1992 PLP 1225 (MLD)

This F.R.A. is directed against the order of VIIIth‑Senior Civil Judge. & Rent Controller, South Karachi, dated 30‑5‑1991, whereby he directed that the appellant be ejected from the shop in question and the respondent be put in its vacant peaceful possession within a period of two months.

2. The respondent filed. an application under section 15 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 against the appellant. He claims to be the owner and landlord of the shop situated on Property scaring No.77, Nawabad, Lyari Quarters, Karachi, which he had purchased by a registered sale‑deed dated 17‑1‑19911. The appellant was already tenant in respect of the shop on the. ground floor of the said building. The respondent served notice in respect of the transfer of the building, upon the appellant, who acknowledged the same on 27‑2‑1990 and executed Rant Note in favour of the respondent at the rate of Rs.500 per month. He started paying the rent to the respondent and paid the same upto June, 1990. It was the case of the respondent that he was retired employee and was in need of a shop to start his own business for maintenance of his children and other family members. He, therefore, requested the appellant to vacate the premises and on his failure to do so filed the ejectment application.

3. The appellant resisted the ejectment application by filing written statement. He admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant, the service of notice and the rate of rent. He, however, denied that the respondent required the premises for his bona fide personal use. According to him the respondent was a rich person and had already a number of buildings and shops and had tiled the ejectment application only to relet the premises on higher rent.

4. The learned Controller took up the issue as to requirement of the premises for bona fide personal use of the respondent and after taking into consideration the affidavits filed by the respondent and the appellant and their respective cross‑examination, came to the conclusion that the need of the respondent was bona fide and therefore, ordered his ejectment as mentioned above.

5. I have heard Mr. Sultan A. Allana; learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. K.B. Bhutto, learned counsel for the respondent.

6. Mr. Sultan A. Allana has contended that the judgment of the learned Controller was based on incorrect statements and misappreciation of evidence. He pointed out that at page 5 of the judgment, while reproducing the evidence of the respondent, he has narrated that the respondent had stated that it was incorrect that his son Zaffar was employee of K.E.S.C. and in fact the evidence record showed that he had stated that it was correct that his son Zaffar was an employee of K.E.S.C. Similarly on page 6 the appellant was shown to have admitted in the cross‑examination that the respondent needed the premises for his personal bona fide use in good faith, whereas he had not admitted that the premises were needed by the respondent for personal bona fide use. Mr. K.B.' Bhutto, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that these mistakes in the judgment were in fact typographical mistakes and‑did not affect the merits of the case at all. The explanation given by Mr. K.B. Bhutto appears to be plausible.

7. The second mistake referred to by Mr. Sultan A. Allana is such that when the sentence is read as a whole it would make it quite clear that the word `not' is omitted by the typist between the words `has' and `admitted', otherwise the next portion of the sentence `but he wants to eject the opponents in order to relet out the premises on higher rates of rent' becomes meaningless and out of context. .

8. Mr. Sultan A. Allana then contended that the respondent has examined himself alone and has not led sufficient evidence to satisfy the Court that the shop in question was bona fide required by him for personal use. In this connection he relied upon the case of dyed Muhammad Ali v. Mst: Aisha (1984 CLC 2332), where it was held that the `mere statement of landlord that he required premises for his use, was not sufficient to establish his requirement when he failed to produce an iota of evidence to substantiate said ground'. He also relied upon the case of Mst. Anwar Jehan v. Ismail Khan (1984 CLC 2849) where it was held that `where the present accommodation in occupation of landlord was sufficient to accommodate his requirement, the finding of the Rent Controller on the ground of personal requirement was reversed. He then' cited the case `Province of Sindh v. Nisar Ahmed (1983 CLC 1905) where the landlord suppressed material fact that his sons had two separate shops in their possession and the evidence produced by him was not inspiring confidence finding of the Rent Controller was, therefore, reversed. He also cited the cases of Muhammad Naseem v. Azmat Khan (1982 SCMR 1132) and Ahmed Saeed v. Karamat Ali Khan (1989 CLC 1009).

9. The above rulings cited by the learned counsel for the appellant do not help him. The case of, Syed Muhammad Ali v. Mst. Aisha (supra) is distinguishable from the appellant's case, because the evidence produced by the landlord was not considered to be sufficient. The case of Mst. Anwar Jehan v. Ismail Khan (supra) is also distinguishable from the present case on the ground that the Court came to the conclusion that the present accommodation in occupation of the landlord was sufficient to meet his requirement, while in the present case there is nothing to show that the respondent has got any shop in his possession in which he can carry on his business. The case of Province of Sindh v. Nisar Ahmed (supra) is also distinguishable from the present case,' because in that case the landlord had suppressed material fact and his evidence was found to be not inspiring confidence. The case of Muhammad Naseem v. Azmat Khan (supra) on the contrary goes against the appellant, because it has been held that eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal bona fide use can be refused only when the landlord was found in possession of building suitable for his need in the same urban area as of the demised property. Having, found that the finding of the High Court and the order of the ejectment of tenant was neither erroneous and was neither suffering from any infirmity, it was held that no ground was made for interference with such order. The case of Ahmed Saeed v. Karamat Ali Khan (supra) is also distinguishable from the present case as in that case ejectment was refused because independent and reliable evidence was not produced to prove the bona fide requirement.

10. By now the settled law is that the statement of landlord on oath that he requires the premises for his bona fide personal use is sufficient to pass an order of eviction when the landlord has withstood the test of cross‑examination satisfactorily. Reliance in this connection was placed in PLD 1976 Kar. 832/835 (Hassan Khan v. Munawwar Begum) where it was held that `assertion or claim on oath by landlord that he required premises for his personal use which was found to be consistent with his averments in his application and not shaken in cross‑examination or disproved in rebuttal, was considered to be sufficient. In 1980 SCMR 593 (Toheed Khanum v. Muhammad Shamshad) the Supreme. Court went to the extent of accepting the appeal of the landlord and directing the ejectment of the tenant setting aside the judgment of the High Court and the Controller when it found that the requirement of the landlord on proper assessment of evidence was genuine and the finding of the lower Court was based on certain considerations which did not prove improper motive on the part of the landlord. It was observed that the lower Court failed to give effect to subsection (4) of section ‑13 of the then West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance providing safeguard to tenants in case of landlord's failure to occupy shop for business as required. Finally reliance was placed in 1986 SCMR 1207 (Muhammad Siddik v. Muhammad Shoaib) where the High Court had accepted testimony of landlord in regard to his need being bona fide, plea that solitary statement of landlord was not enough to establish his bona fide need of the shop for his own occupation was repelled in writ jurisdiction. It was observed by the Supreme Court that law does not require any particular number of witnesses to prove a fact. It is the quality of evidence that determines its acceptance and not its quantity.

11. Finally Mr. Sultan A. Allana has placed reliance in the case of Shahnaz Begum v. Ikhlas Ahmed reported in 1990 CLC 904, where it was held that when a tenant has obtained a shop on Pugree, the landlord had to repay the said amount when asking for his eviction. This ruling also does not help the appellant, because he has not proved by satisfactory evidence that he had paid any Pugree. The Controller has held this allegation to be incorrect and I do not find any reason to disagree with the finding of the Controller on this point. The honourable Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Yousuf v. Distt. Judge, Rawalpindi (1987 SCMR 307) has held that the plea that landlord had received an amount as Pugree at the time of letting out the shop to the tenant does not debar him from seeking ejectment on the ground of bona fide personal use. I am, therefore, satisfied that there is no justification for interfering with the finding of the learned Controller. Hence I uphold the same and dismiss the appeal. However, in the special circumstances of this case I direct that the appellant shall vacate the premises within a period of six months. This will, however, be subject to the payment of rent by the appellant regularly before 10th of every succeeding month. AA./M‑1585/K Appeal dismissed.