1976 PLP 562 (PLC)

Date of hearing: 4th June 1976. These are separate appeals against the decision 1-4-1976 of Punjab Labour Court, No. 1, Lahore, given under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

2. Murad Khan, Mohammad Siddique, Mohammad Aslam, Chiragh Din, Murid Hussain, Wazir Ali and Abdul Jabbar, appellants were employees of Qaddafi Stadium, Lahore. Their services were terminated on 17-3-1975. They challenged the orders of termination of their services by separate petitions before the learned Labour Court, which dismissed the same vide the decision under appeal.

3. Aggrieved by the above decisions, the appellants have filed separate appeals. Since the point involved in all these appeals is the same, they will be disposed of together by one order,

4. Before the learned Labour Court, the respondent had taken preliminary objection that since the Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan was not an industry within the meaning of section 2 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the appellants had no locus stands to file the petitions. The learned Labour Court overruled this objection. The respondent had also taken another objection before the learned Labour Court that the petitions were not competent as the respondent Board was neither a commercial nor an industrial establishment within the meaning of industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968. This objection was upheld. In appeal the learned counsel for the respondent again reiterated the preliminary objection that the respondent Board was not an industry within the meaning of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. He relied on the judgment of the High Court in the Writ Petition No. 1210 of 1973 entitled Mr. K. G. Old Principal v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court etc. (P L D 1976 Lab. 1097) wherein it was observed :- "A review of the Australian and Indian cases makes it clear that in the sphere of Industrial and Labour Laws the terms Business, Trade and Manufacture were without exception given not their plain dictionary meaning but their popular and conventional meaning. Their retention in the definition would clearly suggest that it war not intended key the Legislature to either enlarge their meaning or to further limit it. The expressions, calling, Service, Employment or Occupation have also never been understood or interpreted in their plain dictionary meaning. Instead they have been held to be controlled by and taking their colour from opening words, Business, Trade and Manufacture. The upshot of the entire discussion is that the use of the expressions 'Business, Trade, Manufacture, Calling, Service, Employment or Occupation' in the definition of Industry in Industrial Relations Ordi nance, 1969, is not in its ordinary dictionary meaning but in its popular and conventional meaning In the context of Industrial and Labour Laws, these expressions apply to any enterprise which is organized and is systematic depending substantially; if not entirely on the co-operation between Labour and Capitals and having as its object production, distribution and consumption of wealth, or the production or provision of material service. The enterprise as a whole has to be looked at to find out its raison de'etre and any part of it which is incidental, ancil lary or an adjunct cannot determine the character of the whole." The learned Judge of the High Court had relied on the judgment in the case Cricket Club of India (1969) 1 L L J 775) where a cricket club employing 397 persons, owning and managing immovable property of the value of 67 lakhs running canteen and refreshment rooms, arranging big parties, charging fee for admission to matches in stadium owned by it was held to be not falling in the definition of industry for the following reasons- "It is, in fact, an activity in the course of promotion of the game of cricket and it is incidental that the club is able to make an income on these few occasions which income is later utilized for the purposes or fulfilling its other objects as incorporated in the memorandum of association. The club for the purpose of promoting the game of cricket primarily organizes the holding of matches. This activity by the club cannot, by itself, in our opinion, lead to the inference that the club is carrying on an industry."

5. Originally Qaddafi Stadium was managed by Lahore Stadium Com mittee, but subsequently on 4-2-1975 in compliance with the orders of the Prime Minister, the Governor of the Punjab transferred the control of Qaddafi Stadium to the Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan. Now the point for determination is as to whether the Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan is an industry. Apply the test as laid down in the judgment of the High Court, I find that the Board of Control for Cricket in Pakistan is not an A industry within the meaning of section 2 of Industrial Relations Ordinance. 1969, because its main object is to promote and develop the game of cricket in Pakistan.

6. In view of the above, I uphold the preliminary objection and dismiss all the appeals.