2009 SCMR 846 (PLP)

ZIA PERWEZ, J.

The petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the judgment dated 17-11-2008, whereby Writ Petition No.3233 of 2004 .was dismissed by the learned Single Judge in Chambers of the Islamabad High Court, Islamabad.

2. The petitioner is tenant of shop No.3-B Block No.12-C, Jinnah Super Market, Markaz F-7, Islamabad, hereinafter referred to as the "demised shop", under an agreement dated 1-9-2002 for a period of 11 months commencing from the date of agreement. On expiry of period of tenancy, the respondent/landlord moved application before the Rent Controller seeking eviction of the petitioner from the demised shop on the grounds, amongst others, that the period of tenancy expired and that of personal use. The application was allowed by the learned Rent Controller vide order dated 30-7-2004. The order of ejectment was maintained in appeal by the Additional District Judge, Islamabad vide judgment and decree dated 20-10-2004. Thereafter, the petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. The High Court recorded findings to the effect that the concurrent findings of fact which did not suffer from any legal infirmity which did not warrant any interference and dismissed the petition.

3. Mr. Muhammad Ishtiaq Ahmed Raja, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the petitioner attacked the findings on the ground of personal use and proceeded to argue that the mere fact of expiry of term of agreement does not override the provisions of section 17 of the said Ordinance and does not entitle the landlord to seek ejectment of the tenant on the ground of expiry period of tenancy. The provisions of the Islamabad Rent Restriction Ordinance, 2001, hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance" are attracted to tenants holding over the premises after expiry of term mentioned in the tenancy agreement who then become statutory tenants and are controlled by the provisions of section 17 of the Ordinance, which specifically protects the eviction of a tenant on the grounds as specified in subsection (2) thereof. Under the circumstances, the provisions of section 6 of the Ordinance could not be invoked to seek ejectment of the petitioner. On the other hand, Mr. Abdur Rasheed Awan has supported the concurrent findings of the Courts below against the petitioner.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record.

5. The ground of personal use has been duly considered at length in the impugned judgment. We find ourselves in agreement with' the reasoning, which does not call for further examination. To examine the second contention of the learned Advocate Supreme Court, we may first reproduce section 6 of the Ordinance:

"

6. Tenure of tenancy.--Subject to the provisions of section 17 no tenancy shall be valid beyond such period as the landlord and tenant may, by mutual agreement, fix before or after the commencement of the tenancy: Provided that a tenancy in force before the commencement of this Ordinance for which no period is fixed shall cease to be valid on the expiration of a period of two years from such commencement: Provided further that a tenancy which comes into force after the commencement of this Ordinance and for winch no period is fixed shall not be valid after expiration of period of six months from the date of the receipt by the tenant of a notice in writing given by the landlord terminating the tenancy." The plain reading of section 6 of the Ordinance commencing with the use of words "subject to the provisions of section 17" signifies that the provisions of section 17 continue to apply as grounds for eviction of the tenant in addition to a further condition of existence of a valid tenancy agreement. The words do not affect the rights conferred upon the parties by section 6 of the Ordinance but mean as conditional upon the observance of provisions of section 17 of the Ordinance as held while interpreting the words "subject to" by the Supreme Court in India in the case of KRCS Balakrishna Chetty and Sons and Co. v. The State AIR 1961 SC 1152. The violation of any of the provisions of section 17 may, therefore, continue to regulate the ground of eviction of the tenant by the landlord. Section 6 further reads "no tenancy shall be valid beyond such period as the landlord and tenant may, by mutual agreement, fix before or after the commencement of the tenancy." The Legislature has expressly provided that after expiry of the prescribed period as may be fixed by the mutual agreement agreed or fixed initially at the commencement of the tenancy or after such commencement no tenancy shall he valid. The "word valid" has not been defined under the said Ordinance Therefore reference is to be made to the ordinary dictionary meanings of the word "valid" as under: -- - "Chambers 21st Century Dictionary - "Valid. 1. said of an argument, objection, etc la) based on truth or sound reasoning: (b) well-grounded, having force 2 said of a ticket or official document. a legally acceptable for use. Black's Law Dictionary.-- 'Valid.--Having legal strength or force, executed with proper formalities, incapable of being rightfully overthrown or set aside. legally sufficient or efficacious; authorized by law. Good or sufficient in point of law; efficacious; executed with the proper formalities; incapable of being rightfully overthrown or set aside; sustainable and effective in law, as distinguished from that which exists or took place in fact or appearance, but has not the requisites to enable it to be recognized and enforced by law. A deed, will, or other instrument, which has received all the formalities required by law, is said to be valid." (underline/bold provided). Words and Phrases (permanent Edition) Volume 44:-- The term "valid" means in law having legal strength, force, and effect, or incapable of being rightfully overthrown or set aside. "Valid" means efficient, effective; accomplishing what is claimed or intended. "Valid" means good or sufficient in point of law; sustainable and effective in law." Taking into consideration the above meanings of the word "valid", the intention of the legislature clearly means that the tenancy ceases to have any legal force or strength on expiry of the time fixed by the agreement. The position is similar to that of expiry of any permission or licence, this being so the tenant looses the right to continue to occupy or to hold over the premises after expiry of the term fixed by the parties. Provisions of section 17 of the said Ordinance are similar to the provisions providing grounds of eviction under section 15 of Punjab Rented Premises Ordinance, 2007 and sections 15 and 18 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 which set forth the grounds for eviction of the tenant are almost similar as provided under the said Ordinance. However, section 6 of the Ordinance is in addition to the other grounds of eviction and is available exclusively with respect to the properties situated within the territorial limits where the provisions of the Ordinance apply. This being so the addition of section 6 creates an entirely a different situation as compared to the other statutes with respect to the terms of tenancy and grounds of ejectment of tenants in other areas. The result is that for the areas where the provisions of said Ordinance are attracted, by virtue of the provisions of section 6 of the Ordinance, the tenancy ceases to be valid and the fact of expiry of the period agreed between the parties as the tenure of tenancy would suffice to order the ejectment of the tenant by the Rent Controller. At the same time, the right of the landlord to seek eviction on the grounds specified under section 17 of the Ordinance also remains unaffected. The first and second provisos to section 6 of the Ordinance are attracted to cases prior to the commencement of the said Ordinance and to cases where no period is fixed respectively. In the instant case, the period of 11 months was expressly provided under the agreement and therefore no benefit is available to the petitioner under either proviso.

6. It is settled principle of interpretation that the Courts should adopt an interpretation, which may give meanings of each word of an enactment taking into consideration the spirit of such legislation. An interpretation, whereby any portion of an enactment is rendered ineffective is not to be adopted when clear meanings can be given to various provisions of an enactment in a harmonious manner as held by this Court in the cases of Shahid Nabi Malik and another v. Chief Election Commissioner and 7 others PLD 1997 SC 32, M. Aslam Khaki v. Muhammad Hashim PLD 2000 SC 225, Hafiz Abdul Waheed v. Mrs. Asma Jehangir PLD 2004 SC 219, D.G. Khan Cement Company Limited and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others 2004 SCMR 456 and Shoukat Baig v. Shahid Jamil PLD 2005 SC

530. We are of the view that in the instant case, the learned Single Judge of the High Court upheld the concurrent findings of both the Courts after examining the record in its true perspective and held that no case calling for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 was made out. Under the circumstances, no interference is warranted in the circumstances of the present petition.

7. For the foregoing reasons, this petition being without any merit is dismissed and leave to appeal is refused. S.A.K./Q-4/SC Leave refused.