2000 SCMR 953 (PLP)

SAIDUZZAMAN SIDDIQUI, C.J.

The abovementioned two direct appeals have been filed by the appellants against the judgment and decree of Lahore High Court, dated 10-7-1995. Both the appeals are time barred by 61 days. The appellants have filed application for condonation of delay in the above appeals under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In. the application for condonation of delay, the condonation is sought on the following grounds:-- "That out of the petitioners, Malik Mehraj-ud-Din is aged about 80 years and bed-ridden whereas Mst. Zuleikha Begum is also very old lady and Mst. Aqeela Bano is a Pardanasheen lady. Due to the illness of Malik Mehraj-ud-Din, he could not manage the filing of the present appeals in time whereas the other due to ignorance in respect of limitation for filing appeals in the Supreme Court could not come earlier in time. (2) That the delay, therefore, being neither intentional nor deliberate but due to the circumstances mentioned in the foregoing para. is excusable and, therefore, the delay may be excused. (3) That under these circumstances, it is in the interest of justice that the delay in filing the appeals is condoned and after such condonation, the merits of the appeal are decided, in favour of the appellants. It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that the delay in filing the appeal may very kindly be excused and after condonation the merits of the appeal be decided in the larger interest of justice. " The first ground mentioned in the application for condonation of delay is that appellant No. l(a) Mst. Zuleikha Begum is an old lady while appellant No. l (b) Mst. Aqeela Bano is a Pardanasheen lady and appellant No.2 (Malik Mehraj-ud-Din) is an old man of about 80 years of age and bed ridden. It is nowhere disclosed in the application that when appellant No.2 fell ill and when he recovered from the illness. Mere assertion that appellant No. l (a) is an old lady and appellant No. l (b) is Pardanasheen did not make out a ground for condonation of delay in filing of the appeals. The application for condonation of delay. fails to make out any reason which prevented the appellants from pursuing the matter diligently. The ground A number 2 in the application is; that the delay in filing the appeals is neither intentional nor deliberate but on account of circumstances which are mentioned in paragraph 1 of the application. We have already referred to the assertions made in paragraph 1 of the application which are vague and no sufficient ground for condonation of delay is made out. The learned counsel has contended that in the circumstances of the case, delay should be condoned and has relied on the cases of Gopal Jeo Bigraha v. Mahmuda Begum (PLD 1968 Dacca 265), Chairman, District Screening Committee v. Sharif Ahmed Hashmi (PLD 1976 SC 258), Abdul Karim v. Muhammad Ibrahim (1976 SCMR 79) and an unreported decision in Civil Appeal No. 1145 of 1997 (Sana Ullah v. Rashid Ahmad and others), decided on 23-11-1998. None of the above cases relied by the learned counsel for the appellants is of any assistance in the present circumstances. The first-cited case of Gopal Jeo Bigraha v. Mahmuda Begum was a case where the plaintiff had instituted a suit for declaring the document alleged to have been executed by her as not binding and affecting her title. The appellant claimed in that suit, that she was a Pardanasheen poor woman. It was in the context of this controversy in that suit that Dacca High Court while examining the rule for appreciation of evidence of a Pardanasheen lady made the observation that the object of the rule which is applicable to a Pardanasheen lady is to protect the weak and helpless and consequently such a rule should not be restricted to. that class only but should apply to the case of a poor woman who is equally ignorant and illiterate though not a Pardanasheen woman in the strict sense of the term. The above observations have no application in. the circumstances - of the present cases where the appellants are seeking condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. In the case of Chairman, District Screening Committee v. Sharif Ahmed Hashmi (supra) that Court while examining scope of section 5 of Limitation Act observed that no hard and fast rule can be laid down for the purposes of condoning the delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was further observed that the question of sufficiency or otherwise of the circumstances to condone the delay are to be examined in the light of the facts of each case and that the Courts of Equity have always refused aid to enforce stale claims, or demands. Principle of laches, it was observed, applied strictly, where a public servant seek restoration to his office or other redress against a wrongful order. We fail to understand, how these observations in a service matter could help the appellants in the present case. In the case of Abdul Karim v. Muhammad Ibrahim (supra), the affidavit explaining the reasons preventing the respondent in that case from filing the appeal within time, were not controverted by the appellant and it was in these circumstances observed by this Court that the delay was rightly condoned by the Appellate Court. The facts of this case are equally distinguishable and have no application to the circumstances of these cases. In the last-cited case of Sana Ullah v. Rashid Ahmad and others (supra) the appeal filed before this Court was barred by one day and the grounds alleged for condonation of delay in that case were as follows:-- "That the petitioner under a bona fide legal mistake filed Civil Petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, dated 3-11-1996 on 9-5-1997 at Lahore. The petitioner laboured under an impression that since application under Order VII, Rule 11 of the, C.P.C. was dismissed by the learned trial Court and the judgment of the learned counsel trial Court was reversed by the High Court and since merits of the cash had not been adjudicated upon, therefore, petition for leave to appeal was competent. Petition for leave to appeal was filed well within time as prescribed by law i.e. 60 days. "' This Court having found the above grounds sufficient and reasonable for condoning one day's delay, accepted the application, persuaded by the reasons that on merits, the appellant had a strong case. This case equally is distinguishable on facts. No case for condoning the delay of 61 days in the above two appeals is made out. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed as time-barred. No order ac to costs. Appeal dismissed.