ S. Os. 2(6) & 7‑Appointment letter‑Must contain clearly terms and conditions and nature of employment‑Absence of such terms and conditions cannot be construed into temporariness of workman‑ ignoring of such statutory obligations, held, raise presumption of being permanent in favour of workers‑Worker continued in service from month to month for over one year, held, had attained status of being permanent. Hakim Muhammad Screed for Appellant. Respondent in person. This is an appeal filed on behalf of Resident Engineer Natural Gas Power Station. Piran Gaib, Multan hereinafter mentioned as the appellant Management against the order of the learned Junior Labour Court, dated 4th March 1975, directing the re‑instatement of Khalid Amin workman who was terminated from service with effect from 1st January 1975. The case of the respondent is that he was employed as helper worker and his employment was continued for a period over one year whereafter he was illegally terminated. According to the case of the appellant Management the respondent was never permanently appointed against a job of permanent nature and his service was extended from month to month on the basis of monthly wages. The learned lower Court observed in the impugned order that the respondent attained the status of a permanent worker by virtue of continuous service of over one year to his credit as admittedly he remained employed from 30th November 1973 to 21st December 1974. In the argument today it has been contended in the first instance that the appeal is time barred. Admittedly the impugned judgment was delivered on 4th March 1975 and the appeal was filed on 3rd April 1975. It is urged on behalf of the appellant Management that copy of the judgment was supplied to it only on 2nd April 1975, which fact was mentioned in the memorandum of appeal. But the self averment of the appellant above was not sufficient to substantiate the plea that the impugned judgment was actually applied for on 4th March 1975 and delivered not earlier than 2nd April 1975. In such situation it was necessary for the appellant to get a certificate from the Court concerned to show that the issue of the copy was in fact delayed by the learned Lower Court. This is an obvious fact that a very limited period is provided by law to dispose of the appeal under section 36‑D of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and the Indulgence of the said enquiry cannot be given as a matter of course. It is also a fact that neither the appellant moved this Court separately or the Junior Labour Court to issue a certificate in this behalf to brig the institution of appeal within the statutory period of fifteen day s. Sine the impugned judgment was delivered on 4th Mach 1975 and the copy was attested by the learned Presiding Officer without mentioning any other date the delivery of the copy can be assumed to have been made on 4th March 1975. The appeal therefore is held to be time‑barred. To be on the safe side I have also gone into the merits of the case. It is an admitted fact that an attested copy of the document Exh. P. 1 was issued by the appellant Management. According to this certificate the service of the respondent started as a workman from 30th November 1973 and continued uptil 31st December 1974 with negligible break of one day in his re‑employment on 2nd November, 1.974. Otherwise the re‑employment of the respondent has continuously been ordered from month to month for a period over one year. According to the definition of a permanent worker given in the Standing Order 1 of the Schedule to the West Pakistan Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, a person who has been engaged on work o2 permanent nature likely to last more than nine months and has satisfactorily completed a probationary period of three months would be a permanent workman. For the termination of any such workman the procedure laid down in Standing Order 12 (3) must be followed and his service cannot be terminated at will by the employer. Even for a termination simplicitor it is incumbent on the Management to pass a written order specifying clear reasons for such termination whereas in the present case no such order was admittedly passed. It is also necessary for the Management to give a written order of appointment under Standing Order 2(6) of the Standing Orders Ordinance clearly laying down the terms and conditions of service of a workman, the absence whereof cannot be construed into temporariness of his service. A statutory provision in this behalf being ignored by the Management the presumption should go in favour of the worker that he was employed against a job of permanent nature which lasted for a period' over one year. For all these reasons I have no opinion different from the one formed by the learned Lower Court. The appeal has no force on the point of limitation as well as on merits. The same is therefore dismissed.