2011 YLR 2456 (PLP)

IMAM BUX BALOCH, J.

Heard Mr. Safdar Ali Ghouri, Advocate for appellant, Mr. Syed Aijaz Ali Shah, Advocate for respondent No.1 and Miss. Mr. Ali Raza Pathan, State Counsel. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the trial Court has not considered the evidence produced by the prosecution during trial and miscarriage of justice has been done with the complainant. He further contends that prosecution witnesses have fully supported the case on material points and their testimony cannot be disbelieved only because of minor discrepancies. On the other hand Mr. Syed Aijaz Ali Shah counsel for respondents states that evidence produced by the prosecution is not substantial to make out a case for criminal intimidation. He further states that the complainant has admitted in his evidence that his grandfather had sold out some property to Jurio Mal in the sum of Rs. Seventeen hundred thousands and such agreement has been executed. He also admitted that he has received Rupees Thirteen hundred thousands from Jurio Mal but he has not delivered the property to him: He admitted that civil litigation is going on between him and Jurio Mal in different courts. His son P.W 2 Ameet Kumar also stated the same facts as stated by the complainant. It is noted that Qurban Ali and Parkash Mal were independent witnesses have not been examined by the prosecution during trial. For provocation case of criminal intimidation, the prosecution has to prove that any insult or provocation was caused or the accused has any intention or knowledge or such provocation. For ready reference, Section 503 and 504 are reproduced.

503. Criminal intimidation. Whoever threatens another with an injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.

504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace. Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years or with fine, or with both. Mr. Ali Raza Pathan learned State Counsel supports the impugned judgment and states that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove its case beyond any shadow of reasonable doubt and advanced the contention of Mr. Syed Aijaz Ali Shah counsel for private respondents. I have minutely examined the case and perused the material available on record. The appellant has admitted that there is civil dispute going on between the parties and it seems that the complainant in order to pressurize force, the complainant has filed false case against the respondents. The appreciation of evidence in acquittal appeal and appeal of conviction is distinguishable. In appeal against acquittal, the respondents have gained double presumption of innocence as competent Court of law after recording its findings have given certificate of innocence to the respondents and in appeal under conviction, the Court is to appreciate the evidence with care and caution so that miscarriage of justice may not be done with the accused/convict. Mr. Syed Aijaz Ali Shah has placed his reliance on the cases of Mst. Jallan v. Muhammad Riaz and others PLD 2003 SC 644, Muhammad Mansha Kausar v. Muhammad Asghar and others 2003 SCMR 477, Muhammad Shafi v. Muhammad Raza and another 2008 SCMR 329, Mst. Saira Bibi v. Muhammad Asif and others 2009 SCMR 946 and Muhammad Aslam v. Sabir Hussain and others 2009 SCMR

985. In the circumstances, learned counsel for respondents contended that the appellant has failed to establish the guilt of respondents during trial and that the learned trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondents. In order to appreciate contention of learned counsel for respective parties and with their assistance, I have gone through the evidence produced by the appellant in the trial Court. The respondents have been acquitted from the charge by the trial Court and they have gained double presumption; for reversal of such findings; the appellant is liable to show that the same was not reasonable or was wrong. I would like to reproduce invaluable observations recorded by the honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan in the case of Saira (supra) which in my view is relevant to the case in hand: (12) The learned Appellate Court considered each and every aspect of the case in its true perspective and found that statement of Saira Bibi was not confidence-inspiring. In the above noted circumstances we cannot but agree with the findings of the learned Appellate Court. It is a settled law that before the order of acquittal is reversed, it must be shown that the judgment of the learned Court was not reasonable or wrong. If two conclusions were equally possible the order of acquittal should not be reversed. We would like to reproduce the relevant portion of the judgment of this Court in the case of Ghulam Sikandar v. Mumtaz Khan PLD 1985 SC 11 on the same, wherein it was observed as under:-- "However, notwithstanding the diversity of facts and circumstances of each case, amongst others, some of the important and consistently followed principles can he clearly visualized from he cited and other cases-law on the question of setting aside an acquittal by this Court. They are as follows:

(1) In an appeal against acquittal the Supreme Court would not on principle ordinarily interfere and instead would give due weight and consideration to the findings of Court acquitting the accused. This approach is slightly different than that in an appeal against conviction when leave is granted only for the re-appraisement of evidence which then is undertaken so as to see that benefit of every reasonable doubt should be extended to the accused. This difference of approach is mainly conditioned by the fact that the acquittal carries with it the two well-accepted presumptions. One initial, till found guilty, the accused is innocent and two that again after the trial a Court below confirmed the assumption of innocence. The honourable Supreme Court has also given guideline while deciding the acquittal appeal in the case of Muhammad Aslam (supra), the relevant portion of judgment is reproduced below:-- (22) It needs no reiteration that when an accused person is acquitted from the charge by a Court of competent jurisdiction then; double presumption of innocence is attached to its order with which the superior Courts do not interfere unless the impugned order is arbitrary capricious fanciful and against the record. It was observed by this Court in Muhammad Mansha Kausar v. Muhammad Asghar and others 2003 SCMR 477 "that the law relating to reappraisal of evidence in appeals against acquittal is stringent in that the presumption of innocence is double and multiplied after a finding of not guilty recorded by a competent Court of law. Such findings cannot be reversed, upset and disturbed except when the judgment is found to be perverse, shocking, alarming artificial and suffering from error of jurisdiction or misreading/non -reading of evidence....law requires that a judgment of acquittal shall not be disturbed even though second opinion may he reasonably possible. After considering the law laid down by the honourable Supreme Court. I am of the considered view that once an accused has earned acquittal in his favour, he enjoys double presumption of innocence and the Courts while examining the case of such accused must he very careful. and cautious in interfering with the acquittal order and normally should not set aside the same merely for the reason that some other view is also possible. Learned trial Court has rightly considered the case of respondents and acquitted them in accordance with law. The appellant has failed to establish his case. Therefore, this appeal merits no consideration and the same is dismissed. H.B.T./U-7/K Appeal dismissed.