1988 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

The relevant facts for the disposal of these two appeals are that the appellants while posted in District Police Lines, Sheikhupura where they were detailed for escort duty in the judicial guard on 16-9-1982. It is alleged that while escorting a dangerous convict namely Irshad alias Shadoo son of Rashid Ahmad No Village Kawanwali PS Mananwala, who was under going life imprisonment in a murder case escaped while the appellants were on duty. The appellants were served with a show-cause notice dated 18-9-1982. The appellants proceeded to submit their reply to the respective show-cause notices served upon them.

2. The respondent No.l after hearing the appellants and going through the allegations against them decided to discharge them from service under Police Rule 12.21.

3. The appellants feeling aggrieved by the order of discharge filed representations before the respondent No.2, who maintained the order of the respondent No.1 and rejected the representations of the appellants vide order dated 14-5-1983 annexure 'E' with the appeals.

4. The appellants feeling not satisfied with the orders of respondents Nos. 1 and 2 filed further representations before the respondent No.4, who vide order dated 4-6-1986 dismissed their petitions. The appellants have now filed these appeals under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act 1974. Since the facts and law points involved were not only identical but exactly the same, therefore, the learned counsel for the appellant argued appeal No.504/909 of 1986 and submitted that the same remarks apply to other appeal.

5. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned District Attorney and perused the record. It is evident from the record that a case under sections 332/353, 307/186, 224/225, 148/149-506, P.P.C. was registered in respect of the escape of Irshad alias Shadoo on 16-9-1982 with Police Station Civil Lines, Sheikhupura. It was alleged that the appellants were waylaid by un-known persons, who at pistol and dagger points got opened the handcuff of accused Irshad and made their escape good. The F.I.R. has been attached as annexure 'D' with the appeals.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant, in the first instance, submitted that the accusations against the appellants as contained in the show-cause notice served on them are quite contradictory to the case of the Police as contained in the F.I.R. annexure 'D' recorded in respect of the same occurrence. On the other hand the learned District Attorney has submitted that F.I.R. seems to have been recorded in order to help the appellants, therefore, the same cannot be considered.

7. I have considered the arguments from both sides and gone through the record. I find that the appellants have been accused in i the show-cause notice of letting loose prisoner Irshad for ulterior motive while in the F.I.R. the version is that some un known persons secured the release of the convict on pistol and dagger points. Both the versions cannot stand together and it is not possible for me to find out which of the two versions is correct and which is concocted story. The other submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that although the respondent No.l proceeded to discharge the appellants under Police Rules 12.21 but it is in fact and effect dismissal from service if the first portion of the order of the respondent No. 1 is also taken into consideration. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that since it was a case of misconduct as is clear from pars. I of the order of respondent No.l, therefore, a formal enquiry was necessary in this behalf. It is further submitted that enquiry was must as there were two contradictory versions about the same incident in the field. He has placed reliance on P L D 1974 SC 393, 1970 S C M R 190 and 1986 S C M R 1264. In the last it is submitted that it is clear from the text of the order that it is a case of dismissal from service and not discharge as stated by the respondent No.l. On the other hand, the learned District Attorney has submitted that first part of the order should be ignored and the second part is clear that order is not punishment but only a discharge as provided under Police Rule 12.21.

8. I have given my anxious considerations to the arguments of both sides. The order has to be read as a whole and cannot be split It up into portions to ascertain the spirit of the same. It is cleat, that the respondent No.l after discussing the allegations proceeded to propose the punishment, therefore, to say that it is a case of simple discharge from service under Police Rule 12.21 as permissible under the rule is not justified. It is not permissible under the law to pick up the portions of the document and read the same in isolation, The document has to be read as a whole to find the cumulative effect. When this principle is applied then no doubt is left in my mind that it was a case of dismissal from service and the word discharge has been used only as a clog. Therefore, the order of respondent No. 1 is bad in law. The orders of respondents Nos.2 and 4, also fall with the same. I hold that reference to Police Rule 21.21 is not correct in fact it was simple case of dismissal from the service. It is for the respondents to find out as to which story is concocted and what was the motive. It is necessary in order to avoid repetition of such a situation in future.

9. The upshot of the discussion is that I allow the appeal and set aside the orders dated 23-9-1982, 14-5-1984 and 4-6-1986 and the appellants are deemed to be in service throughout and the period from 23-9-1982 be treated as leave of the kind due. There will be no order as to costs. Judgment be communicated to the parties. M.Y.H. /166/Sr.P Appeal allowed