1994 PLP 1824 (CLC)

The learned Deputy Attorney‑General has submitted that the points involved in these petitions are covered by an unreported decision in the case of M/s. Klas Shoes (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and others. The points involved in these petitions were considered by a Division Bench of this Court wherein after considering similar arguments and identical points, the learned Judges of the Division Bench held: (1) When a law is promulgated, it comes into force on the day it becomes law but the law can have prospective or retrospective effect; (2) The Constitution does not place any general restraint on the Legislature that laws cannot be given retrospective effect. (3) It was contended that the increase in minimum wages from Rs.100 per month to Rs.1,500 per month for unskilled workers is in the nature of a tax and could not have been levied in the manner done through the Amendment Act of 1993. This contention was repelled. It was held that it is not a case of taxation. It was observed that "it is a case of fixation of a minimum wage and taxation of the minimum wage or increase in the minimum wage for various reasons and specially on account of inflation cannot be equalised with tax". (4) It was argued "that the Amendment Act has not been passed in a Joint Session of the Parliament. According to the counsel, only Parliament in Joint Session can make a law. This contention was repelled. It was observed that there is no provision in the Constitution that Act of Parliament can only be made when the Bills are passed in a Joint Session of the Senate and the National Assembly". (5) It was argued that no person shall be deprived of his property save in accordance with law and, by the Amendment Act, the property of the petitioners has been taken away. This argument was not found favour with the learned Judges of the Division Bench. (6) It was observed that when such increases are made in the wages and salaries of workers, it is not usual that retrospective effect is given when the law is made and this is so as the exercise of determining the factors including inflation parties some time and by the time it is determined as to what should be the increase, the affected parties i.e. workers and labourers have already been affected on account of such factors including inflation. (7) It was contended that the retrospective effect of the Amendment Act will completely and totally ruin the petitioners financially. The learned Judges were not impressed with this argument and they did not find any merit. We are in respectful agreement with the judgment of our learned brothers for the reasons given by them in that decision. We affirm the view taken by this Court. The power of Legislature to pass a law postulates the power to pass it prospectively as well as retrospectively the one no less than the other. Within the scope of its legislative competence and subject to other Constitutional limitations, the power of the Legislature to enact law is plenary. In Mehreen Zaibun Nisa v. Land Commissioner, Multan and others (PLD 1975 SC 397), it was observed at page 433 as under:‑‑ "When a statute contemplates that a state of affairs should be deemed to have existed, it clearly proceeds on the assumption that in fact it did not exist at the relevant time but by a legal fiction we are to assume as if it did exist. The classic statement as to the effect of a deeming clause is to be found in the observations of Lord Asquith in East End Dwelling Company Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council (1952 AC 109) namely: `Where the statute says that you must imagine the state of affairs, it does not say that having done so you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs'." The clear effect of section 1(3) of the‑Act No. IX of 1993 is that by a fiction of law, subsection (3) is deemed to have taken effect from the first day of July; 1992. We, therefore, find no force in the contention of Mr. Shamsuddin 8 Khalid that subsection (3) of section 1 of the Act has not come into effect retrospectively. The fact that section 1(3) has the effect of taking away a vested right and it has come into effect retrospectively is sufficiently borne out by section 1(3) of the Act. In the present case, the Parliament has passed an Act giving it retrospective effect. Nothing has been brought to show that such Act could not be passed by the Parliament or it was not within its competence to enact such law nor that the subsection is in any manner in violation of the Fundamental Rights. We have given our careful consideration to the matter and are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the submissions made by Mr. Shamsuddin C Khalid. We hold that the Amendment Act is not violative of Articles 8 and 24 of the Constitution. We, therefore, respectfully following the above judgment dismiss the petitions in limine. Consequently the applications are also dismissed as having become infructuous. The above are the reasons for our short order dated 25‑8‑1993 passed on conclusion of arguments dismissing the petitions in limine. H.B.T./B‑249/K Petitions dismissed.