1997 PLP 650 (PLC)

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the appeal was within time as the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal was on winter vacation from 26‑12‑1996 to 9‑1‑1997 and the Labour Courts were closed for vacation from 26‑12‑1996 to 3‑1‑1997. In support of his contention he hits filed copies of two orders, one of these issued by the Registrar of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, states that, Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal will remain closed on account of Winter Holidays from 26th December, 1996 to 9th January, 1997 and will open on Saturday 10th of January, 1997. The office of the Tribunal will remain open during Winter Holidays." The second notification deals with the observance of winter holidays by the Labour Courts. It provides that, "The High Court has notified the Winter Holidays to the District and Sessions Judge from 26th December, 1996 to 3rd of January. 1997. As per orders of the Hon'ble Chairman the following Presiding Officers of Sindh Labour Court will remain in their offices and will do the urgent work of their Courts as well as of the other Courts on the dates shown against each." From the above notifications, it is apparent that while the Sindh Labour Courts were to observe Winter Holidays from 26‑12‑1996 to 3‑1‑1997, the Labour Appellate Tribunal was to remain closed for that purpose from 26‑12‑1996 to 9‑1‑1997. In the present case, the Sindh Labour Court having passed the order of re‑instatement of respondent No. 3 on 30‑11‑1996, the petitioner had time to file the appeal up to 30‑12‑1996. However, as is apparent from the notification, the Labour Courts observed winter holidays from 26‑12‑1996 to 3‑1‑1997 and reopened on 4‑1‑1997 on' which date the petitioner applied for the certified copy of the order which was supplied to it on the same day and the appeal was filed in the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal also on the same day. The present case would appear to attract the provision of section 4 of the Limitation Act which reads as under:‑‑ "Where the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application expires on a day when the Court is closed, the suit, or appeal or application may be instituted, preferred or made on, the day when the Court reopens." It is true that during the winter holidays of the Labour Appellate Tribunal its office remained opened but that cannot deprive the petitioner of the benefit of the abovementioned provision of section 4 which provides for extension of the period of limitation if it expires on a day when the Court is closed. There is no mention of 'office' in the section and there can be no justification to deprive the petitioner of the benefit of the provision by giving extended meaning to the expression 'Court' used therein so as to include the ' office' also, all the more, when the word 'Court' as used in the section as also the notification is not synonymous with 'office'. It has been observed in the case of Fazal Karim and another v. Ghulam Jilani and others (1975 SCMR 452) where it was observed: " From the plain reading of section 4 of the Limitation Act, it becomes abundantly clear that the period during which the Court remains closed on account of vacations, has to be excluded for the computation of limitation and the notification cannot take precedence over the statutory provision. Even otherwise, we find that there is no conflict between the notification and the provision contained in section 4 of the Limitation Act. According to the notification, the office was to remain open for receipt of petitions from persons who might choose to file. Surely, the word 'Office' as used in the notification is not synonymous with 'Court' as used in section 4 of the Limitation Act. The Court may be closed and yet the office might still be open. " Accordingly, we are of the view that the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal was not justified in dismissing petitioner's appeal on the ground of limitation. As such, we set aside the impugned decision and remand the case to the learned Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal for decision on merit.

2. In view of the above order, this application stands dismissed as having become infructuous. A.A./D‑12/K Case remanded.