P L D 1953 Lahore 26 (PLP)

KHURSHID ZAMAN, J.‑--This is a petition for leave to appeal to the Federal Court against an order passed by me in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The learned counsel for the respondent has raised a preliminary objection that sec tion 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure bars appeals to the Privy Council from the decrees or orders of one Judge of a High Court constituted by his Majesty by Letters Patent. Reliance was also placed on a number of rulings of which B. V. Stayanarayana Varaprasada Rao v. B. V. Bhashyhkarulu Rao (A I R 1924 Mad. 399) Hanmant Shriniwas Deshpande v. Shriniwas Lakshmipati Deshpande (A I R 1931 Bom. 503) and Prameshwar Dayal Singh and others v. Brindaban Chandra Sardar and others (A I R 1936 Pat. 106) are in point. The relevant portion of section 111 reads as follows:‑ "Notwithstanding anything contained in section 109, no appeal shall lie to His Majesty in Council--‑ (a) from the decree order or of one Judge of a High Court constituted by His Majesty by Letters Patent * * * * Section 111 read by itself clearly bars an appeal to the Privy Council from the decree or order of a Single Judge. The learned council for the petitioner, however, relies on clause 29 of the Letters Patent, which according to him varies section 111 of the Code of Civil Procedure inasmuch as it gives a right of appeal from any final judgment, decree or order made by the High Court either on appeal or otherwise when the said High Court declared that the case is a fit on for appeal to His Majesty's Council. Clause 29 is in these terms:‑ "And we do further ordain that any person or persons may appeal to Us, Our Heirs and Successors, in Our or their Privy Council, in any matter not being of criminal jurisdiction, from any final judgment, decree or order of the High Court of judicature at Lahore made on appeal, and from any final judgment, decree or order made in the exercise of original jurisdiction by Judges of the said High Court, or of any Division Court, from which an appeal does not lie to the said High Court under the provisions contained in the 10th clause of the presents; Provided, in either case, that the sum or matter at issue is of the amount or value of not less than Rs. 10,000 or that such judgment, decree or order involves, directly, or indirectly, some claim, demand or question to or respecting property amounting to or of the value of not less than Rs. 10,000; or from any other final judgment, decree or order made either on appeal or otherwise as aforesaid, when the said High Court declares that the case is a fit one for appeal to Us, Our heirs or Successors, in Our or Their Privy Council; but subject always to such rules and orders as are now in force, or may from time to time be made respecting appeals to Ourselves in Council from the Courts of the Provinces of the Punjab and Delhi except so far as the said existing rules and orders respectively are hereby varied; and subject also to such further rules and orders as we may, with the advice of Our Privy Council, hereafter make in that behalf." The learned counsel lays stress on the following words of the proviso: "Or from any other final judgment, decree or order made either on appeal or otherwise as aforesaid, where the said High Court declares that the case is a fit one for appeal to Us, Our heirs or Successors, in Our or Their Privy Council." He argues that the word "otherwise" is wide enough to include decrees or orders made by a single Judge of the High Court in the exercise of his revisional jurisdiction. I am unable to accept this interpretation of the word "otherwise". The opera tive part of clause allows appeals to the Privy Council in two classes of cases: (1) From any final judgment, decree or order of the High Court made on appeal, the matter not being one of criminal jurisdiction, and (2) from any final judgment, decree or order made in the exercise of original jurisdiction by the Judges of the High Court or any Divisional Court from which an appeal does not lie to the said High Court under the provisions of clause 10 of the Letters Patent. It follows that an appeal from a final judgment, decree or order of a Single Judge made on revisional side, is excluded. The proviso lays down conditions on which appeals are permitted to the Privy Council in the cases mentioned in the operative part of the clause. The first condition is "that the sum or matter at issue is of the amount or value of not less than Rs. 10,000 or that such judgment, decree or order involves, directly, or indirectly some claim, demand or question to or respecting property amounting to or of the value of not less than Rs. 10,

000. But where this condition is not satisfied an appeal may still be taken to the Privy Council from a final judgment, decree or order of the High Court made either on appeal or otherwise as aforesaid" when the said High Court declares that the case is a fit one for appeal. The word "otherwise" when read with the words "as aforesaid" which immediately follow it can have reference only to "any final judg ment, decree or order made in the exercise of original jurisdiction by the Judges of the said High Court or any Divisional Court from which an appeal does not lie to the said High Court under the provisions contained in the Tenth Clause of these presents" and cannot, therefore, be interpreted so a3 to allow appeals to the Privy Council (now the Federal Court) from final judgments, decrees or orders of the High Court which are not appealable under the operative part of the clause. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied on Joy Chand Lal Babu'v. Kamalaksha Chaudhry and others (A I R 1939 P C 239). In that case an appeal was entertained by their Lordships of the Privy Council from an order made by the Calcutta High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The learned counsel, however, overlooked the fact that the order is that case was made by a Division Bench and not by a Single Judge. This authority, therefore, has no bearing on the facts of the present case. For the reasons stated above I hold that no appeal lies to the Privy Council from an order, judgment or decree made by a Single Judge of this High Court, in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. The same view was taken in the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondent, A I R 1924 Mad. 393, A I R 1931 Born. 503, and A I R 1936 Pat.

106. This petition is dismissed with costs. A. H. Petition dismissed.