1989 PLP 552 (PLC)

Gohar Iqbal for Applicant. Iqbal Afridi for Respondents. Date of hearing: 2nd February, 1989. This revision application was filed against the order of learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. VI at Hyderabad, dated 26‑9‑1988, whereby he dismissed in limine the grievance application of the applicant on the ground of limitation. As it was a final order,, revision application could not be filed therefore, by consent of the parties, this Revision application was converted into appeal and was heard.

2. I have heard Messrs Gohar lqbal, learned Advocate for the applicant and Iqbal Afridi, learned counsel on behalf of the respondents.

3. Admittedly the order terminating the services of the appellant was passed on 6‑12‑1987. Admittedly the grievance notice was given on 20‑12‑1987, and grievance application was filed on 26‑9‑1988.

4. Subsection (1) of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, requires the aggrieved worker to bring his grievance to the notice of his employer within three months of the date on which cause of such grievance arises. Under subsection (2) the employer is required to communicate his ` decision in writing to the worker within 15 days of the grievance being brought to his notice. Under subsection (4) if the employer fails to communicate his decision within the period specified in subsection (2) the worker may take the matter to t Ire Court. The provision to subsection (4) requires that a worker if so desires to take the matter to the Labour Court shall do so within a period of two months from the date of the communication of the employer or as the case may be from the expiry of the period mentioned in subsection (2). The appellant, therefore, had to file a grievance application within two and half months from the date he brought grievance to the notice of the employer. The grievance notice was given on 20‑12‑1987, therefore, two and half months expire on or about 5‑2‑1988, whereas grievance application was filed on 26‑9‑1988, viz., more than seven months of the expiry of the period of limitation.

5. Even for condonation of this delay the appellant has to satisfy the Court or the Tribunal that the delay was for the reasons beyond his control. The only r reason he has given is that the appellant being illiterate worker thought the la Labour Directorate would redress the grievance and, therefore, moved the Labour Directorate which informed the appellant by letter, dated 2‑5‑1988 to move the Labour Court. He alleges that he fell ill and has produced certificate to show that he was admitted in the hospital from 9‑7‑1988 to 25‑9‑1988.

6. Ignorance of law is never considered as sufficient excuse. In the instant case the appellant does not appear to be so ignorant of law as he gave the grievance notice as required under subsection (1) of section 25‑A of I.R.O., 1969, 1 within the period prescribed. Again there is no explanation for delay from 2‑5?1988, to 9‑7‑1988 which is the date he was allegedly admitted in the hospital. Prior to his admission in the hospital he had nearly three months to file the grievance petition but he did not file it though the limitation period had expired much 1) earlier viz. 5‑2‑1988. At least after 2‑5‑1988, he could not be said to be ignorant of the legal position. Besides neither letter, dated 2‑5‑1988 is clear nor is there any such averment in the pleadings or affidavit of the appellant as to when he moved the Labour Directorate.

7. The learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the case of Forbes Forbes Campbell & Co. Ltd. v. Habibur Rehman 1982 S C M R 651, wherein their Lordships have observed that `provisions of Labour Laws 'having been enacted to benefit workers have to be construed in a sense favourable to interests of employees and not to be used as a trap'. In the reported case question of issue was whether period of two months as provided under subsection (4) was to be reckoned from the date when workman sent telegram to the higher officer requesting redress or from the date he served formal grievance notice. The grievance application was time‑barred if date of telegram was taken as due date, but, if grievance notice was taken as due date, then, it was within time. Their Lordship held that the Law contemplated formal grievance notice and earlier telegram sent by the employee could not be regarded as formal grievance notice.

8. The facts of the instant case, as pointed out above, are absolutely distinguishable. Even the most favourable interpretation that could be put would not explain the inordinate delay of the appellant in filing the grievance petition, has rightly been rejected by the' learned Labour Court as time‑barred. I see not merit to this appeal which is' rejected. M.Y.H./1396/Lb. S????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.