P L D 1961 (W (PLP)
MESSRS Haji ILAHI BAKHSH‑UMAR HAYAT‑ — Petitioners Versus THE STATE‑ — Respondent
| Citation | P L D 1961 (W (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | Punjab Pure Food Act (XVIII of 1929), S. 13‑Whether sale of adulterated food by other than manufacturer not indictable Whether actual sale and not mere exposure for sale of adulterated food necessary for conviction‑Sat Pal Tara Chand v. Lahore Municipality A I R 1941 Lah. 158 overruled. |
| Bench Members | Jamil Hussain Rizvi, J |
| Parties | MESSRS Haji ILAHI BAKHSH‑UMAR HAYAT‑ — Petitioners Versus THE STATE‑ — Respondent |
| Primary Law | 2. The facts of this case are as follows:, REPORT OF THE SESSIONS JUDGE |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1961 (W (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: 2. The facts of this case are as follows:, REPORT OF THE SESSIONS JUDGE as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1961 (W (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the Punjab Pure Food Act (XVIII of 1929), S. 13‑Whether sale of adulterated food by other than manufacturer not indictable Whether actual sale and not mere exposure for sale of adulterated food necessary for conviction‑Sat Pal Tara Chand v. Lahore Municipality A I R 1941 Lah. 158 overruled. bench comprising: Jamil Hussain Rizvi, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1961 (W (PLP) (MESSRS Haji ILAHI BAKHSH‑UMAR HAYAT‑ — Petitioners Versus THE STATE‑ — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Faqir Muhammad for Petitioner.
- A. S. Pal for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 19th June 1961.
Headnotes / Summary
Punjab Pure Food Act (XVIII of 1929), S. 13‑Whether sale of adulterated food by other than manufacturer not indictable Whether actual sale and not mere exposure for sale of adulterated food necessary for conviction‑[Sat Pal Tara Chand v. Lahore Municipality A I R 1941 Lah. 158 overruled.] H, a shopkeeper had kept gur for sale in his shop, a sample of which was taken by the Food Inspector and sent for chemical analysis, as a .result of which the gur was found to be deficient in sucrose content and consequently it fell within the definition of adulterated food. H was convicted under section 13 (6) (i) of the Punjab Pure Food Act, 1929. In revision it was contended before the High Court that the word "sale" mentioned in clause (a) of section 13‑(1) of the Act contemplates only sale by the manufacturer and not by a person other than the manufacturer and consequently unless it was established by the pro secution that H had knowledge that the gur in question was adulterated food he could not be convicted of the offence under section 13 (6) (i) of the Act. It was further contended that before H could be convicted of the offence under section 13 (6) (i) of the Act it was necessary to prove that the gur had been sold by H. The mere fact that H had exposed the gur for sale was not enough to warrant his conviction. Held: The word "manufacturer" did not occur in sub section (1) of section 13 of the Punjab Pure Food Act, 1929 and there is no reference in it to manufacture or manufacturer. A plain reading of this subsection shows that the Legislature intended to prohibit the sale of adulterated food unless the seller had complied with the rules as might be prescribed in this behalf. It is not possible for any Court to add to the provisions of law. Held further, that the definition of the word "sale" is so wide that it covers the case of those who expose any commodity for sale for human consumption or use. Sat Pal Tara Chand v. Lahore Municipality A I R 1941 Lah. 158 overruled. Emperor v. Prem Singh A I R 1944 Lah. 420 ref. This is a revision petition by Ilahi Bakhsh of Messrs Haji Ilahi Bakhsh Umar Hayat, Dealers in Gur etc., of Mianwali against the judgment dated 13‑5‑60 whereby he has been convicted by Mr. C. A. Saeed, Additional District Magistrate, Mianwali, of the offence under section 13 (6) (i) of the Pure Food Act and has been sentenced to a fine of Rs. 200 in exercise of his summary jurisdiction. A sample of gur weighing about one maund was taken by the Food Inspector, Mianwali on 22‑2‑60 from the peti tioner's shop. It was sent to the Provincial Public Analyst, Rawalpindi and his report was received that the sample of gur was deficient in sucrose content which was 75% while the pres cribed minimum limit was 80%.
3. The proceedings are forwarded for revision on the following grounds :‑ The petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge and was convicted by the learned Additional District Magistrate accordingly. The plea of guilty by the petitioner was only to the effect that the sample of gur was deficient in sucrose contents than the prescribed minimum limit of 80%. Notwithstanding this plea of guilty the petitioner is entitled to urge that‑actually no offence was committed by him under law. The relevant provisions of law on the point are contained in section 13 (i) clause (a) and clause (g) of the Pure Food Act, 1929. Under clause (a) the manufacture or sale of any adulterated food is prohibited unless the rules which may be prescribed in this behalf are complied with while under clause (g) the sale of any food which is unfit for human consumption is prohibited on the same premises on which the sale of food fit for human consumption is carried out. The present case is obviously not covered by clause (g) because there is nothing on the record to show that the gur in question was unfit for human consumption and the mere fact that it contained sucrose contents less than the minimum prescribed limit of 80 Y. does not make it unfit for human consumption. Consequently it has to be seen whether the present case is covered by clause (a). In my opinion "sale" mentioned in clause (a) contemplates only sale by the manufacturer himself and not by a person other than the manufacturer as the word "manufacture or sell" relate to "adulterated food" which can be only within the knowledge of the manufacturer and not a dealer other than the manufacturer. In fact only the manufacturer can be expected to know the sucrose contents of gur and to abide by the minimum limit pres cribed by rules by having a proper analysis at the time of its manufacture. Consequently unless it is established by the pro secution that the petitioner had the knowledge that the gur in question was "adulterated food" on account of its being deficient in sucrose contents he could not be convicted of the offence under section 13 (6), (i). In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that the petitioner had not committed any offence because there is nothing on the record to show that he had the knowledge as above and so his plea of guilty cannot have the desired effect.
4. Thus the petitioner's conviction under section 13 (6) (i) of the Pure Food Act and a sentence of a fine of Rs. 200 cannot be sustained. I, therefore, forward the case to the High Court with the recommendation that the petitioner's conviction and sentence may be set aside and he may be acquitted and order may be passed that the fine of Rs. 200 paid by him may be refunded to him.
Judgment & Decree
3. The proceedings are forwarded for revision on the following grounds :‑ The petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge and was convicted by the learned Additional District Magistrate accordingly. The plea of guilty by the petitioner was only to the effect that the sample of gur was deficient in sucrose contents than the prescribed minimum limit of 80%. Notwithstanding this plea of guilty the petitioner is entitled to urge that‑actually no offence was committed by him under law. The relevant provisions of law on the point are contained in section 13 (i) clause (a) and clause (g) of the Pure Food Act, 1929. Under clause (a) the manufacture or sale of any adulterated food is prohibited unless the rules which may be prescribed in this behalf are complied with while under clause (g) the sale of any food which is unfit for human consumption is prohibited on the same premises on which the sale of food fit for human consumption is carried out. The present case is obviously not covered by clause (g) because there is nothing on the record to show that the gur in question was unfit for human consumption and the mere fact that it contained sucrose contents less than the minimum prescribed limit of 80 Y. does not make it unfit for human consumption. Consequently it has to be seen whether the present case is covered by clause (a). In my opinion "sale" mentioned in clause (a) contemplates only sale by the manufacturer himself and not by a person other than the manufacturer as the word "manufacture or sell" relate to "adulterated food" which can be only within the knowledge of the manufacturer and not a dealer other than the manufacturer. In fact only the manufacturer can be expected to know the sucrose contents of gur and to abide by the minimum limit pres cribed by rules by having a proper analysis at the time of its manufacture. Consequently unless it is established by the pro secution that the petitioner had the knowledge that the gur in question was "adulterated food" on account of its being deficient in sucrose contents he could not be convicted of the offence under section 13 (6), (i). In this view of the matter I am of the opinion that the petitioner had not committed any offence because there is nothing on the record to show that he had the knowledge as above and so his plea of guilty cannot have the desired effect.
4. Thus the petitioner's conviction under section 13 (6) (i) of the Pure Food Act and a sentence of a fine of Rs. 200 cannot be sustained. I, therefore, forward the case to the High Court with the recommendation that the petitioner's conviction and sentence may be set aside and he may be acquitted and order may be passed that the fine of Rs. 200 paid by him may be refunded to him. Faqir Muhammad for Petitioner. A. S. Pal for Respondent. Date of hearing: 19th June 1961. This is a reference by the learned Sessions Judge, Mianwali, recommending that the conviction of the petitioner under sec tion 13 (6) (i) of the Pure Food Act be set aside and fine of Rs. 200 imposed upon him be ordered to be refunded. The ground on which the learned Sessions Judge has made a reference is that in his opinion "sales" mentioned in clause (a) contemplated a sale by the manufacturer himself and not by a person other than the manufacturer. The petitioner being a shopkeeper, the learned Sessions Judge considered that as he was not a manufacturer, he could not be convicted of the offence under section 13 (6) (i). 2.I Section 13 (1) reads as follows "No person shall sell any adulterated food unless he has complied with such rules as may be prescribed in this behalf." A plain reading of this subsection shows that the Legislature intended to prohibit the sale of adultered food unless the seller has complied with the rules as might be prescribed in this behalf. It is not possible for any Court to add to the provisions of law. I fail to understand as to how the learned Sessions Judge has added the word "manufacture" along with "sell." He has remarked in his order as follows :‑ "In my opinion `sale' mentioned in clause (a) contemplates only sale by the manufacturer himself and not by a person other than the manufacturer as the words `manufacture or sell relate to adulterated food' which can be only within the knowledge of the manufacturer and not a dealer other than the manufacturer." The word "manufacturer" did not occur in the subsection. The meanings of the subsection are clear. It has prohibited the sale of adulterated food without the compliance of the rules as might be framed in that respect. The sub‑clause has no reference to the manufacture or the manufacturer. The petitioner had kept the gur for sale in his shop, a sample of which was taken by the Food Inspector and sent for chemical analysis, as a result of which it has been found that it was a deficient in sucrose contents and consequently it fell within the definition of adulterated food. The petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge and was consequently convicted. The view of the law taken by the learned Sessions Judge is unwarranted and consequently I am not prepared to accept his recommendation. The learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to cite any authority or advance any argument in support of the view taken by the learned Sessions Judge. The learned counsel conceded that he could not find the word "manufacture" in the relevant provision of law.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner took up another plea. He argued that it was necessary to prove that the gur had been sold by the petitioner before recording his conviction and that the conviction could not be based on the fact that the adulterated food (gur) was exposed for sale. In support of this contention the learned counsel cited Sat Pal Tara Chand v. Lahore Municipality (v). This authority has been specifically overruled by a Division Bench ruling Emperor v. Prem Singh (A I R 1944 Lah.420). The definition of the word "sale" is so wide that it covers the case of persons who expose any commodity for sale for human consumption or use. This contention of the learned counsel has also no force. On the merits of the case, the petitioner pleaded guilty. The reference was made only on a law point, which as discussed above does not help the petitioner. The reference is therefore, declined. The revision petition shall stand dismissed. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.