1988 PLP 853 (PLC(CS))

Bashir Awan for Appellant. Jan Muhammad for Respondents. DECISION These are ten (10) appeals, separately filed by Messrs Amreen Glass Bangles Industries against a common impugned order, dated 7‑7‑1987, passed by the Sind Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad who had allowed all the ten grievance petitions of the respondents under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, directing their reinstatement in service with full back benefits. As, the facts and legal points involved in all these appeals are same and similar and the impugned order is also common, therefore, I would also decide all these ten appeals by this single decision.

2. The facts of the case are that all the ten respondents claimed to be the permanent employees of the appellant establishment and covered by the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. They further claimed that the appellant establishment had never issued them any appointment letter, attendance card or any other service document, as required by Law and so on 12‑8‑1986, they were refused employment without assigning any reason or issuing any letter of termination and also they were not paid their earned wages from 1‑8‑1986 to 11‑8‑1986. Being aggrieved with this action of the appellant establishment, the respondents filed their individual grievance petitions before the learned Labour Court, under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969.

3. One, Haji Muhammad Yameen, claimed to be a Partner of the appellant establishment had resisted the petitions submitting that as the establishment was a Partnership Concern from July, 1985, and since some rift had cropped up in between the Partners and since also the factory had been closed down due to the disconnection of Gas supply as well as the accumulation of the stock, therefore, all the workers were laid off and a proper notice to this effect was also pasted on the Notice Board of the factory on 11‑8‑1986 and since that date, neither any worker was working in the factory nor it was functioning. Thus, according to the claim of the appellant establishment, none of the respondents were entitled to maintain their grievance petitions, so, they were liable to be dismissed.

4. On behalf of the establishment, one Haji Muhammad Yameen was tendered in evidence, while on behalf of the respondents, one Jan Muhammad was examined and both of them were duly cross‑examined. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the present common impugned order, hence, the present ten (10) appeals.

5. Today, Mr. Rana Mahmood Ali Khan, the learned representative for the respondents has sent an application seeking again an adjournment of the case. This application has been rejected as on the last date of hearing, the case was adjourned, also at the request of Mr. Rana Mohammad Ali Khan himself. Jan Muhammad respondent is present while all other respondents, called absent. However, I have heard Mr. Bashir Awan, the learned Advocate for the appellant establishment and so also the respondent, Jan Muhammad. I have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of these cases. At the very outset, I would observe here that there is an admitted position that in consequence of the settlement, outside the Labour Court between the parties, all the respondents had been paid their earned wages from 1‑8‑1986 to 11‑8‑1986, as well as the wages of lay‑off period in full and final settlement of their claim with an undertaking that as and when the factory would restart, all the respondents would be re‑employed. Thus, an application for withdrawal of all the grievance petitions from the Labour Court was submitted by the lawfully and duly authorised representative; of the respondent workers, namely, Mr. Wahid Bux. It is not known why the learned Labour Court did not accept this withdrawal application, submitted by the said representative of the respondent workers and it had suo moto proceeded with the original petition even without either recording the statement of Mr. Wahid Bux the said learned representative of the workers, or affording an opportunity to the partner of the appellant establishment to confirm the genuineness of the said withdrawal application. There is also no indication why and under what circumstances, the respondents were made to refute the receipt of the payments of thier above referred dues. If, at all there was a false statement or professional breach of trust on the part of a representative, particularly of the poor workers, then, it was not proper for the learned Labour Court to simply administer a warning against Mr. Wahid Bux, the learned representative of the respondents and instead, a proper and a legal action should have been taken against all such type of persons or the representatives. The learned Labour Court should not act as benevolent despot and it had to do justice, equally with the parties. Bare words of the respondents that they had not received the payments or they had not signed the application or any other document, should not have been relied upon by the learned Labour Court, unless both the parties were heard and the matter was thoroughly investigated, if, it was suspicious or such a complaint was brought to his notice by the respondents. In absence of the above requirements, the conduct of the respondents is not free of doubt as they had been intimidated to be paid more by the appellant establishment, thus, this benefit of doubt, must go in favour of the appellant establishment. There is also an admitted position on record that the factory was closed and all the workers were laid‑off. Mr. Bashir Awan, the learned Advocate for the appellant establishment submits that the factory is still closed and not functioning. I would, therefore, hold that the respondents had received all their dues by severing their relations with the appellant establishment and were no more employees of the establishment, thus could not maintain their grievance petitions under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, hence, these petitions are dismissed. The findings of the learned Labour Court are without any substance and without appreciation of the admitted position, hence, it is also set aside.

6. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would set aside the impugned order and would allow all these ten appeals. The result would be that all the ten grievance petitions of the respondents under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, are accordingly dismissed. A.E/1139/Lb. S Appeals allowed.