1992 PLP 1237 (MLD)
SHUJAAT ALI ‑‑‑Appellant Versus Sheikh EHSANUDDIN‑‑‑Respondent
| Citation | 1992 PLP 1237 (MLD) |
| Forum / Court | Karachi |
| Bench Members | Haziqul Khairi, J |
| Parties | SHUJAAT ALI ‑‑‑Appellant Versus Sheikh EHSANUDDIN‑‑‑Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1992 PLP 1237 (MLD)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1992 PLP 1237 (MLD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Karachi bench comprising: Haziqul Khairi, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 1992 PLP 1237 (MLD) (SHUJAAT ALI ‑‑‑Appellant Versus Sheikh EHSANUDDIN‑‑‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- SA. Jalib for Appellant. K.B. Bhutto for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 16th February, 1992.
Headnotes / Summary
Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance (XVII of 1979)‑‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S.15‑‑‑Bona fide personal need of landlord‑‑‑Proof‑‑‑Landlord had produced on record, sufficient material to establish his bona fides‑‑‑Landlord had been transferred to Karachi by his employer and it was natural for him to live in his own house ‑‑‑Landlord had also produced letter of his transfer to Karachi, contents whereof remained un-rebutted and unshaken‑‑‑Landlord's evidence inspired confidence with regard to his bona fides‑‑‑Demand for increase in rent made on tenant would not ipso facto demolish ground of personal requirement of premises by landlord‑‑‑Bona fide need of landlord was proved in circumstances.
Judgment & Decree
This appeal arises from the order dated 30‑9‑1991 passed by the learned IVth Rent Controller East, Karachi in Rent Case No.466 of 1990 whereby the ejectment of the appellant was ordered by the learned Controller. The respondent filed an ejectment application under section 15 of Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 on the grounds of default in payment of rent and his personal bona fide requirement. The respondent did not press the first ground and no evidence was adduced by him with the result that it failed. The respondent however succeeded in establishing his personal bona fide requirement and hence this appeal. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. SA. Jalib urged before me that the so‑called requirement of the respondent is mala fide as would appear from the record of the case. Reference was made to the cross‑examination of the respondent wherein it was admitted by him that from time to time he had demanded increase in rent from the appellant and also admitted the various letters written by him to the appellant in which such demand was made by him. It was on account of these demands that the appellant increased the rent of the demised premises several times. However, when in his letter dated 20‑6‑1986, the respondent once again required the appellant to increase the rent, he refused to accede to his demand, which resulted into the filing of the present ejectment application. In support of his contentions learned counsel placed reliance on 1985 CLC 562, 1986 CLC 561, 1984 CLC 755 and 1987 CLC 1988 in which inter alia it was held:‑‑ (a) Where the evidence of the landlord shows mala fides he is not entitled to evict the tenant, 1985 CLC 562; (b) To establish bona fides of the landlord for personal requirement of premises, burden would be on landlord to establish good faith through evidence inspiring confidence, 1986 CLC 561; (c) Where a landlady does not come to Court with clean hands and suppresses material facts, the ground of personal bona fide requirementfails,1984 CLC 755; (d) A bare plea of the landlord that he wants accommodation for his own, occupation will not be sufficient, 1987 CLC 1988. It was argued by learned counsel for appellant that the respondent suppressed many facts relevant to the case. He deliberately has not given details of his first transfer to Karachi and the circumstances under which such transfer had taken place but he also failed to disclose the amount of the rent he is entitled to receive as Bank Officer. He purposely concealed the information with regard to his stay in Karachi from the date of his alleged transfer upto the date of deposition. Non‑disclosure of these facts and inconsistent pleas demolish his so‑called ground for personal bona fide requirement. Above all, the very fact that the respondent demanded increase in rent from time to time duly admitted by him by itself will render the said ground liable to be rejected straightaway. Learned counsel for respondent Mr. K.B. Bhutto, on the other hand, contended that the landlord's averments in the plaint have not been shaken and from his evidence the only inference that can be drawn it is that he requires the premises in question bona fide for his own use. Reference was first made to a letter dated 9th March, 199() issued by M/s. Habib Bank Ltd. A.G. Zurich to the respondent stating that the respondent has been transferred to Karachi branch of the Bank. This letter has remained unrebutted so also the fact that in pursuance thereof the respondent is working at Karachi branch of the said Bank has gone unchallenged. It was submitted that the requirement of the appellant ‑had undergone change inasmuch as he was previously 'living in Switzerland and now .he has come down to Karachi on transfer and wants to occupy has own house for his own use. Being a landlord his interest earlier was that the rent should be increased which is not an unreasonable demand for any landlord, but when he was transferred to Karachi, his natural desire amounting to his requirement was to live in his own house as he has no other house of his own in Karachi. In support of his contention learned counsel for respondent placed reliance on PLD 1976 Kar. 832; 1980 SCMR 593; 1988 SCMR 772; 1990 SCMR 544 and 1989 SCMR 1366 and
233. In PLD 1976 Karachi 832, it was held by a single Judge of this Court that the assertion or claim on oath by landlord that he required premises for his personal use found to be consistent with his averments in his application and not shaken in cross‑examination or disproved in rebuttal should be accepted by Rent Controller as bona fide. In 1980 SCMR 593, the Supreme Court of Pakistan approved the view taken in PLD 1976 Kar. 832 and held that "neither the 1st Appellate Court nor the High Court held the evidence of appellant's witness to be false or in any way lacking in any essential respect in establishing the plea viz personal bona fide requirement". In 1990 SCMR 544, it was held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that demand for increase of rent per se could neither be a basis for a finding of mala fides nor such like alleged mala fides can be the basis for rejection of an application for eviction, in very case. In 1989 SCMR 1366 it was held that the demand of higher rent by itself would not cause doubt on the personal bona fide requirement where the factum of bona fide requirement was independently proved. It was lastly contended by learned counsel for respondent that sufficient protection is provided under section 15‑A(ii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 to a tenant in case the landlord fails to occupy the premises and give it on rent to any other person. In‑such a case a tenant would always be entitled to get back possession of the premises vacated by him. From the perusal of record before me, there is sufficient material to establish the bona fides of the respondent. Admittedly he has been transferred to Karachi and it is very natural for him to live in his own house. He has produced in support of his case, a letter from Habib Bank Ltd. A.G. Zurich the contents of which have remained unrebutted and unshaken. No evidence has come on record that the respondent has not been working at the branch office, of the said Bank in Karachi. The respondent has provided in sufficient details his personal requirement. His evidence inspires confidence with regard to his bona fides. A demand for increase in rent made on a tenant will not ipso facto demolish the ground of personal requirement of the premises of the landlord. In the result, I dismiss the appeal with costs with direction to the appellant to vacate the premises within three months hereof. A.A./S‑850/K Appeal dismissed.