1994 PLP 344 (SCMR)

Nemo for Respondents. Date of hearing: 20th October, 1993. AJMAL MIAN, J.‑‑‑This is a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment dated 1‑3‑1993 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh in Appeal No.14 of 1980 (Kar.) (New Appeal No.7 of 1993 (Hyd.) filed by the present petitioners against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Tharparkar at Mirpurkhas, passed in Land Acquisition Suit No.6 of 1975, whereby he allowed Rs.1,39,327.57 in excess of the award made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, hereinafter referred to as the Act, dismissing the same on the ground of limitation and also for the reason that 15% compulsory acquisition charges were awarded with the consent of the learned counsel for the petitioners.

2. The brief facts are that 22 acres and 32 Ghuntas of agricultural land out of 60 acres of agricultural land situated in Deh 108 at Mirpurkhas Road owned by the respondents was acquired under the Act for petitioner No.2. Petitioner No.l, acting as the Land Acquisition Officer under the Act, awarded compensation to the extent of Rs.98,147.03, the break‑up of which was as follows:‑‑ "(a) Agricultural land per acre Rs.3,500 (b) Trees Rs.380 (c) Katcha but Rs.330 In addition to the above, respondents were allowed interest at the rate of 6% from the date of possession.

3. Since the respondents were not satisfied with the above amount of compensation, they filed reference under section 18 of the Act before the learned District Judge, Tharparkar at Mirpurkhas, which was registered as a suit. The respondents. claimed compensation at the rate of Rs.20,000 per acre. They further claimed Rs.1,920 for the trees, Rs.10;000 for the house and Rs.4,612 for the standing wheat crop.

4. The learned District Judge, after recording the evidence, increased the amount of compensation from Rs.3,500 per acre to Rs.7,000 per acre, for the trees from Rs.380 to Rs.1,000 and for the hut, from Rs.330 to Rs.1,

000. He also allowed a sum of Rs.2,000 as compensation for the standing crop by his judgment/decree dated 1‑10‑1979. It appears that upon respondents' application under section 151, C.P.C. dated 12‑11‑1979, the respondents were allowed 15% statutory compensation with the consent of the petitioners by order dated 5‑12‑1979. Against the above judgment/decree, the petitioners filed above appeal, which was disposed of through the impugned judgment by a Division Bench of the High Court of Sindh. The petitioners have, therefore, filed the above petition for leave to appeal.

5. In support of the above petition, Ch. Ijaz Ahmad, learned Deputy Attorney‑General appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently contended that since the judgment/decree dated 1‑10‑1979 was modified by the order dated 5‑12‑1979, whereby statutory compensation at the rate of 15% was awarded by the learned District Judge, limitation period for the purpose of the above appeal by the High Court should have been computed from the above subsequent date, namely, 5‑12‑1979 for the reason that the original judgment/decree stood merged in the above order.

6. The above contention seems to be devoid of any force. The judgment/decree as to the amount of compensation was passed on 1‑10‑1979 and, therefore, the period of limitation for the purpose of appeal was to be computed from the above date. The above consent order dated 5‑12‑1979 awarding 15% statutory compensation to the respondents passed by the learned District Judge would not have stopped the running of the above limitation, as no appeal could have been filed by the petitioners against the above consent order. In this view of the matter, no exception can be taken to the High Court's conclusion that the appeal was time‑barred against the judgment/decree dated 1‑10‑1979 and no appeal could have been filed against the above consent order dated 5‑12‑1979.

7. Then it was urged by Ch. Ijaz Ahmad that under Article 187 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, this Court has been empowered to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any matter and that the case in hand is a fit case, in which the above provision of the Constitution should be pressed into service by this Court.

8. We are unable to subscribe to the above submission as we do not feel that the impugned judgment is unjust or unfair. A perusal of the judgment of the learned District Judge indicates that he has assessed the amount of compensation inter alia on documentary evidence. Leave is, accordingly, refused. A.A./L‑63/S Leave refused.