1976 PLP 706 (PLC)

"It applies to- (a) every industrial establishment , or commercial establishment wherein twenty or more workmen are employed, directly or through any other person whether on behalf of himself or any other person, or were so employed on any day during the preceding twelve months:- (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . (c) such classes of the industrial and commercial establishments as Government may, from time to time by notification in the official Gazette specify in this behalf: Provided that nothing in this Ordinance shall apply to industrial and commercial establishments carried on by or under the authority of the Central or any Provincial Government, where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline are applicable to the workmen employed therein" The Municipal Committees are industrial and commercial establishments. They are created under the authority of Provincial Government. The proviso referred to above takes out the cases of Municipal Committee from the fold of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. The reason is that these statutory bodies have framed their own rules of service, conduct or discipline. There will be duplicity of the application of rules if the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 are applied to them. In that case on one hand they will be governed by the rules, laid down in the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 and on the other hand they will be governed by the rules, framed by their own departments. In order to avoid this duplicity the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 have not been made applicable to them. The clear position will be that the servants of Municipal Committee shall be governed by their own rules. It may be mentioned here that the West Pakistan Municipal (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1963 have already been framed and they laid down the penalties to be imposed on Mun;cip31 Committee employee, if he is found guilty of misconduct, inefficiency, corruption and subversion etc. It is obvious that he will be governed by these rules and not the rules laid down in the Standing Orders Ordinance 1968. However, the position of Municipal Committee's Servants will remain the same. His rights are guaranteed under the Efficiency and Discipline Rules of 1963 and if the action against him has not been taken in accordance with rules, he will be justified to knock the door of a Court of Law. I hold that non-application of the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, will not bar a Sweeper off Municipal Committee to come to a Junior Labour Court. On the question of jurisdiction reference was made to section 119 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 and it was argued that under this section the Junior Labour Court was barred to provide any relief to a Sweeper of Municipal Committee, if he has been removed from service. This section runs as under:- "Appeals.-Any person aggrieved by an order passed by a Municipal Committee or its Chairman or Vice-Chairman in pursuance of this Ordinance or the rules or bye-laws may appeal to such authority, in manner and within such period as may be prescribed. Any order passed in appeal shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court." The argument of the learned counsel appearing on behalf of Municipal Committee was that the law provided a remedy to a person who is aggrieved by any order, passed by a Municipal Committee under any rules, framed under the Municipal Administration Ordinance and he can file an appeal to the competent authority. It is further provided in the above section that the order passed in appeal, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any Court. From the above provision it appears that the Ordinance has provided a framework for the grievances to be redressed by filing appeals to the competent authorities. Under this section all Courts are barred to take the cognizance of the matters which can be decided under the said Ordinance. The question is whether the jurisdiction of a Labour Court to provide remedy to an aggrieved worker under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is barred. My answer is in the negative. The reason is that the Industrial Relations Ordinance is a special enactment, promulgated by the Central Legislature and its aim is to guarantee certain rights to the workers. These rights cannot be taken away by a Provincial Legislation. Obviously section 119 of the Municipal Administration Ordinance is in direct conflict with section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in these circumstances the provisions of section 25‑A of the Industrial Rela tions Ordinance, 1969, must prevail on the provisions of section

119. I hold that irrespective of the provisions of section 119 a Sweeper of Municipal B Committee can file his petition before a Labour Court if he is aggrieved by an order of dismissal or termination. On merits the case is very simple. The Sweepers of Municipal Committee, Kamalia were Class IV servants and were paid out of contingency. Recently the Provincial Government issued orders to regularize their services and they were made permanent servants of the Municipal Committee. All the five appellants were accordingly made permanent. A question of their age arose They were called upon to file certificates about their age. They did not file such certificates. Offended by their action the Municipal Committee terminated their services. It is clear that their services could not be terminated arbitrarily. If they had committed any misconduct it was necessary for the Municipal Committee to frame charge‑sheet, to make an inquiry and after a show cause their services could be dispensed with. This procedure was not adopted. They were permanent servants and if the Municipal Committee wanted to retire them, it could do so if they had attained the age of superannuation. In case of their retirement they would be entitled to certain benefits i. e. pension, gratuity etc. In the present case neither they had been retired nor they had been dismissed from service. The orders, passed by the Municipal Committee are, therefore, not sustain able in law. The result is that all the appeals are accepted and the appellants are ordered to be re‑instated with back benefits.