P (PLP)
AHMAD and others‑Petitioners Versus CROWN Respondent
| Citation | P (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Muhammad Sharif and M. R. Kayani, JJ. |
| Parties | AHMAD and others‑Petitioners Versus CROWN Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Muhammad Sharif and M. R. Kayani, JJ..
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Cite this legal precedent as: P (PLP) (AHMAD and others‑Petitioners Versus CROWN Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- S. Mohsin Shah, for Petitioners.
Headnotes / Summary
This case was referred by Mr. Muhammad Munir, Chief Justice, on the 30th March 1950, to the Division Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Muhammad Sharif and Mr. Justice M. R. Kayani. Petition under section 498/439, Criminal Procedure Code, praying that the order of Sessions judge, Montgomery, dated the 16th March 1950, be set aside and the petitioners be released on bail. Criminal Procedure Code (V of 1898), Ss. 497 (5), 498, 439 and 561‑A‑Concellation of bail‑Whether Sessions judge could cancel bail granted by him under section 498‑‑Powers of High Court. Per Muhammad Sharif, J.‑‑The powers to grant bail by the High Court or Court of Session under section 498, .Criminal Procedure Code, are very wide. These may be exercised at any stage in a pending case, uncontrolled by any of the limitations mentioned in section
497. There is, however, under this section no corresponding power to cancel bail. Whenever, therefore, bail is granted by the Sessions judge under section 498, he cannot countermand his own order, and the High Court, as a Court of revision, alone shall have the power to do it. Similarly, where the bail was granted by the High Court; it has no power to cancel it under section 498, and resort must be had to its inherent powers under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code. The Legislature has intentionally placed difficulties in the way of the cancellation of bail where it was once granted. This, however, might sometimes lead to a curious position. A Magistrate holding the inquiry or trial might at a subsequent stage of the inquiry or trial withdraw his own order of bail, but the Sessions judge who in the course of the inquiry or trial in the lower Court, might have allowed bail under the influence of the consideration relevant under section 497, Criminal Pro cedure Code, would have no such powers. His action was under section 498 which knows of no cancellation of bail. This apparent anomaly is for the benefit of the accused. Per Kayani, J.‑As a Court, that can release a person on bail under section 497, the Court of Session has power only after the committal of the accused, but not before. If the release by the Court of Session took place before com mittal, it must have been under the' wide powers conferred by section 498, but that section does not provide for the cancellation of bail, and as subsection (5) of section 497 clearly provides for the re‑arrest of a person "released under this section," it is reasonable to assume that section 498 was not intended to give any power of re‑arrest. Except where a power is inherent in a Court (as in the High Court) it cannot be argued that if a Court has power to do a thing, the power to undo is implied in it. There is no provision analogous to that o section 21 of the General Clauses Act of 1897‑which says that the power to issue a notification, order, rule or bye‑law includes a power, to rescind or modify it‑by which a Court is empowered to cancel its own order. Ch. Muhammad Sharif, Assistant to Advocate‑General,' for Crown.
Judgment & Decree
KAYANI, J.
‑The view that we have taken of the scope of section 497 vis-a‑vis the Sessions Judge is primarily bossed on the words "appears or is brought before a Court" occurring in subsection (1), and as subsection (2), (3) and (4) refer only to "such" Court or the Court acting under subsection (1), the question to be determined is: Which is the Court before which the person accused appears or is brought ? A person accused, of an offence would be said to appear before the Court either if he has already been bailed out or if the object of his appearance is to seek bail before he is actually arrested. In the Court of a Magistrate in a non‑bailable case, the first appearance would clearly be to seek bail, for if he has already been bailed out, the question of bail would not arise. Such person is "brought before a Court" by another agency the police‑either to obtain a remand, or, if the investigation is complete, to answer the charge. At first sight, therefore, the Court in which an accused person appears or to which he is brought would be the Court competent to take cognizance of the offence; in other words, the Court of a Magistrate, not that of the Sessions Judge, for the Sessions judge does not take cognizance of the case a until it is committed to his Court. From the stage of committal, however, the Court of Session would also be the Court before which the accused appears or is brought, and the Sessions Judge would thereafter have power the grant bail under the first four subsections of section 497 or, under subsection (5), to cancel bail granted by himself. Originally I was doubtful whether an accused person committed to the Court of Session could‑be properly‑said to appear or be brought before that Court, but a reference to section 271 showed that NN hen the of Session is ready to commence the trial, the accused r or be brought before it, and the charge 0iall be in Court and explained to him. AS a Court, therefore, that can release a person on bail under section 497, the Court of Session has power only after the committal of the accused, but ‑not before. If the release by the Court of Session took place before committal, it must have been under the wide powers conferred by section ‑193, but that section does not provide for the cancellation of bail, and as subsection (5) of section 497 clearly provides for the re arrest of a person "released under this section", it is reasonable to assume that section 498 was not intended to give any power of re‑arrest. Except where a power is inherent in a Court (as in the High Court), it cannot be argued that if a Court has power to do a thing, the power to undo is implied in it. There is no provision analogous to that of section 29 of the General Clauses Act, of 1897‑which says that the power to issue a notification, order, rule or bye‑law includes a power to rescind. or modify it‑by, which a Court is empowered to cancel its own order. Announced. A. H Reference answered