P L D 1980 Lahore 125 (PLP)

This second appeal has been filed by one Muhammad Zabir Khan to challenge an order of ejectment made against him by a Rent Controller which has also been affirmed by an Additional District Judge while dismissing his first appeal against that order.

2. The solitary ground on which the order of eviction has been passed against the appellant is that- the house in dispute is needed by the respondent, Shah Muhammad for his granddaughter and grandson as they want to pursue their studies in Gojra, District Faisalabad, where the disputed house is situated. According to the respondent, they are presently living in a village. The plea raised-by him, has found favour with both the tribunals below.?????????????

3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that according to paragraph (a) of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (3) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, a landlord can apply for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of a residential building if he requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children but since the landlord in the instant case wanted the disputed house for his grandchildren the appellant could not be obliged to make room for them.

4. In reply, the learned counsel for the respondent maintained that the respondent intended to live in the house in dispute along with his grandchildren and, thus, he needed the house for his own occupation. It was also urged by him that the word "children" used in paragraph (a) of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance included grandchildren as well.

5. As for the plea raised by the learned counsel for the respondent that respondent would personally live in the house in dispute along with his grandchildren it is not supported by the statement made by the respondent, Shah Muhammad, as A. W. 5 inasmuch as he did not say that he will live himself in the disputed house together with his grand children. As against this, it was deposed by the appellant while appearing as R. W. 3, that the respondent would not personally live in the house in question. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the respondent needed the house in question for his own occupation.

6. Now, I advert to the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the grand children were included in the term "children" employed in paragraph (a) of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance. He did not cite any authority for the proposition put forth by him except the Shorter Oxford Dictionary (Third Edn., page 301) according to which the term "child" includes the descendant also. I am afraid the meaning of the word "child" as given in the said dictionary cannot be adopted for the purpose of interpreting the aforesaid provisions of the Ordinance.

7. With a view to spelling out the different meanings which can be given to the word "child" I would like to refer to the following observations made by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Shaikh Ahmad Shaikh Mahomed Ashraf v. Bai Fatima (1) while interpreting the word "child" occurring in section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ; "The word `child' according to its use in the English language has different meanings, according to the context. If used without reference to parentage, it is generally synonymous with the word `infant', and means a person who has not attained the age of majority. Sometimes it may be used in a context which shows that it refers to quite young children, for instance, a notice that children are not admitted to this enclosure would hardly be held to apply to_ young persons of eighteen to twenty; it would mean children who are too young to look after themselves. Where the: word `child' is used with a reference to parentage, it means a descendant of the first degree, a son or a daughter, and has no reference to age. In certain contexts it may include descendants of more remote degree, and be equivalent to `issue'." (1) A I R 1943 Bom. 48 The view expressed by their Lordships constituting the Division Bench was that in section 488 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the word "child" was used with reference to parentage and, therefore, it meant the son or daughter of any age. This view was followed in Mst. Sughran and others v. Mian Muhammad Din (1). It has also been stated in Stroud's Judicial Dictionary on Words and Phrases (3rd Edn., page 471) that; "The word child or children primarily means issue in the first generation only-sons and daughters-to the exclusion of grandchildren or other remoter descendants . . . . . In Australia the phrase `child of the settlor' was held to exclude descendants beyond the first generation." According to Black's Law Dictionary 4th Edn., page 303 also the term "children" ordinarily means children in first degree.

8. As regards the term "child" used in paragraph (a) of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance it has also been used with reference to parentage. Therefore, it means the sons and daughters of the landlord. There is nothing in the context to suggest t that the said term was intended to apply to the entire progeny of the landlord. It seems that while enacting the above paragraph the framer of the Ordinance desired a tenant to make room for the landlord himself or the first generation of his off springs, namely; his sons and daughters, because it is his responsibility to cater for their needs. As for his grandchildren or other descendants beyond the first generation it is the headache of their respective parents to take care of their needs. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the grandchildren of a landlord can also be treated as his children for the purpose of paragraph.(a) of sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of subsection (3) of section 13 of the Ordinance.

9. Since the two tribunals below ordered the ejectment of the appellant on the ground that the house in. dispute was needed by the respondent for his grandchildren and this ground is not recognised by law for directing a tenant to vacate the premises let out to him, the order of eviction made against the appellant cannot be maintained. 1, therefore, accept the appeal with costs, set aside the order of the, two tribunals below and dismiss the respondent's application for eviction of the appellant., M. A. K.????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal accepted. (1) P L D 1957 Lah. 441 slut.