1974 PLP 6 (PLC)

4. In the present petition it was contended that since the Supreme Court bad held the transfer of petitioner, to be improper the award as amended by the Supreme Court be interpreted as conferring full back benefits on the petitioner and granting annual increments for the period of forced unemployment.

5. The respondent raised the following preliminary objections :‑ (1) That the judgment dated 19‑10‑70 of the Supreme Court and the decree dated 11‑11‑70 was not an award within the scope of sec tion 2(b) of Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 under which the award was given and section 2(d) of Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1969. (2) That the industrial dispute in question was originally under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in which there was no provision of inter pretation of an award analogous to section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. (3) That this Tribunal had no jurisdiction to interpret the judgment of Supreme Court in question. (4) That the claim of the petitioner was barred by the principles of res judicata. (5) That the petition was liable to be dismissed on account of laches. 6. 1st preliminary objection. Before discussing this direction it will be proper to reproduce relevant sections. Section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, reads as under:-- Interpretation of settlement and award.‑(1) If any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any provisions of an award and settlement, it shall be referred to the Tribunal constituted under this Ordinance. (2). . . . . . . . . .". Section 2(it) of the same Ordinance reads as under:‑-- "Award means the determination of Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any Industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes interim awards."

7. In the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 under which this dispute was filed there is no provision analogous to section 54) of Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969. The award is defined in section 2(b) of the Act of 1947 as follows:‑ "Award means an interim or final determination by an industrial Tribunal of any industrial dispute or of any question relating there to." The award of the Industrial Court was given under the industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1949 wherein section 35 is analogous to section 56 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The wordings of section 35 are the same as in section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Award is defined in section 2(b) of the Ordinance of 1959 as under:‑ "Award means the determination by any Industrial Court of any Industrial Dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes interim award."

8. Thus it will be seen that for the first time the determination of a industrial dispute by the Appellate Tribunal was inserted in the definition of the award given in section 2(ii) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. If the Legislature intended that the determination of an industrial dispute either by the High Court or by the Supreme Court was an award, it would have specifically stated so as it was done in the case of determination of an industrial dispute by the Appellate Tribunal. Since it was not done, the A judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be called an award and as such it' cannot be interpreted by this Tribunal. So far as the modification of the award is concerned it is the decision of the Supreme Court which has to be looked into and if any doubt arises with regard to its interpretation or, the consequences which flow from the modification, it is only the Supreme Court alone which can interpret its modification. In the present case the petitioner had himself moved the Supreme Court for the clarification of the judgment and the decree but later on withdrew that application praying that the petitioner after perusal of the decree was satisfied and claimed no further relief. This also shows that the Supreme Court alone had the power and jurisdiction to clarify its own judgment.

9. The learned Representative of the petitioner, however, contended that the Supreme Court exercising its power under Article 160 of Constitu tion of 1956 had amended the award and therefore the award as amended can be interpreted by this Tribunal under section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In support of his contention he cited the judgments of the Supreme Court in cases "Mohammed Saeed and 4 others v. Election Petitions Tribunal, West Pakistan, and 3 others" (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 91) and "Remington Rand of Pakistan Ltd. v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan and 2 others (P L D 1957 S C (Pak.) 170). In both cases it was held that the award given by the Special Tribunal was liable to correction under Article 160 of the Constitution of 19.16. It is nowhere mentioned that the judgments of the Supreme Court could be interpreted by this Tribunal and therefore these authorities are of no avail to the petitioner.

10. Under Order XL, rule 6 of the Pakistan Supreme Court Rules of 1956 the Supreme Court has inherent power to make orders which arc necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. Therefore the Supreme Court alone can clarify and interpret its cwt judgments and the decrees.

11. In the result I uphold this preliminary objection and dismiss the petition.

12. In view of the above finding it will not be necessary to decide the other preliminary objections.