1989 PLP 272 (PLC)

Since common questions of law and facts are involved in all the abovementioned three revisions, they are being disposed of together through this single judgment.

2. The grievance petitions of the three petitioners were dismissed on the ground that the envelops for sending n6tices to the respondents by registered post were not provided.

3. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the petitioners that Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to the labour cases and there being no provision in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for the payment of process fee and postal expenses for sending notices to the respondents, the grievance A petitions could not be dismissed. He has also argued that no direction was given to the petitioners for providing stamped envelops for sending registered notices. The other point argued is that although envelops were not supplied by the petitioners, yet since notices had actually been issued by the office, there was no justification for the learned lower Court to dismiss the grievance petitions. On the other hand, it has been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Code of Civil Procedure applies since the petitions brought under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 are to be heard and decided as an industrial dispute and for the said industrial disputes Code of Civil Procedure g applies as provided in section 36(2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. I do nest fund any force in this argument of the learned counsel for the respondent A petition brought under section 25‑A is quite different from an industrial dispute. Sections 26 to 32 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 deal with the industrial disputes. It is not provided in section 25‑A that the petitions brought under the said section are to be entertained and heard as an industrial dispute. Subsection (4) states only this much that where a matter is taken to the Labour Court, it shall give a decision within seven days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such a matter is an industrial dispute. So, the grievance brought to the Labour Court under section 25‑A is not an industrial C dispute nor is to be entertained and heard like that but is to be decided as if such a grievance was involved in an industrial dispute. So all the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable in labour cases brought under section 25‑A. Even there is no provision m Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure that alongwith the plaint or thereafter envelopes for sending registered summons to the defendant shall be filed. Rule 10‑A provides that simultaneously with the issue of summons under Rule 9, there shall be sent, unless otherwise ordered by the Court, to the defendant by registered post A.D. another copy of the summons signed and sealed in the manner provided in Rule

10. Learned counsel for the respondent has not be able to show any provision in the Code of Civil Procedure wherein it may have been provided that the plaintiff shall pay postal charges or shall supply envelops for sending registered notices to the respondents. So, in v these circumstances the plaintiff in a suit or a petitioner in other cases may be guilty of not obeying the order of the Labour Court if the direction of the Court is to supply registered envelops. In the present case the Court did not direct the petitioners to supply registered envelops for sending notices to the respondents. There is a note m all the cases given on the margin of the order sheet made by the Ahmad that notices had been issued. Copies of the notices are also on the record of the learned lower Court which amply show that actually notices had been issued for the date on which the learned lower Court dismissed the grievance petitions. I do not find any force iii the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the notices are illegal, as the copies of the notices present on the files do not bear the signatures of the Presiding Officer but of some employee of the Court. Learned lower Court may have authorised some official to sign the notices. This argument is equally without force that since the copies of the summons do not bear the signatures of the learned Presiding Officer, actually the notices may not have been issued and afterwards office copies may have been prepared and attached to the tiles. It appears that the notices in all the three cases were sent in single envelop as is evident from the postal receipt and A.D. receipt attached to the case of Abdul Sattar, petitioner. On the A.D. receipt titles of all the three cases are given which show that the notices were sent in one envelop. Since the addressee was the same, therefore, no illegality was committed by sending all the three notices in one envelop.

4. It has also been argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that his Court should not exercise suo motor revisional powers since two other remedies are available to the petitioners; one by bringing fresh petitions and the other by applying to the Labour Court for setting aside the orders of dismissal. It is doubtful if fresh petitions could be brought m the circumstances of the case since the Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable but this is true that the E petitioners had a right to apply for the restoration of the grievance petitions. But the mere fact that this remedy was not availed of is not sufficient for refusing to exercise revisional jurisdiction. Since no direction was given for the deposit of registered envelops and since notice had actually been issued, the orders of dismissing the petitions were patently illegal and thus need interference and in these circumstances I am not inclined to refuse to exercise revisional jurisdiction.

5. I also do not agree with the learned counsel for the respondent to his argument that the provisions made in section 38(3‑a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 are not distinguishable from the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that since according to section 115, revision lies where there is a case decided, no revision lies in the present case since it has been finally decided and there is no provision in section 38(3‑a) that revision lies where there is a case decided. The phrases `where there is a case decided' does not mean that a case should have been finally decided. Even an interlocutory order can be challenged under section 115 if it decides a case although the main case is still pending. By section 38(3‑a) wider powers have been given to the Tribunal and even if there is not a case decided, this Tribunal has jurisdiction to call for the record to see if the order passed is proper or not.

6. As a result of what has been said above, all the revisions are accepted and setting aside the impugned orders, the cases are remanded for decision on the running points in controversy between the parties. A.E./401/Lb.P Revision accepted.