1999 PLP 2999 (MLD)

Ch. Khalid Barlas for Respondents This judgment will decide Civil Revision No. 695 of 1998.

2. Siraj Din son of Allah Jawaya, filed a suit for declaration with consequential relief, which was decreed ex parte on 14-6-1974. On 17-3-1988, petitioner (Naseer-ud-Din) filed an application under Order, -9, Rule 13 of, C. P. C., for setting aside the ex parte decree, dated 14-6-1974. The application was dismissed by the learned Civil Judge on 11-7-1995 on the ground that the same was barred by time and also that there was no sufficient ground for setting aside the ex parte decree.

3. Petitioner went in appeal which was dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge, Gujranwala on 8-11-1997. The two orders have been challenged in the present revision petition.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the decree was obtained by fraud, proper service was not effected and that sufficient ground was made out for deciding the suit on merit.

5. Learned counsel for the respondents argued that the revision was time -barred and that the decree was consent decree and also that no sufficient ground was made out for interference.

6. Admittedly, this revision is barred by time Civil Miscellaneous No. 2-C of 1 998 has been filed under section 5 of Limitation Act for condonation of delay on the ground that the petitioner could not obtain attested copies of the relevant documents and that the delay was not intentional.

7. The impugned judgment was passed by the learned Additional District Judge on 8-11-1997. Petitioner applied for certified copies on 24-11-1997 which were supplied on 27-11-1997. Despite having the certified copy of the judgment of the Appellate Court and ground of appeal, the petitioner did not file revision petition and filed the same on 18-4-1998. The certified copies of the annexures show that the petitioner applied for the certified copies of some of the documents on 24-3-1998 which were supplied on 26-3-1998 while some of the documents were applied on 16-3-1998 and the same were supplied on 18-3-1998. Certified copy of application under Order 9, Rule 13 of C. P. C. was applied on 1-7-1995 and the copy as received on 2-8-1995, i.e. much before the impugned judgment in appeal. The same is the position with reply to the application, as the copy of reply to application under Order 9, Rule 13 of C. P. C., was applied on 24-5 1989 and copy received on 29-5-1989. It is, therefore, evident that the petitioner had the certified copy of the impugned judgment of the Appellate Court, copy of grounds of appeal and also copies of application and reply to the application under Order 9, Rule 13 of C. P. C., on 24-11-1997 but despite that, he opted not to file revision till 18-4-1998. After excluding the period, consumed by copying agency for preparing of certified copies of the impugned judgment, the petitioner had 74 days at his disposal and in this way, the revision could have been filed till 6th February, 1998 but the revision was filed on 18-4-1998. There is no reason for not filing the revision within time when the petitioner had the certified copy of the impugned judgment with him. Again there is no proper explanation as to why the certified copies of the other record was not applied alongwith the copy of the impugned judgment. Even otherwise, if the appellant had obtained the certified copy of the judgment of the Appellate Court on 24-11-1997, he could have immediately applied for certified copy of the other documents without wasting further time but he opted not to file application for certified copies of the other documents, till 24-3-1998, for which there is no justification. It is, thus, a case of extreme negligence on the part of the petitioner. The application for condonation of delay is vague and does not explain delay of each and every day. There being no sufficient cause for condonation of delay, the revision being barred by time is liable to be dismissed on this short ground.

8. Even otherwise on merit, the petitioner has no case. The decree was passed on 14-6-1974 while the application for setting aside the decree was moved on 17-3-1988. Instead of filing application within thirty days, the same was filed after fourteen years approximately. The material on record, proved beyond doubt, that the petitioner had the knowledge of the decree, proper service of summons was effected in the suit and, therefore, no sufficient cause was shown for setting aside the decree. Both the Courts below have properly appreciated the oral as well as documentary evidence on record and recorded findings of fact against the petitioner, which could not be shown to be suffering from any misreading of the evidence or error of law.

9. Resultantly, no ground is made out for interference.

10. The revision petition is, therefore, dismissed as being barred by time and also on merit. H.B.T./N-145/L Revision petition dismissed.