1992 PLP 54 (PLC)

(b) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)

Art.199

Constitutional jurisdiction

Scope

Concurrent finding of fact recorded by Tribunals below based on evidence on record, could not be interfered with in Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. Ahmad Awais for Petitioner. Irfan Qadir, Addl. A.-G. for Respondents. The facts as stated by the learned counsel are that respondent No.l, Tahir Iqbal was appointed on 31-12-1987 as Conductor on temporary basis for a period of three months by the petitioner. He took the charge of his duties on the same day. However, his services were terminated by the petitioner on 14-4-1988 (Annexure `B'). This order, terminating the services of the respondent was challenged by him by filing a grievance petition before learned Punjab Labour Court No.l on 10-9-1988. The grievance petition of the respondent was accepted by the learned Labour Court on 29-7-1990 and., consequently, he was reinstated in service with back benefits. The petitioner challenged the propriety of the order of the learned Labour Court by filing an appeal before learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal which was heard and dismissed by it on 23-9-1991. It was held by the learned Tribunal that there was no evidence to show that respondent was informed about the temporary nature of his appointment and further that he was appointed only for three months. It was observed that there was no contract at all between the parties that the respondent had been appointed for three months only to do the job. On these premises, the order of the learned Labour Court was affirmed by the learned Appellate forum.

2. Learned counsel contends that it is established that respondent was holding the post on temporary basis and that his services were terminated on 14-4-1988 by competent Authority in that behalf. He argues that the impugned order was valid inasmuch as no law was violated by the petitioner.

3. Mr. Irfan Qadir, learned Additional Advocate-General submits that order of appointment was never conveyed to respondent No.l to show that he had been appointed only for three months. No evidence in this regard was produced by the petitioner. He says that no writ can issue in aid of injustice, Reliance has been placed by the learned Law Officer on Tufail Mohammad v. Raja Muhammad Zia Ullan Khan etc. (PLD 1965 SC 269), Federation of Pakistan and others v. Haji Mohammad Saifullah Khan and others (PLD 1989 SC 166) and Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 236). It is forcefully contended by the learned counsel that respondent No. 1 was relieved of his duty after the termination order was passed against him anti as such he is not entitled to get his back benefits. He argues that he will have no objection to his reinstatement in service provided respondent does not claim back benefits. Last argument is that respondent succeeded on a technical ground and as such he cannot at all claim back benefits. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel upon Qadeer Ahmad v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal (PLD 1990 SC 787).

4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record. I am of the view that both the learned Tribunals have come to a finding; A of fact after discussing the entire evidence on record that order of appointment was never conveyed to respondent and that he had been appointed only for a limited period. Admittedly there was no contract between the parties about the service of the respondent. This being a finding of fact, I do not find any justification to interfere in the matter. It may be added that the nature of duty B of the respondent was such that his appointment under the circumstances was to be made permanent. Drivers and conductors are absolutely necessary for plying the vehicles maintained and owned by the petitioner. Their appointments to do the job as such are also permanent in nature. Even otherwise the facts and circumstances of this case are such that writ cannot issue in a case like this. Respectfully following the precedent cases, referred to earlier, I do not find it a fit case to interfere. The petition is accordingly dismissed in limine. H.B.T./P-159/L Petition dismissed.