P L D 1961 Supreme Court 57 (PLP)

B. Z. KAIKAUS, J.-This judgment will dispose of Civil Petitions for Special Leave to Appeals Nos. 21-D, 16 and 170 and Writ Petitions Nos. 1-D and 5 of 1960, which are all directed against the orders of the Central Industrial Court at Karachi refusing the petitioners in all these cases to be represented by their office bearers in proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance LVI of 1959 on the ground that such office bearers were at the same time legal practitioners. The decision of the question involved in these cases turns upon the interpretation of section 34 of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance LVI of 1959 which runs :- "

34. Representation of parties.-(1) A workman who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceedings under this Ordinance by an officer of a registered trade union, and any employer who is a party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any such proceedings by an officer of an association of employers. (2) No party to an industrial dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings, or, except with the consent of all the parties to the dispute, in any proceedings before a Court adjudicating such dispute." Subsection (1) of this section allows a workman to be represented in any proceedings under the Ordinance by an officer of a registered trade union and an employer to be represented in any industrial dispute by an officer of an association of employers, while subsection (2) forbids representation of any party to industrial dispute to be represented in any proceedings before an industrial Court by a legal practitioner except with the consent of all the parties to dispute. The matters pending before the industrial Court out of which these five cases arise are all industrial disputes. The petitioners in four of these cases are unions of employers, while in one case, namely, Civil Petition for Special Leave -to Appeal No. 170 of 1960, the petitioner is a union of employees. All the petitioners wanted to be represented in proceedings before the Industrial Court by their office bearers who are at the same time legal practitioners. The question for consideration is as to which of the two subsections of section 34 is to be read as subject to the other, for the two subsections, if read without any qualification, are inconsistent with each other. In order that the two may be read together h it will be necessary to regard one of them as containing a general proposition and the other as containing a proviso to such a general proposition. Not much consideration would be needed for reaching a conclusion that it is only the second subsection that can be read as a proviso or exception to the first, and that by no reasonable construction can the first subsection be regarded as the proviso to the second. The first subsection is in fact in the nature of a general provision contained in procedural enactments entitling, parties to be represented by other persons. For instance, in Order III of the Civil Procedure Code it is provided that parties can be represented by recognised agents. Had the provision in section 34 (1) been to the effect that parties may be represented by recognised agents there would have been little difficulty in holding that the provision in subsection (2) forbidding legal practitioners from appearing in industrial disputes was an exception to the first subsection, and we do not think that the fact that office bearers are to represent parties instead of recognised agents makes any difference. The conclusion that the second subsection is a proviso to the first is supported also by the order in which the two provisions are placed. It would be, to say the least, very unusual that an exception should be placed before the general proposition. Also, had the intention of the law been as is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners section 34 would have been differently worded. It would have stated that legal practitioners were not allowed to appear unless they happened to be office bearers of a union or an association of employers, and, in any case, it should have been made clear subsections of section 34 is to be read as subject to the other, for the two subsections, if read without any qualification, are inconsistent with each other. In order that the two may be read together it will be necessary to regard one of them as containing a general proposition and the other as containing a proviso to such a general proposition. Not much consideration would be needed for reaching a conclusion that it is only the second subsection that can be read as a proviso or exception to the first, and that by no reasonable construction can the first subsection be regarded as a proviso to the second. The first subsection is in fact in the nature of a general provision contained in the procedural enactments entitling parties to be represented by other persons. For instance, in Order III of the Civil Procedure Code it is provided that parties can be represented by recognised agents. Had the provision in section 34 (1) been to the effect that parties may be represented by recognised agents there would have been little difficulty in holding that the provision in subsection (2) forbidding legal practitioners from appearing in industrial disputes was an exception to the first subsection, and we do not think that the fact that office bearers are to represent parties instead of the recognized agents makes any difference. The conclusion that the second subsection is a proviso to the first is supported also by the order in which the two provisions are placed. It would be, to say the least, very unusual that an exception should be placed before the general proposition. Also, had the intention of the law been as is contended by learned counsel for the petitioners section 34 would have been differently worded. It would have stated that legal practitioners were not allowed to appear unless they happened to be office bearers of a union or an association of employers, and, in any case, it should have been made clear that a legal practitioner who was also an office bearer was not debarred from appearing.' As the section stands it is unsuited for giving expression to the meaning that is contended for it by learned counsel for the petitioners. Obviously, the Legislature regarded the appearance of legal practitioners (except in cases where all parties consent) in proceedings before Industrial Courts undesirable, for what reason it is not necessary to go into. It cannot be contended that the defect in the legal practitioner would disappear if at the same time he happened to be an office bearer of an association, and if the defect does not disappear than the interpretation for which learned counsel for the petitioners contends will not be consistent with the object which the Legislature had in view in disallowing a legal practitioner from appearing in an industrial dispute. Another reason for not accepting the interpretation contended for by the petitioners is that the law could be easily defeated if we accept it. There is no bar to the legal practitioners being appointed honorary office bearers of unions or associations, and in all cases legal practitioners could without any difficulty be introduced in proceedings before the Industrial Court in the guise of office bearers. We understand from M. Fazlul Rehrnan, who appears in some of these cases, that the office bearers by whom they wanted to be represented were honorary office bearers. Some decisions of Indian Courts were cited before us. They all deal with section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act of 1947 whose wording is different. Even otherwise we are not satisfied with the reasoning of these judgments. We hold that the legal practitioners who are office bearers of associations or unions were not entitled to appear before the E Industrial Court, and that the orders of the Industrial Court refusing to allow them to represent parties before them were justified in law. All these petitions are dismissed. There is no order as to costs. K. B. A. Petitions dismissed.