1988 PLP 773 (PLC(CS))

N.A. Talpur, for Appellants. Date of hearing: 10th February, 1988. This is an appeal filed by the appellant Mills against an impugned order. dated 6‑10‑19'87, passed by the Sind Labour Court No. VI at Hyderabad, who had allowed' the grievance petition of the respondent under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, directing the appellant Mills to pay salary to the respondent as per increase granted by the Chairman of the Mills ‑with effect from 1‑10‑1986 with all consequential benefits.

2. Briefly stated the facts of the ease, are that the respondent claimed to have been appointed in the appellant. Mills on 10‑6‑1986 with a basic pay of Rs.725.00 per. month plus allowances and that vide letter dated 5‑11‑1986, his basic pay‑ was increased to Rs.3105.00 per month with effect from. 1‑10‑1986 and so bonus in the month of November, 1986 was also paid to him on the basis of the said increase. Further, the claim of the respondent was that for the month of October, 1981 and onwards, he was not held his salaries at the increased rate' therefore he sent a grievance notice to the appellant Mills; on ‑2‑4‑1987 followed by the present grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969.

3. The appellant Mills resisted the, petition on the grounds that on account of exercise of influence by the respondent, the Chairman of the appellant Mills had approved the increase in his pay, under a political, pressure vide, an order, dated 5-11-1986, issued by the Administrative Officer although the Chairman was competent to do so, but the Rules required, recommendations of the General Manager for the purpose, However, the Chairman approved the special increase in contravention of Delegation of Power Rules of the Corporation. The appellant Mills further claimed that as immediately an irregularity was realized by the Chairman of the appellant Mills, on the same date i.e. 5‑11‑1986, he issued an order suspending the increments granted to all such employees referring the matter to a Committee consisting of 6 Officers to rationalise the same, strictly on efficiency, seniority and merit basis and that vide a subsequent order, dated 21‑12‑1986, it was also directed that all such officers/ employees be paid their salaries as per their entitlements on 1‑10‑1986. The appellant Mills claimed that in view of the above facts, the respondent was not legally entitled to maintain his present application which was liable to be dismissed.

4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits‑in‑evidence and they were cross‑examined. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court has passed the impugned order, hence, the present appeal.

5. I have heard Mr. N.A. Talpur, the learned Advocate for the appellant Mills and the respondent in person and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case as well as the written arguments submitted by both the parties. Mr. N.A. Talpur, the learned Advocate for the appellant Mills has very convincingly argued that grant of special increment is not a right guaranteed or secured under any law, settlement or award or even the terms and conditions of service of the respondent and that the present application of the respondent under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969 also suffered from non‑joinder of the proper party, as the Chairman, Sind Sugar Corporation who had granted the alleged Special Increment and later on withheld it, was not made a party and the appellant Mills, subordinate to the said Chairman, could not upset/disobey the orders of the said Chairman, therefore, incompetent , to give the relief, as had been prayed for by the respondent. In support of his arguments, Mr. Talpur has referred me to a case reported in 1988 P L C 749 and 1987 P L C at page

806. It was further pleaded by Mr. N.A. Talpur, the learned Advocate for the appellant. Mills that the orders of the Chairman for grant of Special Increment were against the Rules and were suspended by himself before implementation as no salary was paid to the respondent at the increased rate as was admitted by the respondent himself in his cross‑examination, therefore, the increase order could be recalled under Section 21 of 'the General Clauses Act. In support of this argument, Mr. Talpur has relied upon a case reported is 1987 P L C (Service) at page

787. I see much force in these arguments of Mr. N.A. Talpur, the 'learned Advocate for the appellant Mills.

6. On the other hand, it was contended by the respondent that whereas the competent authority having super powers, justifyingly raised his pay equal to that of his other colleague having the same status and performance, therefore, it had become his guaranteed right to invoke the jurisdiction of the learned Labour Court under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969. It was further contended by the respondent that the Delegation of Powers. Rules were not Statutory Rules, therefore, the Courts were not bound to consider them over and above the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. It was lastly contended by the respondent that by, virtue of his status which came under skilled and manual labour, he was a permanent workman within the meaning of Labour Laws, therefore, his application before the learned Labour Court was quite competent. I see no force in these arguments In view of the above facts, circumstances and the legal points, I would hold that the grant of Special Increment was not a right, guaranteed or secured under any Law, Award or the Settlement and/or under the terms and conditions of the service of the respondent and further more, it is an admitted position that the order granting the Special Increment, vide order, dated 5‑11‑1986, was immediately suspended on the same date i.e. 5‑11‑1986 by the same authority, was not at all implemented. Bonus is not a part of the wages. Therefore, if the respondent was erroneously paid the bonus in accordance with the alleged increased pay, would not entitle him to claim the increased pay, as guaranteed right under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969. I would, therefore, hold that the learned Labour Court was not correct in passing the impugned order, which is liable to be set aside.

7. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would set aside the impugned order and would allow the present appeal. The result would be that the respondent would not be entitled to claim his salary alongwith the alleged Special Increment. The amount of consequential benefits, as deposited by the appellant Mills with this Tribunal be immediately returned to the appellant Mills. A.E./1196/Lb.S Appeal allowed.