P L D 1964 W (PLP)
Mst. RASHIDAN‑‑‑‑Petitioner Versus SHAH NAWAZ — ‑Respondent
| Citation | P L D 1964 W (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Nasir Ahmad, Member Board of Revenue, |
| Parties | Mst. RASHIDAN‑‑‑‑Petitioner Versus SHAH NAWAZ — ‑Respondent |
| Primary Law | ORDER |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1964 W (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: ORDER as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1964 W (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Nasir Ahmad, Member Board of Revenue,.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1964 W (PLP) (Mst. RASHIDAN‑‑‑‑Petitioner Versus SHAH NAWAZ — ‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Fazal Illahi Taftery for Petitioner.
- Mohammad Anwar Buttar for Respondent.
Headnotes / Summary
Rehabilitation Laws‑General‑Object is to settle refugees Laws cease to be effective on rightful claimant's settlement‑Cash of succession is to be decided by Revenue Authority alone‑ Punjab Land Revenue Act (XIII of 1887), S,
34. Syed Abdul Rashid v. Pakistan P L D 1962 S C 42; Ramzan v. Rehabilitation Commis6ioner (Legal) and others P L D 1963 L ah. 461 and Peaogul v. The State I' L D 1960 S C 307 ref. This case relates to the succession of Abdul Aziz, a displaced person, who held land in village Kot Waris district Gujranwala. Abdul Aziz died in 1959 and the Assistant Collector decided his inheritance in favour of his widow Rashidan vide mutation No. 425 dated 3‑9‑1959. An appeal was preferred against this order before the D. R. C., Gujranwala by Shahnawaz, the present respondent before me. He claimed to be a collateral of the deceased. In support of his claim, he produced certain documentary evidence which was accepted by the D. R. C. who set aside the order passed by the Assistant Collector and directed that under Shariat 3/4th of the property of the deceased be given to Shahnawaz and the remaining J /4th allowed to remain with the petitioner Rashidan. The latter went in revision against this order before the Additional Commissioner, Lahore, who declined to interfere on grounds of jurisdiction, the matter having been decided by a Rehabilitation Authority. Rashidan has now come up in second revision. The main argument that has been advanced before me is that the D. R. C. had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal that his order is a nullity in law and should be set aside. Reliance in this behalf is placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court, Syed Abdur Rashid v. Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, Karachi (P L D 1962 S C 42) Claims Commissioner, Pakistan and 3 others and Ayub Khan v. The Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division and 3 others (1). It was held in that case that the Rehabilitation Authorities only deal with the claims of right. holders and once these claims have been confirmed it is the Revenue Authorities who proceed to deal with cases of succession, inherit ance or acquisition of any other right by purchase, mortgage, gift etc., regarding Tie confirmed land. In support of this view reliance was placed on the instructions issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner in Memorandum No. 4953‑54/3917 1, (L), dated the 14th April, 1954 and also the amendment sub sequently carried out in subsection (1) of section 34 by the Punjab Land Revenue Amendment Act, 1954 (IV of 1955). This amend ment clearly shows that allotment of evacuee land under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme created an interest in land which had to be recorded by the Revenue Authorities in the Record‑of-Rights like any other succession of rights in non‑evacuee land. This was the stand taken by R.C. (Legal) before me who urged that once land is confirmed in favour a refugee all subsequent acquisition of rights in it by inheritance, purchase, mortgage, gift etc., have to be dealt with by the Revenue Authorities. Up to the time of confirmation it is merely a claim and the Rehabilitation Authorities deal with it including claims by inheritance or succes sion. The counsel for the respondent relies on Ramzan v. Rehabilita tion Commissioner (Legal) and others (P L D 1963 Lah. 460), In the concluding paragraph of this judgment Manzoor Qadir, Chief Justice observed that it was not necessary for him to deal with the issue whether Revenue Authorities are or are not competent to deal with property acquired by Government and acquisition of rights in respect of it e.g. like rights of succession, inheritance, gift etc. The Assistant Advocate‑General who had appeared in that case was not able to take up a clear stand and the matter was left undecided in view of the judgment in Abdus Salam v. Waheeduddin. Another argument which is urged is that the amendment of section 34 referred to above is repugnant to the Evacuee Laws enacted by the Central Legislature and has, therefore, no legal sanction behind it. Now the object of Rehabilitation Laws is to settle refugees and once to settlement of a rightful claimant has been made the Rehabilitation Laws should cease to be effective. This is the stand which has been taken by the Rehabilitation Authorities themselves, and this stand is in keeping with the scheme of rehabilitation of refugees. Obviously, therefore, the D. R. C. was not competent to deal with the appeal. Mr. Buttar has, in the alternative, taken up the plea that the D. R. C. was also the Revenue Assistant and thus competent to deal with the appeal. In this connection he has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court, Peaogul v. The State (P L D 1960 S G 307). All Revenue Assistants, however, do not exercise appellate powers as Collector and it has not been proved before me that Sh. Bashir Ahmad the officer who decided this appeal exercised these powers. As a result of the above reasoning I would accept the revision petition on the ground that the D.R.C. did not have jurisdiction to deal with this case and the order passed by him is nullity in law. In view, however, of the claim which has been put forward by the respondents, as collaterals of the deceased, i.e., last male holder of the property. I would remand the case to the Assistant Collector, II Grade and direct that he should give an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence in support '8f their claim. The mutation should then be decided afresh on merits. K. M. A. Revision accepted.
Judgment & Decree
Fazal Illahi Taftery for Petitioner. Mohammad Anwar Buttar for Respondent. This case relates to the succession of Abdul Aziz, a displaced person, who held land in village Kot Waris district Gujranwala. Abdul Aziz died in 1959 and the Assistant Collector decided his inheritance in favour of his widow Rashidan vide mutation No. 425 dated 3‑9‑1959. An appeal was preferred against this order before the D. R. C., Gujranwala by Shahnawaz, the present respondent before me. He claimed to be a collateral of the deceased. In support of his claim, he produced certain documentary evidence which was accepted by the D. R. C. who set aside the order passed by the Assistant Collector and directed that under Shariat 3/4th of the property of the deceased be given to Shahnawaz and the remaining J /4th allowed to remain with the petitioner Rashidan. The latter went in revision against this order before the Additional Commissioner, Lahore, who declined to interfere on grounds of jurisdiction, the matter having been decided by a Rehabilitation Authority. Rashidan has now come up in second revision. The main argument that has been advanced before me is that the D. R. C. had no jurisdiction to decide the appeal that his order is a nullity in law and should be set aside. Reliance in this behalf is placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court, Syed Abdur Rashid v. Pakistan, through the Secretary, Ministry of Refugees and Rehabilitation, Karachi (P L D 1962 S C 42) Claims Commissioner, Pakistan and 3 others and Ayub Khan v. The Rehabilitation Commissioner, Lahore Division and 3 others (1). It was held in that case that the Rehabilitation Authorities only deal with the claims of right. holders and once these claims have been confirmed it is the Revenue Authorities who proceed to deal with cases of succession, inherit ance or acquisition of any other right by purchase, mortgage, gift etc., regarding Tie confirmed land. In support of this view reliance was placed on the instructions issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner in Memorandum No. 4953‑54/3917 1, (L), dated the 14th April, 1954 and also the amendment sub sequently carried out in subsection (1) of section 34 by the Punjab Land Revenue Amendment Act, 1954 (IV of 1955). This amend ment clearly shows that allotment of evacuee land under the Rehabilitation Settlement Scheme created an interest in land which had to be recorded by the Revenue Authorities in the Record‑of-Rights like any other succession of rights in non‑evacuee land. This was the stand taken by R.C. (Legal) before me who urged that once land is confirmed in favour a refugee all subsequent acquisition of rights in it by inheritance, purchase, mortgage, gift etc., have to be dealt with by the Revenue Authorities. Up to the time of confirmation it is merely a claim and the Rehabilitation Authorities deal with it including claims by inheritance or succes sion. The counsel for the respondent relies on Ramzan v. Rehabilita tion Commissioner (Legal) and others (P L D 1963 Lah. 460), In the concluding paragraph of this judgment Manzoor Qadir, Chief Justice observed that it was not necessary for him to deal with the issue whether Revenue Authorities are or are not competent to deal with property acquired by Government and acquisition of rights in respect of it e.g. like rights of succession, inheritance, gift etc. The Assistant Advocate‑General who had appeared in that case was not able to take up a clear stand and the matter was left undecided in view of the judgment in Abdus Salam v. Waheeduddin. Another argument which is urged is that the amendment of section 34 referred to above is repugnant to the Evacuee Laws enacted by the Central Legislature and has, therefore, no legal sanction behind it. Now the object of Rehabilitation Laws is to settle refugees and once to settlement of a rightful claimant has been made the Rehabilitation Laws should cease to be effective. This is the stand which has been taken by the Rehabilitation Authorities themselves, and this stand is in keeping with the scheme of rehabilitation of refugees. Obviously, therefore, the D. R. C. was not competent to deal with the appeal. Mr. Buttar has, in the alternative, taken up the plea that the D. R. C. was also the Revenue Assistant and thus competent to deal with the appeal. In this connection he has relied on a judgment of the Supreme Court, Peaogul v. The State (P L D 1960 S G 307). All Revenue Assistants, however, do not exercise appellate powers as Collector and it has not been proved before me that Sh. Bashir Ahmad the officer who decided this appeal exercised these powers. As a result of the above reasoning I would accept the revision petition on the ground that the D.R.C. did not have jurisdiction to deal with this case and the order passed by him is nullity in law. In view, however, of the claim which has been put forward by the respondents, as collaterals of the deceased, i.e., last male holder of the property. I would remand the case to the Assistant Collector, II Grade and direct that he should give an opportunity to the parties to adduce evidence in support '8f their claim. The mutation should then be decided afresh on merits. K. M. A. Revision accepted.