P L D 1996 Lahore 232 (PLP)

This petition under section 115 of Code of Civil Procedure seeks revision of the order dated 18‑2‑1991 of the Additional District Judge, Mianwali accepting the appeal of the respondent against the order dated 11‑12‑1990 of Civil Judge Ist Class, Mianwali rejecting the plaint.

2. The dispute arises out of a suit for declaration filed by the respondent to the effect that he was entitled to be appointed as Lambardar for Chak No.27/D.B., Tehsil and District, Mianwali and the order of Assistant Commissioner dated 1‑12‑1984 which was maintained in appeal by the Commissioner on 18‑3‑1985 and on revision by the Board of Revenue on 15‑7‑1985 appointing the petitioner as Lambardar in the village were illegal, void and without jurisdiction. A mandatory injunction was also sought against respondents Nos.2 and 3 directing them to appoint respondent No. I as Lambardar in place of the petitioner.

3. The main ground of attack on the petitioner was that he was appointed as Lambardar without any notice to respondent No.1 who was also one of the applicants.

4. On 11‑12‑1990 the plaint was ‑rejected by the trial Court under Order VII, Rule I I of Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the suit of the petitioner on the face of it was not maintainable as the question of appointment was within the exclusive discretion of the Revenue Authorities and as such the plaint did not disclose any cause of action.

5. On appeal the order rejecting the plaint ' was set aside by the Additional District Judge who was of the view that as the issues already stood framed in the case the trial Court should not have rejected the plaint and if the impugned orders of the appointment of the petitioner had been passed without hearing respondent No. ‑1 they were void and could be set aside in the suit.

6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at length I am clearly of the view that the impugned order of the Additional District Judge is not sustainable. A suit for declaration lies under section 42 of Specific Relief Act and can only be filed by a person who claims any legal character or right in any property while a suit for injunction is competent under section 54 of the Specific Relief Act, if a legal obligation subsists in favour of the plaintiff. Appointment to the office of Lambardar is purely administrative in nature and exclusively falls within the domain of the Revenue Officers. No one can claim'a vested right to be appointed as a Lambardar. Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were under no obligation to appoint respondent No. I as a Lambardar. Consequently the suit neither lay under section 42 of the Specific Relief Act nor under section 54 thereof and as such the trial Court was correct in rejecting the plaint, which did not disclose any cause of action. I

7. In Abdul Wahid v. Member, Board of Revenue, Punjab 1971 SCMR 719 it was observed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that no one has any vested right to be appointed as Lambardar which is a post purely administrative in nature. The same view was reiterated in Abdul Ghafoor v. The Member (Revenue), Board of Revenue 1982 SCMR ' 202 by the Supreme Court. Reference may also be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Ch. Ghulam Ullah v. Board of Revenue, West Pakistan, Lahore 1984 CLC 2973 and Subedar (Rtd.) Muhammad Ali v. Muhammad Anwar and others 1985 CLC 668. 8 1 am not unaware that in certain cases Constitutional petitions against the orders of Revenue Officers in Lambardari matters have been entertained but the right sufficient for maintaining Constitutional petitioners different from right which the plaintiff must possess for filing a suit for declaration or injunction. While in the former case if the petitioner shows that he has been deprived of some advantage or benefit illegally, he can maintain a Constitutional petition, for filing a suit the plaintiff must have a legal right or character in the strict sense. It cannot be argued seriously that the present dispute relates to any right in property or legal character or that there is an obligation imposed by any law upon the respondents to appoint the petitioner as a Lambardar, moreso when in the present case the petitioner was not claiming appointment on hereditary basis.

9. In view of what has been stated above, this petition is allowed, the impugned order of the Additional District Judge is set aside and that of the trial Court rejecting the plaint of respondent No. I stands restored. No order as to costs H.B.T./M‑2669/1 Petition allowed