P L D 1966 (W (PLP)
SIEMENS (PAKISTAN) EMPLOYEES UNION — Appellants Versus SIEMENS (PAKISTAN) ENGINEERING Co. LTD.,
| Citation | P L D 1966 (W (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Wahiduddin Ahmed, J |
| Parties | SIEMENS (PAKISTAN) EMPLOYEES UNION — Appellants Versus SIEMENS (PAKISTAN) ENGINEERING Co. LTD., |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1966 (W (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1966 (W (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Wahiduddin Ahmed, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1966 (W (PLP) (SIEMENS (PAKISTAN) EMPLOYEES UNION — Appellants Versus SIEMENS (PAKISTAN) ENGINEERING Co. LTD.,). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Abdul Majid for Appellants.
- S. M. Naim for Respondent No. 1.
- Nemo for Respondents Nos. 2 and 3.
- Dates of hearing: 10th and 13th May 1965.
Headnotes / Summary
(a) Industrial Disputes Ordinance (LVI of 1959)
S. 14(1) Second settlement between parties providing "all other conditions of employment except as modified herein shall remain in force as laid down in the last agreement" and that "the parties. undertake not to raise any demand for the period prior to the date of the execution of this settlement"‑First settlement entitling workmen to "full wages and allowances during absence" on account of work injury‑Second settlement coming into force on 14‑12‑62 allowing "14 days' full wages in a year"‑Claim relating to period prior to 14‑12‑62 to be settled according to provisions of first settlement. (b) Industrial Disputes Ordinance (LVI of 1959)
S. 14(1) Workmen entering into a settlement and relinquishing all pending demands‑Settlement providing for counting of lay‑off period for purpose of annual increments‑Concession not shown to have retrospective effect‑Cannot be claimed for period prior to date of settlement. (c) Industrial Disputes Ordinance (LVI of 1959)
S. 13 -Settlement‑Terms of agreement binding on parties‑Concessions not granted in settlement cannot be claimed.
Judgment & Decree
5. Coming to the second demand it will be noticed that under it the appellants have claimed that the period of lay‑off should be included in the period of service for purposes of grant of increments. It is not disputed that this claim was accepted by the employers for the first time under the second settlement. Under clause No. 5(d) of the said agreement the following settlement was arrived at between the parties:‑ "Demand No. 5.‑Wages for Lay‑Off (a) (b) (c) (d) In case of a lay‑off, keeping in view the smooth running of the workshops and departments concerned, the junior workmen in service in the affected sections of work or trade shall be laid off first, and wherever possible a policy of rotation in subsequent lay‑offs shall be applied. The period of lay‑off shall be included in the period of services for the purposes of grant of annual increment. For the accrual of annual leave and other benefits the provisions of the Factories Act in respect of period of lay‑off shall apply. It is admitted that the Management is implementing the settlement in this respect from the 14th of December 1962. The appellants, however, claim that this clause also applies to the past period and should be given retrospective effect the learned Industrial Court has rejected this plea because it is of the opinion that under the terms of the agreement this concession was not given retrospective effect. The learned representative of the appellants has admitted before me that no such concession was granted to the appellants under the first agreement. It was granted for the first time under the Settlement dated 14th December 1962. It was, therefore, necessary for the appellants to satisfy me that it was given retrospective effect. I have not been able to find out any such term in the agreement which can lead to the conclusion that it has retrospective effect. On the contrary, as stated earlier, the appellants had relinquished all their pending demands in B lieu of the acceptance of the terms under the second settlement. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the learned Industrial Court that this term of the settlement cannot be given retrospective effect.
6. I do not find any force in the argument of Mr. Abdul Majid, that under the definition of a "Permanent Workman" as given in Standing Orders Ordinance III of 1960, the employees are entitled to get the lay‑off period counted towards their period of service for purposes of increment. Under it a workman is considered as permanent if he is engaged on permanent basis and includes a person who has completed his probationary period satisfactorily. It further provides that while calculating the period of probation any break therein which may be due to strike has to be included. It does not in the least confer any benefit on the workman in respect of lay‑off period for purposes of increment. Similarly, the contention of the learned representative that the Explanation of section 49‑B of the Factories Act 1934, is helpful to the appellants' case, has also not impressed me. It deals only with the question of annual holidays which a worker is allowed on completion of a period of twelve months continuous service in a factory. The Explanation only provides that a worker shall be deemed to have completed this period of service notwithstanding any interruption during this period brought about by a strike which is not an illegal one. This certainly can have no possible bearing on the point under consideration. These are nothing else but concession granted to a workman in certain circumstances which has nothing to do with increments.
7. The last question for consideration is whether the learned Industrial Court was justified in rejecting the claim of the appellants that the Bonus should be calculated at the rate of sixty basic hours. The appellants' case is that for financial year 1958‑59 the basic hours were fixed at sixty. Similarly, in the year 1959‑60, sixty basic hours were fixed for calculating the Bonus. Their grievance is that though for 1960‑61, originally a notice was displayed fixing 60 hours, but soon thereafter it was changed into 50 basis hours, and on that basis bonus was paid to the workers. This according to the appellants was not proper. Their representative contended that no reason has been made out for changing 60 basic hours into 50 basic hours. In order to appreciate this dispute it may be mentioned here that the appellants' demand for bonus was accepted by the contesting respondent under a settlement dated 12th December 1959. In this connection the parties agreed as under:‑ "It has been mutually agreed to pay an annual bonus to hourly workers whenever the financial position of the company allow on the following scale:‑ (a) Workers putting up their service between 6 but below 12 months of the financial year of the company (i.e., from 1st October to 30th September) will get 50 per cent. of a number of hours fixed for every financial year according to its result ... ... ... ... (b) Workers putting up their service 1 but below 2 years ... ... ... 100 (c) Workers puting up their service 2 but below 3 years ... ... ... 150 (d) Workers putting up their service 3 but below 4 years ... ... ... 200 (e) Workers putting up their service 4 but below 5 years ... ... ... ... 300 (f ) More than 5 years of the number of hours mentioned under para (a) ... ... 400 For the financial year 1958‑59 the basic hours are fixed at 60." Thus, it is quite clear that 60 basic hours were only fixed for financial year 1958‑
59. In respect of subsequent year basic hours were to be calculated according to the formula reproduced above. It is conceded on behalf of the appellants that if this formula is adhered to some of the workers will not be entitled to to get bonus on the basis of 60 basic hours. They, however, contended that since the Management in subsequent years also paid bonus on the basis of 60 basic hours, there is no justification to change the basic hours and to pay it on the basis of 50 basic hours.
8. On the other hand, the Management has contended that this agreement was reiterated by the parties in the second settlement dated 14th December 1962. Under it the appellants agreed by para. 1 of Demand No. 1 that all other conditions of employment except as modified shall remain in force as provided in the last agreement dated 12th December 1959, which included bonus formula for hourly workers also. It is contended on their behalf that the appellants are not entitled to by‑pass this agreement and to raise a new demand during the continuation of the said settlement. The contention of the Management is not without force. In law parties are bound by the terms of the agreement/ accepted by them and they are not entitled to claim any concession which has not been granted to them. The appellants are unable to establish that all their workmen can claim bonus at 60 basic hours under the above formulae. It is next contended by the appellants that the hourly rated workers should be paid bonus on the basis of the same formulae which is applicable to the monthly paid staff. Their representative urged that no discrimination should be made by the Management in this behalf. This argument has no force in view of the solemn agreement arrived at between the parties. The appellants even in 1962 agreed that the bonus should be paid to them on the basis of the formulae agreed upon in 1959. In view of the clear terms of the agreement it is not open to them to raise this new plea.
9. After going through the evidence led by the parties I am satisfied that the Management is treating its employers very generously. The evidence on the record shows that the employers have not earned any profit during the years 1960‑61 and 1961‑
62. Since the grant of bonus is dependent on the financial position of the company, it was open to the respondent‑company to express their inability to meet this demand. Instead they are paying bonus to their workmen ex‑gratia. In the written argu ments submitted by the respondent‑company they have agreed to increase the minimum basic hours for the year 1961‑62 from 50 to 52 on the condition that the actual amount payable would be worked out exactly according to the bonus formulae laid down in the settlement dated 12th December 1959. This is without prejudice to their rights regarding payment of bonus during the period prior or subsequent to 1961‑
62. Thus, in this way the respondents have increased the bonus to the extent of four per cent. and the maximum amount payable will work out to one month's wages. The appellants have not accepted this offer. In spite of that the respondents have agreed to pay them bonus on this basis for the year 1961‑62, subject to the condition that the arrears will be payable only to such of the workers who were entitled and paid bonus for the year 1961‑62 @ 50 basic hours and who are still in their employment. In the light of the above discussion I would hold that the Industrial Court was fully justified in rejecting the appellants claim for bonus at the rate of sixty basic hours.
10. In the result the appeal is allowed in respect of Demand No.
1. Subject to the above remarks the appeal is dismissed in respect of the rest of the demands. Parties are to bear their own costs. S.Q. Appeal partly accepted.