1989 PLP 989 (CLC)

3. The appellant has resisted the application for eviction. According to him, the application for ejectment was filed with ulterior motives. The case as set up by the appellant finds place in para No.3 of the written statement in the following words:‑-- "The applicant firstly attempted to take possession of the demised premises by illegally dispossessing the opponent against which the opponent filed a complaint with the police and one of the applicant's relative was proceeded under section 107, Cr: P. C. In order to further prevent the applicant from using force and taking possession by wrongful means the opponent had to file a suit bearing No.1414 of 1985, in the Court of Civil Judge No.26 (now No.12 South) for injunction and obtained an order of status quo which was subsequently confirmed by the Honourable Court the applicant having failed to achieve the illegal object, had invented the story of personal use and filed an application under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, bearing No.1832 of 1985, which was dismissed on 31‑5‑1986, by this Honourable Court. Now the applicant has filed the present application for the ejectment of the opponent. The accommodation presently in occupation of the applicant is very much sufficient for her as she has no such business which requires any accommodation whatsoever."

4. The respondent has examined her brother and attorney Ibrahim (P.W.1), while the appellant has examined himself (D.W.1) and Abdul Karim (D.W.2).

5. On the assessment of the evidence available on record, the learned Rent Controller decided the issue of personal requirement against the appellant and consequently directed his ejectment from the demised premises. It is in these circumstances that the present appeal has been filed.

6. There are certain facts and circumstances in this case which are not in dispute. These are:‑

(a) That the respondent is a widow. (b) That the late husband of respondent was doing business of fisheries and had an office on a portion of the plot where the disputed premises is situated. (c) That the respondent and her sons have expanded the business and are engaged in export work. (d) That there was previous litigation between the parties.

7. It is the case of the respondent that after the death of her husband, she needed the godown which is in possession of the appellant so that she may store the fish consignments for export purpose. This assertion is admitted by the appellant himself in clear terms when he stated:‑

"It is correct to suggest that applicant and her sons have expanded their business and are engaged in export." This admission also belies the version of Abdul Karim (D.W.2), who has the audacity to state on oath that the office accommodation in possession of the respondent was not being used.

8. While determining the question of requirement the Rent Controller should not ignore the new requirement of the landlady. There is clear evidence on record that the respondent has expanded the business of her husband with the help of her sons. The need of godown by the respondent in this context is thus justified.

9. The appellant has alleged mala fides against the respondent on various grounds. According to him she wanted to take forcible possession of the disputed premises, and as a result thereof one of her relatives was prosecuted under section 107 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. This factor has hardly any relevance in this case, specially when no documentary evidence is placed on record forming the background of this litigation. The question of mala fide came under examination in Muhammad Hussain v. M/s. Zafar Ahmad and another reported in 1985 C L C 2295, and it was held:‑-- "The question of mala fides raised by the learned counsel for the respondents is otherwise of not much relevance now in view of complete safeguard provided to tenant in the Ordinance by insertion of section 15‑A in the Ordinance of 1979."

10. As a result of above discussion, the order of the Rent Controller is upheld and the appeal is dismissed with no costs. The appellant is, however, granted two months time to vacate the demised premises. A.. A. /A‑453/x.?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? Appeal dismissed.