2006 PLP 3170 (YLR)

RAHMAT HUSSAIN JAFFERI, J.

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 24-4-1998 passed by the learned IIIrd Additional Sessions Judge, Khairpur in Sessions Case No.35 of 1997 by which the learned Judge convicted the appellant under section 13-A(2) (b) of Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 and sentenced him to suffer R.I. for 7 years. The incident took place on 15-1-1997 when section 13-A(2) (b) was in force, which was subsequently protracted vide Ordinance XCVIII of 1996 dated 2-11-1996. The life of the Ordinance is four months as provided under Article 89(2)(a)(i) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Thereafter the provisions of section 13-A were not protracted as no ordinance was issued subsequent to the said Ordinance, there-fore the Ordinance lapsed on 2-3-1997. The judgment has been announced on 24-4-1998, at that time the provisions of section 13-A(2)(b) of the Ordinance had already expired and were inoperative. The Ordinance is a temporary statute under which the proceedings and action are valid up to the last date of the enforcement of the Ordinance. After the lapse of the Ordinance then all the proceedings stand terminated and no further action can be taken in pursuance of the temporary lapsed Ordinance. Similar point was considered by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Arif and another v. The State and another (1993 SCMR 1589 and at page 1609), it has been observed as under:- "

16. From the above cited cases, it is evident that there is judicial consensus that where a law is repealed, it will not inter alia affect any investigations, legal proceedings or remedy in respect of any right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment, and any such investigation, legal proceedings or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the law had not been repealed. This is so, inter alia, because of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (which corresponds to section 4 of the West Pakistan General Clauses Act, 1956), in the absence of any contrary intention manifested in the relevant statute. Since the General Clauses Act is not applicable to the Constitution, the above provision has been incorporated therein in the form of Article

264. However, the above principle cannot be pressed into service, while dealing with temporary statutes as highlighted in the above treatises on the interpretation of statutes. The general rule in regard to a temporary statute is that in the absence of special provision to the contrary, proceedings which were taken under it would ipso facto terminate. The case of Wicks v. Director of Public Prosecutor supra decided by the House of Lords has dealt with a statute where the law-maker while enacting it expresses contrary intention in section 11(3) thereof by providing that its expiry shall not affect operation thereof as respects things previously done or omitted to be done. There is' no similar provision in the Act in issue. It was to operate only for one year from the date on which it was assented to by the President in terms of section 1(2) thereof unless it was extended by the Parliament. The effect of promulgation of Ordinance XIX of 1988 was that the life of the Act was extended for a period of four months i.e. up to 12-2-1989. Since in the present case the Special Court recorded conviction on 11-4-1989 when the Act and Ordinance XIX of 1988 already stood lapsed, the judgment of the Special Court was corum non judice as has been held by the High Court. The judgment of this Court in the case of Muhammad Naeem alias Naeema v. The State (1992 SCMR 1617) wherein conviction of the accused person for possessing of a Klashinkov after the expiry of the relevant Ordinance was held good for the reasons that the relevant provision of the Ordinance was re-enacted retrospectively from a date prior to the date of conviction. Thus, the above case is distinguishable from the instant case." In view of authoritative decision of the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan, the proceedings of the case were terminated on 2-3-1997, therefore after that all the proceedings were corum non judice, hence the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not competent to pass the judgment. The learned A.A.-G. has also not supported the impugned judgment because of the legal defect in the proceedings. In the light of what has been discussed above, the impugned judgment is set aside. The appeal stands allowed. H.B.T./R-25/K???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal allowed.