PLC(CS) 1981

1981 PLP 876 (PLC(CS))

IQBAL MUJEEB AND ANOTHER Versus HABIB BANK LTD., KARACHI

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1981 PLP 876 (PLC(CS))
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Bench Members Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal
Parties IQBAL MUJEEB AND ANOTHER Versus HABIB BANK LTD., KARACHI
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1981 PLP 876 (PLC(CS))?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1981 PLP 876 (PLC(CS))?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Z. A. Channa, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1981 PLP 876 (PLC(CS)) (IQBAL MUJEEB AND ANOTHER Versus HABIB BANK LTD., KARACHI). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Sultan Allana for Respondent.

Judgment & Decree

Wasiullah Qureshi for Appellant. Sultan Allana for Respondent. Date of hearing : 21st February, 1981. These 2 appeals are directed against 2 separate but similar decisions both given on 3rd August, 1980 dismissing the grievance petitions filed by the appellants, on the ground that they were barred by res judicata.

2. The circumstances in which these 2 appears have been filed briefly stated are that the appellants, Iqbal Mujeeb and Jamshed Farooq were respectively employed as a Clerk and a Cashier in the Nawaz Shah Branch of the respondent‑Bank. Both of them were dismissed from service on 12th August, 1978 on the charges, of misconduct. Both the appellants preferred separate grievance petitions to the learned VIIth Labour Court at Sukkur. These 2 petitions were dismissed by the learned Labour Court mainly on the ground of non‑maintainability of the petitions and for want of jurisdiction. The appellants preferred appeals to this Tribunal against the dismissal of their grievance petitions. This Tribunal by its order, dated 9th January, 1980 disposed of the 2 appeals on the offer made by the respondent‑Bank, which was accepted by th e appellants, that the appeals preferred by the appellants against the orders of their dismissal would be duly considered by the competent authority in the respondent‑Bank. It appears that no less an authority than the President of the Bank himself has considered and examined the appeal of the 2 appellants but has dismissed the same by his 2 separate orders dated 12th February, 1980. Against the rejection of their appeals by the President of the respondent‑Bank, the appellants filed second grievance petitions before the learned Labour Court at Sukkur. These have been dismissed by the learned Labour Court by the impugned decisions on the ground that the petitions were barred by res judicata. As common issues are involved in both these appeals they have been heard together and are being disposed of by this order.

3. I have heard Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi, who appeared for the appel lants, and Mr. Sultan Allana, the learned counsel for the respondent Bank. The main contention of Mr. Wasiullah Qureshi was that the learned Labour Court, in dismissing the grievance petitions of the 2 appellants on the ground of res judicata, has misconceived the legal position in that the appellants were not agitating against the original orders of dismissal passed on 12th August, 1978 but the rejection of their appeals by the President of the respondent‑Bank, by his order, dated 12th February, 1980. On the other hand, Mr. Sultan Allana submitted that the grievance of the appellants in fact was against their dismissal from service and since this was effected by the order, dated 12th August, 1978 the present grievance petitions were not only barred by res judicata, but also by limitation. In my view, no question of res judicata arises in the instant case. What the appellants are challenging in these pro ceedings are not the original orders of their dismissal passed on 12th August, 1978 but the orders passed by the President of the respon dent‑Bank in appeal on 12th February, 1980. The withdrawal of the previous appeal preferred by the appellants before this Tribunal was expressly on the understanding given by the respondent‑Bank that the departmental appeals by the appellants would be duly considered by the competent authority in the Bank. No doubt, this has been done, but since the appellants are aggrieved by the decision of the President of the Bank, they are entitled to challenge the same by means of a grievance petition under section 25‑A, I. R. O. The order of this Tribunal passed on the previous appeals filed by the appellants is to be deemed to be an award for the purposes of the I. R.O., and since it gave a right to the appellants for a decision on the appeals preferred by them to respondent Bank, though they may have been time barred, the appellants could prefer grievance petitions against the decision given by the respondent. Bank on their departmental appeals. It is a well‑settled principle that an original order stands merged with the order of the appellate authority. As such the original orders of dismissal passed in respect of the appellants on 12th August, 1978 stood merged with the orders passed on appeals by the President of the respondent‑Bank on 12th February, 1980. I am, therefore, of the view that the passing of the latter order gave a fresh cause of grievance to the appellants who were entitled to initiate individual grievance proceedings in respect of the same. The fresh grievance petitions, therefore, are not hit by the bar of res judicata, assuming that the provisions contained in section 11, C. P. C., are applicable to proceedings before the Labour Courts under section 35‑A, I. R. O.

4. For the reasons discussed by me above, I would set aside the impugned decisions of the learned Labour Courts and remand the cases to it for decision on the merits of the cases. Cases remanded.