2017 P Cr (PLP)

ISHTIAQ IBRAHIM, J.

State through Advocate General, Khyber Pakhatunkhwa, Peshawar has preferred the instant appeal under section 417, Cr.P.C., assailing the judgment dated 14.11.2015, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-III, Kohat whereby the respondents Saqlain, Muhammad Saeed, Akram Shah involved in case FIR No.118 dated 04.10.2013 under sections 324/34, P.P.C., P.S. City Kohat, were acquitted from the charges levelled against them.

2. According to prosecution case, accused/respondents were charged by complainant for firing at him as well as PW. Muhammad Safdar as a result of which he sustained injury on his left foot whereas PW. Muhammad Safdar escaped unhurt. Consequently, a case vide FIR mentioned above was registered against the accused/respondents.

3. After completion of investigation, complete challan against respondents submitted before the learned trial Court, where after framing of formal charge against them, the prosecution in order to prove its case against respondents produced Nine (9) PWs. After recording statement of accused under section 342, Cr.P.C., hearing arguments of learned counsel for the parties and State counsel, the learned trial Court acquitted the accused/respondents from the charges levelled against them vide impugned judgment, hence the instant appeal has been preferred by the State through Advocate General, KPK, Peshawar.

4. Arguments of learned AAG on behalf of appellant heard and record perused.

5. Though respondents were directly nominated by the complainant for effective firing at him and ineffective firing at Muhammad Safdar (PW.6) but no specific role of firing has been attributed to any of the accused as to with whose fire shots, complainant sustained solitary graze wound. It is apparent from the contents of FIR that all the three accused made indiscriminate firing at the complainant party followed by Court statement of complainant PW.5, that 7/8 shots were fired by all the three respondents. No bullet marks on the surrounding walls adjacent to the spot was found during spot inspection. Neither empty nor blood has been recovered during spot inspection which creates doubt in the prosecution case. Besides, a criminal complaint prior to the present occurrence has also been filed by the present respondents against complainant party which is still pending as per cross-examination of PW.5, so the possibility of false involvement of respondents in the instant case by complainant in order to compel them for compromise, cannot be ruled out, which creates doubt in a prudent mind regarding false involvement of respondents in the present case.

6. It is settled law that the prosecution is duty bound to prove its case beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt against an accused person and it is also settled that multiple doubts in the prosecution case are not required to record judgment of acquittal but a single reasonable doubt is sufficient to extend benefit of the same to the accused as a matter of right. In this regard, reliance is placed on the esteemed judgment passed in case titled "Mst. Shamshad v. The State" reported as 1998 SCMR 854, case titled "Waqar Ahmed v. Shaukat Ali and others" reported as 2006 SCMR 1139, case titled "Akhtar Ali and others v. The State" reported as 2008 SCMR 6 and case titled "Sher Bahadur and another v. The State" reported as 1972 SCMR 651.

7. Apart from above, it is well-settled by now that there are certain limitations on the power of the Appellate Court to convert acquittal into a conviction and would not interfere with acquittal merely because on reappraisal of the evidence, it comes to the conclusion different from that of the court acquitting the accused, provided that the conclusions are reasonably possible. If, however, the conclusion reached by that court was such that no reasonable person would conceivably reach the same and was impossible then this court would interfere in exceptional cases on overwhelming proof resulting in conclusive and irresistible conclusion; and that too with a view only to avoid grave miscarriage of justice and for no other purpose. The important test visualized in these cases, in this behalf was that the finding sought to be interfered with, after scrutiny under the forgoing searching light, should be found wholly as artificial, shocking and ridiculous. The view taken by the apex Court in Ghulam Sikandar v. Mamaraz Khan (PLD 1985 SC 11) is well-known that "in an appeal against acquittal this Court would not, on principle, ordinarily interfere and instead would give due weight and consideration to the findings of Court acquitting the accused. This approach is slightly different from that in an appeal against conviction when leave is granted only for the reappraisement of evidence which then is undertaken so as to see that benefit of every reasonable doubt should be extended to the accused. This difference of approach is mainly conditioned by the fact that the acquittal carries with it the two well accepted presumptions; one initial, that, till found guilty, the accused is innocent; and two that again after the trial a Court below confirmed the assumption of innocence. This will not carry the second presumption and will also thus lose the first one if on points having conclusive effect on the end result the Court below; (a) disregarded; (b) misread such evidence; (c) received such evidence illegally".

8. In view of what has been discussed above, this Court is of the firm opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case against appellant beyond any shadow of doubt therefore, find no illegality in the impugned judgment of acquittal, which is based on proper appreciation of the evidence on record. Consequently, the present appeal being devoid of merit is dismissed in limine. JK/332/P Appeal dismissed.