1969 PLP 720 (SCMR)

The decision of the question raised depends upon an interpre tation of section 15 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance which runs:- "

15. Appeal.‑(1) (a) Government may by a general or special order, by notification, confer on such District Judges (and Additional District Judges) as it thinks fit, the powers of .appellate authorities for the purposes of this Ordinance, in such area, or in such classes of cases, as may be specified in the order. (b) Any party aggrieved by an order passed by the Controller may within thirty days from the date of such order prefer an appeal in writing to the appellate authority having jurisdic ‑tion. (2) On such appeal being preferred, the appellate authority may order stay of further proceedings in the matter pending decision of the appeal. (3) The appellate authority shall decide the appeal after sending for the record of the case from the Controller and after giving the parties an opportunity of being heard and, if necessary, after making such further inquiry as it thinks fit either personally or through the Controller. (4) Any party aggrieved by an order passed on appeal by the appellate authority appointed by the Government under clause (a) of subsection (P L.D ,1963 Lah. 523), and if an appellate authority has not been appointed in respect of any area or class or cases, any party aggrieved by an order of the Controller may, within 30 days from the date of the order of the appellate authority or, as the case may be of the Controller, prefer an appeal in writing to the High Court and decision thereof shall be final. (5) No order passed by the Controller, the appellate authority or the High Court under the provisions of this Ordinance shall be called in question in any Court of law by suit or otherwise, except as provided under this Ordinance." Admittedly there is no notification by the Government to the effect that appeals will lie against a finding of relationship of landlord and tenant by the Rent Controller though this is really not material as will presently appear. The words used in section 15 are "an order", but learned counsel for the petitioner does not find it possible to contend that these words are to be interpret ed in their wide generality and he accepts that some qualification has to be added to these words for otherwise an order adjourning a case or summoning a witness would also be subject to appeal and learned counsel agrees that this could not be the intention. The High Court has in a Full Bench case reported as Muhammad Amin v. Jamshed All (P L.D ,1963 Lah. 523) held that "an order" in the section means any order which is covered by some provision in the Rent Restriction Ordinance. This appears prima facie to be a reasonable qualification to add to "an order". The section envisages orders which the Rent Controller is empowered by the Ordinance to make while learned counsel for the petitioner does not accept this interpretation he is unable to make a reason able suggestion as to any other limitation which can be placed on the words "any order". All that he has been able to contend is that an order which goes to the root of the case should also be appealable, but he is unable to explain how the words of section 15 are to be interpreted so as to achieve this result. Even in a civil suit a decision which goes to the root of the matter is not always the subject‑matter of an appeal. When a civil Court decides a preliminary issue as to jurisdiction in favour of the plaintiff no appeal lies against the finding; The mere fact that an issue as to jurisdiction has been decided cannot be a ground for granting a right of appeal when on the wording of the relevant provision it is not possible to do so. We do not see why the petitioner should not have waited for the decision of the cases before he filed the appeals and we have questioned learned counsel for the petitioner why he did so, the reply of learned counsel is that the petitioner is apprehensive in spite of his having been strictly regular fn payment or deposit of rent that an order of ejectment may be made against hint if this question of landlord and tenant is not decided in his favour. It is stated on behalf of the petitioner that it has not made a default in the payment of rent for a single month for when 'it did not pay to the different claimants it deposited rent with the Rent Controller in the name of the Mutawalli. If the petitioner was continuously paying rent or depositing it, it will be a matter for the consideration of Court whether it can be penalised just because the legal position as to who was entitled to receive rent was riot clear. Although a question of law was involved we are not granting leave as we do not think the interpretation put forward on behalf of the petitioner is arguable. These petitions are dismissed. Petitions dismissed.