1986 PLP 2639 (CLC)

This order will govern two First Rent Appeals bearing Nos. 1071 and 1072 of 1984 as in both appeals, the appellant is same and grounds taken are common.

2. The facts giving rise to filing of these appeals are that appellant Mst. Fatima is wife of deceased T. Peer Khan, who was owner of House No. 4/3, Block III‑A, Nazimabad, Karachi and after her husband's death, appellant has become co‑sharer in the house by way of inheritance. Respondents Bashir Ahmad is occupying 4 rooms and garage at monthly rent of Rs.600 whereas Issa Khan is in occupation of two rooms and is paying Rs.200 p. m. The appellant filed two rent cases separately bearing Rent Cases Nos. 5244 of 1983 and 19 of 1983 under section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance (hereinafter to be referred as Ordinance) against respondent/tenant. She claims possession on the ground that she is widow and requires house for her personal bona fide use and her sons.

3. The respondents in their written statement stated that appellant is not landlady of the premises in dispute as such she is not entitled to file ejectment application under section 14 of the Ordinance. It has also been stated that appellant is stranger lady and is not a wife of late T. Peer Khan and that they are tenant of Jamil Ahmad who is residing at Islamabad. It has also been mentioned in the written statement that rent application is barred by section 14 of the Sind Rented Premises Ordinance as appellant is in occupation of two houses at Islamabad and Karachi respectively. On the pleadings of the parties the Rent Controller framed the following issues: (1) Whether the appellant requires case premises for her personal use and his children in good faith? (2) What should the order be? The Rent Controller dismissed both the applications by two separate orders, dated 30th May, 1984. In both the rent cases one Amanullah Khan the attorney of appellant has been examined. Where respondents Issa Khan and Bashir Ahmad examined themselves.

4. Mr. Sami Ahmad Tirmizy, Advocate appearing for the appellant contended that Mst. Fatima Bi is widow of late T. Peer Khan who died and she has got a share in the house in question, therefore, she being widow and aged about 74 years is entitled to have a house for her bona fide personal requirement and can get benefit of section 14 of Sind Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979. He has referred to the cases reported in 1984 C L C 2343, 1983 C L C 468, 1981 S C M R 193 and 1986 C L C

354. Mr. Ch. Muhammad Suleman appearing for the respondent contended that Mst. Fatima Bi is not absolute owner of the house and she is already residing with her son at Islamabad, therefore, she cannot claim possession under section 14 of the Ordinance. He has further submitted that property has not yet been mutated in the name of the appellant. He has argued that in such circumstances Supreme Court has granted leave to appeal in case of Muhammad Ali v. Mst. Hameeda Begum in Civil Petition No. K320 of 1983. So as to determine if bona fide requirement could be considered in ease which fall under section 14 of the Ordinance.

5. Amanullah attorney of the appellant in his evidence stated that appellant is widow of late T. Peer Khan, who died at Islamabad on 30‑5‑1981. He has produced photostat copy of death certificate as Exh.A.2. He stated that respondents were duly served with notices under sections 18 and 14 of the Ordinance, intimating them about the change of ownership by inheritance and asking them to hand over vacant possession of the demised premises. He has also produced copy of P.T.10 of House No.A/336, Block 1, Gulshane Iqbal, Karachi and stated that appellant is not the owner of the house and also she does not own property at Islamabad. He further stated in his evidence that appellant is widow and 74 years old. He in his cross‑examination stated that a son of appellant is running his business of Building Maintenance at Islamabad and Karachi and has also business at Hyderabad. He has deposed that son of appellant namely Jameel Ahmad used to receive rent from the tenants from 1969 and he rented out the case premises to the tenants. He has also admitted that other son of appellant is married and is residing at Islamabad alongwith his family, and case property is still in the name of her husband. He has also admitted that appellant is so old that she needs help from atanger even to move in her house. The respondent in their evidence stated that appellants' sons are not doing any business at Karachi and late T. Peer Khan had permanently shifted to Islamabad. It has been admitted by both the respondents that appellant is a widow of late T . Peer Khan and Jameel Ahmad used to collect the rent on behalf of deceased.

6. The learned Rent Controller has dismissed both the rent applications on the grounds that appellant is not full owner of the case premises, therefore, she is not entitled to the relief claimed against the respondent under section 14 of the Ordinance and that she has failed to prove her case for personal bona fide use in good faith.

7. There are some facts which are admitted. That rate of rent and relationship is not denied. It has been also admitted that appellant has become widow of the late T. Peer Khan. The points which require consideration in these rent appeals are whether appellant being co‑sharer in the house can claim benefit of section 14 of the Ordinance, and if she is in personal need of both the portions of the house in question. In both the rent cases, the sons of appellant have not been examined to support her version about bona fide requirement. She has claimed that she requires both the portions of the house for her personal use and occupation of her sons. Her son, Jamil Ahmad admittedly rented out the premises to tenants and used to receive the rent froth them. He has not been examined by the appellant in rent case for the reasons best known. The attorney of appellant in his affidavit in evidence at para. 6 has not stated that appellant requires the premises for her sons also. He has only stated in para. 6 that appellant being widow and 74 years old can apply under section 14 of the Ordinance of her personal requirement of the demised premises. It has also come on record that appellant is so old that she cannot live without help of some persons. Her sons have not come to say, under what circumstances appellant wants to occupy both the portions of house. From the evidence, it is clear that premises are not required for occupation by her two sons who are living at Islamabad. In my view she cannot afford to occupy and live in both portions alone. She may be competent to file ejectment application under section 14 of the Ordinance. She is entitled to 1/8th share from the property and the present case co‑sharers having 7/8th share in the house have neither filed any rent case under section 15 of the Ordinance nor they have come forward to give evidence for her. The case of appellant as given in rent application that house is required, for her use and use of her sons has not been proved. It has also not been proved that she needed both the portions of the house for her personal bona fide use. Had she been in actual need of a house for her use, she could have applied for one portion of the house not for both the portions consisting of 6 rooms. The bona fide requirement is doubtful.

8. Now I come to the question if bona fide requirement is to be considered in cases which fell under section 14 of the Ordinance. This question has been decided in various cases that bona fide requirement of landlord is not to be considered. It has also argued that this point is being considered by Supreme Court and leave has been granted in Civil Petition No. K‑320 of 1984 on 12‑12‑1983. The purpose underlying for giving benefit to class of people whose case comes within the purview of section 14 is to give immediate relief for providing accommodation provided they do not possess any premises in the locality. The intention for making such provision is not to encourage those to take undue advantage without substantiating their case for bona fide requirement. For instance a landlord having a huge building consisting of numerous flats and shops in the building after attending at the age of 60 or provided under section 14 of the Ordinance can be entitled to evict all tenants and take benefit of summary proceedings as enunciated is section 14 of the Ordinance. My humble view is that he cannot take benefit and word "any locality" could in these cases needs to be interpreted. The simple interpretation of giving benefit of section 14 is to provide accommodation by way of summary preceedings when such persons do not possess any other accommodation and bona fide need is `also to be proved specially in the circumstances when higher rents are being charged and huge amount of Pugri is involved for giving commercial accommodation on rent. In such cases the Courts can keep such circumstances in view while deciding the cases.

9. For the reasons stated above I have come to the conclusion that Rent Applications Nos. 5244 of 1983 and 5245 of 1983 have rightly been dismissed by the Rent Controller and he has exercised discretion properly in favour of respondent. Both the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs. A.A. Appeals dismissed.