2003 PLP 1848 (CLC)

6. It is better and appropriate to reproduce the basic facts in chronological order to resolve the controversy between the parties:-- (i) Respondent No.2 reserved the order on 8-9-2001. (ii) Office of respondent No.2 intimated the parties on 11-9-2001 on telephone that the order would be announced on 13-9-2001. (iii) The petitioner's representative visited the office of respondent No.2 on 16-1-2001. (iv) The petitioner came to know that the matter was finally decided by respondent No.2 on 13-9-2001. (v) The petitioner submitted an application for securing the certified copy of the impugned order, dated 30-9-2001 before respondent No.2 on 16-1-2002. (vi) Respondent No.2 supplied the copy of the impugned order to the petitioner on 17-1-2002. (vii) The noting of respondent No.2's office reveals that the announcement of the impugned order was communicated to the petitioner through telephone on 11-9-2001. (viii) The appeal of the appellant was dismissed as time-barren on 30-9-2002. In case, the aforesaid facts are put in juxta position, then it is crystal clear that respondent No.2 intimated the petitioner on 11-9-2001, whereas the order was announced on 13-9-2001. The office noting does not reveal that who has received the telephone message on 11-9-2001 qua announcement of impugned order, dated 13-9-2001 of respondent No.2. This fact clearly shows that the impugned order was not communicated to the petitioner, even otherwise does not fall within the parameter of section 64 of the Cooperative Society Act. The word "communication" means communicated to the petitioner through written letter and not on telephone.

7. It is better and appropriate to reproduce section 64 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 to resolve the controversy between the parties:-- "

64. Appeal.

An appeal against an order or decision of or sanctioned by the Registrar under sections 10, 16, 45, 47, 50, 50-A, 54 subsection (3) of section 54-A may be made by any party aggrieved or affected by the order, or decision to the Provincial Government within 2 months of the date of communication of the order." underline is mine. The word "communicate has defined by this Court in Nawab Begum's case PLD 1974 Lah. 344 in the following terms:-- "I may, however, observe that the word 'communicate' is quite comprehensive. It carries with it the meanings of imparting news or information. It also means intercourse which word would indicate impartation of information etc. on one side and reception and understanding on the other. The burden is on the State to show that grounds were communicated to the detenu. This burden has not been discharged. The detention becomes illegal as held in Ghazi Masud Gil, Government of West Pakistan referred to above. The word `communicate' means to transmit the information or utter, as defined in Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition. The word 'utter' means to put or send into circulation; to publish or put forth; to offer, to utter and publish an instrument' as defined in Blacks' Law Dictionary 6th Edition. The word 'communicate' has also been considered in `Shanti Parsad v. Competent Authority` 1965 Punjab

315. The relevant observation is as follows- "In view of subsection (4) of section 19 and rule 8, it is only when the Competent Authority, on refusal of an application under section 19, furnishes a copy of its order to the applicant that there is communication of its order to the applicant and it is from the' date of such communication of the order of the Competent Authority that 30 days must be reckoned under rule 8, Slum Area (Improvement and Clearance) Rules, (1957), Rule and Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, section 19(4). " In case, the contention of the learned counsel of the respondents be accepted even then the communication through telephone is not proved on record. As mentioned above, the office noting does not reveal that who has received the telephone message. After addition of Article 2A in the Constitution the superior Courts insisted that the cases must be decided on merits instead of technicalities, as per principle laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in Said Muhammad's case PLD 1989 SC

532. It is pertinent to mention here that in the present case, the petitioner has filed the appeal within 2 months from date of knowledge/communication, therefore, the appeal of the petitioner was not time-barred before respondent No.

1. In view of what has been discussed above, the impugned order, dated 30-9-2002 passed by respondent' No. 1 is set aside, meaning thereby the appeal filed by the petitioner shall be deemed to be pending adjudication before respondent No.

1. Parties are directed to appear before respondent No. 1 who is directed to decide the appeal of the petitioner on merits in accordance with law within reasonable time after providing proper hearing to all the concerned. H.B.T./C-222/L Cave remanded.