P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

RAYMOND, J.‑This is a writ petition in which the petitioner prays for an appropriate writ quashing the order dated 11‑11‑1958 of the respondent No. 2 namely the Divisional Commissioner, Hyderabad, and the two orders dated 28‑5‑1959 and 22‑9‑1960, of the respondent No. 1 namely the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore.

2. The facts giving rise to this matter are that on 8‑3‑1958, the petitioner through a sale‑deed purchased agricultural land in Deb Bhaji, Taluka Shahdadpur, District Sanghar, from one Easo son of Gul Hassan since deceased for the sum of Rs. 11,996‑4‑0 prior to the execution of the sale‑deed on 8‑3‑1958, the petitioner on 30‑12‑1957, submitted an application under section 5 of the Sind Rual Credit and Land Transfer Act, 1947 (Sind Act No. XLIX of 1947) hereinafter referred to as the said Act, to the Deputy Commissioner, Sanghar, for according the necessary sanction to the said sale and the Deputy Commissioner by his order dated 19‑2‑1958, granted the necessary sanction as prayed for. Thereafter the property was duly conveyed to the petitioner who continued to be in possession thereof. On 18‑3‑1958, the respondent No. 3 Misri Khan son of Mooso Khan preferred an appeal under section 26 of the same Act to the respondent No. 2, Divisional Commissioner, Hyderabad, who by his order of 11‑11‑1958, allowed the appeal and revoked the sanction granted to the petitioner by the Deputy Commissioner, Sanghar, on 19‑2‑1958. The petitioner further alleges in this writ petition that this order in appeal was passed by the respon dent No. 2 without any notice to him and that he only came to know of it when he received a notice from the respondent No. 2 dated 30‑9‑1958, informing him that the appeal of Easo Khan had been fixed for hearing in the office of the Commissioner at Hyderabad on 6‑11‑1958. The vendor of this property Easo Khan then preferred a revision against this order of the Divisional Commissioner, Hyderabad, before the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, but the Board by its order dated 28‑5‑1959, rejected this revision petition. The petitioner then filed a review applica tion against this order of the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, but the same was also rejected on 22‑9‑1960. Hence, the peti tioner filed the present writ petition praying for the quashing of the order of the respondent No. 2 dated 11‑11‑1958, and the two orders of the respondent No. 1 dated 28‑5‑1959 and 22‑9‑1960.

3. Mr. Ramchand, Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner first contended that the respondent No. 3 Misri Khan is not an aggrieved party within the meaning of section 26 of the said Act and therefore he was not entitled to prefer an appeal in this matter against the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Sanghar, dated 19‑2‑1958. In order to dispose of this first contention of the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner, it is only necessary to refer to the language of section 26 of the said Act. This section expressly states that‑ "Any party aggrieved by an order passed by the Collector or other revenue officer in exercise of his powers under this Act may within 60 days from the date of the order present an appeal in writing to the Revenue Commissioner." The words "any party" appear to us to be significant and the use of these words leaves it open to any one who is affected or aggrieved by an order of the Collector or other Revenue Officer in exercise of his power under this Act to prefer an appeal under this section.

4. Besides, it appears from the papers before us that the respondent No. 3 Misri Khan is not an out‑sider but a nephew of the petitioner Pir Bakhsh. Further, not only is the respondent No. 3 a family member of the petitioner's family and closely related to him but it was admitted before us at the Bar that the respondent No. 3 was a party to the proceedings in this matter before the Deputy Commissioner, Sanghar. On these facts, then, the respondent No. 3 is clearly an interested party, concerned in this agricultural land and therefore fully entitled to prefer the appeal that he had made in this matter to the respondent No. 2 the Divisional Commissioner, Hyderabad.

5. It was next argued by the learned Advocate on behalf of the petitioner that the grounds on which the Divisional Commis sioner, Hyderabad, set aside the order of the Deputy Commis sioner, Sanghar are vague and general and therefore the order of the respondent No. 2 should be reversed and set aside. It was also contended that this order was ultra vires and without jurisdiction. We have not been able to discern any illegality or want of jurisdiction in this order of the respondent No. 2 dated 11‑11‑1958. Nor are we, in the exercise of our, extraordinary writ jurisdiction, going to sit in appeal as it were on the facts as found by the Divisional Commissioner, Hyderabad. This very senior official of the Revenue Department had the parties before him when hearing this appeal so that seeing them he was in a position to make his own observations and to reach his own conclusion. There being no want of jurisdiction or other illegality in this order, we are not disposed to disturb the findings of the respondent No. 2, particularly his finding that the vendor Esso Khan (since deceased) was a very old man between 85 and 90 years and, therefore, not in a fit state of mind to take proper and rational decisions.

6. The learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the peti tioner then attacked the order of the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, dated 28‑5‑1959. We find, however, that in this revisional order and in its review order of 22‑9‑1960, the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan has rightly held that the petitioner was unduly hasty in rushing through with the execution of the sale‑deed on 8‑3‑1958, when the necessary sanction under section 5 of the said Act had been obtained by him barely three weeks earlier on 19‑2‑1958. We find ourselves in agreement with the view expressed by the Board of Revenue, West Pakistan that the petitioner was unduly precipitate in this matter and that he would have been well advised to wait for the expiration of the statutory period of 60 days prescribed in section 26 of the said Act for the filing of an appeal instead of rushing through with the execu tion of the sale‑deed within three weeks.

7. For the above reasons, therefore, we found no force in this writ petition and we passed a short order in Court dismissing it with costs. This is the reasoned order for the decision announced by us in this matter in Court today. A. H. Petition dismissed.