1987 PLP 396 (SCMR)

‑‑‑S. 27‑‑Security‑‑Power of government to demand security‑ Government, held, had the power under S.27 of the Ordinance to call upon the publisher/printer after giving him opportunity to show cause, to furnish security. Ch. Aitzaz Ahsan, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by M.A. Qureshi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner. S. M. Zubair, Assistant Advocate‑General for Respondent. Date of hearing: 13th December, 1986. SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.‑‑ The petitioner seeks leave to appeal from the order, dated 22‑12‑1985 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dismissing his writ petition.

2. The petitioner is the Editor and Publisher of a fortnightly magazine known as Atish Fishan. In its issues of April, June and September, 1984 he published an interview of one Syed Shaukat Hussain Rizvi. On 23‑12‑1984 the Home Department of the Provincial Government issued him with a notice under section 27 of the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance, 1963 to show cause why he should not be required to deposit a sum of Rs.30,000 as security on the ground that the contents of the interview were obscene within the meaning of clause (f) of section 24(1) of the Ordinance. The petitioner submitted a reply on 13‑1‑1985. The Provincial Government found his reply as unsatisfactory and on 17‑2‑1985 directed him to furnish security in the amount already mentioned. The petitioner challenged the order of the Provincial Government in writ jurisdiction in the High Court. By the order impugned in this petition a learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that a remedy by way of appeal was open to the petitioner .and that he ought to have availed of it in the first instance.

3. In support of this petition it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that under section 49(1) it was the duty of the Provincial Government to constitute a Tribunal for hearing appeals from orders directing inter alia the keepers of printing press or publishers to furnish security. The Provincial Government had not so far constituted any Tribunal with the result that on account of lack of proper forum the petitioner could not possibly have exercised his right of appeal. That being so, the learned Judge in the High Court ought not to have dismissed the petitioner's writ petition on the ground that he had not taken advantage of his statutory remedy.

4. The learned Assistant Advocate‑General who is present before us admits that at present no Tribunal is in existence. He states that whenever an appeal is filed, the Government constitutes a Tribunal for its disposal. Since, the petitioner has not filed any appeal with the Government, the question of constitution of a Tribunal does not arise.

5. There is merit in the contention of the learned Assistant Advocate‑General. Under section 48 of the West Pakistan Press and Publications Ordinance the appeal is to be preferred to the Government. If it is not lodged within the prescribed period the Government has the option of rejecting it. In case the Government does not reject the appeal on the ground of limitation it is required under section 49(1) of the Ordinance to constitute a Tribunal for its disposal. The learned Assistant Advocate‑General is, therefore, right in contending that under the Ordinance the Provincial Government is not required to set up a standing Tribunal. In the circumstances, it is not open to the petitioner to contend that he was not in a position to file the appeal as there was no Tribunal in existence. As already pointed out the appeal is to be filed with the Government and not before the Tribunal directly. Since the petitioner had not availed his statutory remedy before invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court the learned Single Judge rightly declined to interfere in the matter.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner then contends that the order of the Government was non quoram judice. We find little merit in this contention. Under section 27 of the Ordinance, the Government did have the power to call upon the petitioner to furnish security. It exercised this power after giving an opportunity to the petitioner to show cause. Whether the circumstances of the petitioner's case justified the making of such an order is a question which has primarily to be determined in the appeal provided by the Ordinance. It can hardly be l said that the order of the Government suffered from lack of jurisdiction 7.For the reasons stated above we find no merit in this petition, which is hereby dismissed. S. Q. Petition dismissed.