2007 PLP 7 (YLR)

JAWWAD S. KHAWAJA, J.

Iftikhar Ahmad, petitioner/defendant has filed this revision petition to impugn the order dated 24-9-2003 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Multan, whereby the petitioner's application under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. seeking leave to defend has been dismissed. Another application moved by the petitioner under section 151, C.P.C. seeking amendment in the application for leave to defend has also been dismissed.

2. The facts of this case are simple. Malik Allah Diwaya respondent/plaintiff filed a suit against the petitioner for recovery of Rs.7,00,000 on the footing of a promissory note. Summons in the prescribed form were issued and admittedly were received by the petitioner/ defendant through registered post on 10-4-2003.

3. On 17-4-2003, the petitioner through counsel filed an application under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. for leave to defend the suit. The said application did not disclose any ground of defence. It was merely stated therein that the petitioner had received the summons and was filing the application for leave to defend within time. A reply to the application was submitted by the respondent/plaintiff pointing out that the application for leave to defend was liable to be dismissed because it did not disclose any defence whatsoever.

4. Thereafter, the petitioner filed the above-referred application under section 151, C.P.C. praying that he be allowed to amend the application for leave to defend. Certain grounds were urged in this application to establish a defence to the suit. No reason whatsoever was given as to why these grounds were not included in the original application. Furthermore, it is to be noted that this application was filed on 27-5-2003 i.e. after the expiry of the ten-day period permitted to the petitioner under Order XXXVII, C.P.C.

5. The learned trial Court considered the above aspects of the case and rightly came to the conclusion that the application, originally filed, did not contain any ground of defence. It was also observed by the learned trial Court that the subsequent application seeking to raise grounds of defence, was an afterthought. In the circumstances, the applications seeking leave to defend and the application attempting to raise grounds of defence, were both dismissed.

6. The reasoning of the learned trial Court cannot be faulted. At this point, it is important to note that no justification was given in the application for adding grounds of defence, as to why such grounds could not be taken earlier or as to the reasons for not filing the said application within the ten days period prescribed by Order XXXVII, C.P.C. The impugned order, therefore, does not suffer from any such jurisdictional defect or legal infirmity, which would require interference therein in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. This revision petition is, therefore, dismissed.

7. Since learned counsel for the petitioner was also counsel representing him before the learned trial Court, I questioned him as to why no grounds of defence had been taken in the application for leave to defend. He stated that this was due to his fault. This circumstance, however, does not find any mention in the application under section 151, C.P.C. seeking to raise grounds of defence. The petitioner also appears not to have been informed by counsel of the gravity of counsel's negligence.

8. This case reflects the alarming state to which professional standards have deteriorated. It is obvious from the facts of this case that counsel either did not care to examine the provisions of Order XXXVII, C.P.C. while drafting the application seeking leave to defend or he failed to inform the petitioner of the implications of the law. In either event, there was a serious breach of professional duties on the part of counsel resulting in grave prejudice to the petitioner.

9. Since cases showing negligence or breach of professional duties by Advocates are coming before me with increasing frequency, I consider it my duty to raise this important issue at an institutional level. It needs to be ascertained from the Punjab Bar Council, which is the statutory body entrusted with the function of ensuring professionalism among Advocates, if there are any effective procedures in place which can ensure that practising licences are only issued to those persons, who are capable of adhering to the highest professional standards.

10. Here it is important to note that ordinary litigants from amongst the general public are entitled to rely on the representation inherent in every licence issued by the Bar Council, that the holder of the licence is acquainted with the law and is capable of representing the litigant and protecting his legal interest. A heavy duty falls on the shoulders of the Bar Council because in our adversarial legal system the importance of maintaining high standards in the Bar cannot be gainsaid.

11. Of equal importance is the question of indemnifying, or providing other means of redress to such litigants who have suffered loss due to negligence on the part of counsel.

12. In view of the above, the individual case of Ch. Babar Akram Ghumman, Advocate is being referred to the Bar Council for appropriate action. At the institutional level, the office is directed to place a copy of this order before Honourable the Chief Justice for such action, which he may consider appropriate in the wider context discussed above. F.B./I-49/L Petition dismissed.