P L D 1980 Lahore 316 (PLP)

This long and protracted litigation relates to House No. S-50-R-49, Lakhashmi Mansion, Hall Road, Lahore which has been transferred to the respondent under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The respondent, firstly applied for the ejectment of the appellant under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 on 3-2-1964 and the learned Rent Controller made a direction against the appellant under section 13(6) of the Ordinance-on 2-5-1964 which was appealed against by the appellant under section 15 of the Ordinance. The learned Additional District Judge, Lahore dismissed that appeal on 2-2-1966 with a direction to appear before the learned Rent Controller for further proceedings. The aforesaid order passed by the appellate authority was assailed in second appeal i.e., S. A. O. No..53/1966 by the present appellant. During the pendency of that appeal the dispute was compromised and abovementioned S. A. O. was decided to terms of the compromise by the learned brother Mr. Noor-ul-Arifin Judge, as he then was on 18-4-1967. According to the decision passed in S. A. O. No. 53/1966, the present appellant undertook to pay rent of the premises in question to the present respondent at the rate of Rs. 45 p. m. w. e. f. 26-3-1960. up to 31-5-1967 and failing that S. A. O. No. 53/1966 would stand withdrawn resulting in the forthwith eviction of the appellant from the premises in question. The appellant, however, pursuant to the aforesaid judgment of this Court, admittedly paid the rent due to the respondent and consequently the present respondent got her eviction petition filed as withdr-awn per terms of the abovementioned decision based upon compromise.

2. Later on the present appellant discontinued to make payments of stipulated rent of the premises in question to the present respondent. Ultimately the present respondent under the compelling circumstances again resorted to invoke the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller and therefore submitted another application for ejectment under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 on 14-1-1975 alongwith certified copies of the statements of the parties as well as decision of this Court passed in S. A. O. No. 53 of 1966. The learned Rent Controller while taking into consideration the material placed upon the record passed a direction under section 13(6) of the Ordinance on 2-3-1976 for payment of arrears of rent as well as future rent at the stipulated rate of Rs. 45/P. M. Despite repeated adjournments, the appellant could not produce receipts and the learned Rent Controller ultimately parsed an eviction order against the appellant pertaining to the premises in dispute on 11-10-1976. Being dissatisfied, the appellant assailed that eviction order in appeal which was heard by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore who dismissed the same on 29-t-1977. The petitioner again has assailed the correctness of the aforesaid impugned orders in this second appeal.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire record of the case as well as of S. A. O. 53/1966 requisitioned by me on the request of learned counsel for the respondent.

4. The only contention which has been canvassed before me by the learned counsel for the appellant is that without first resolving the objections regarding the non-service of requisite notice under section 30 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and non-existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties raised by the appellant in his written statement, the learned Rent Controller had no jurisdiction to make a direction under section 131,6) of the said Ordinance to deposit arrears of rent as well future rent and consequently the non-compliance of such unlawful order could not entail the eviction of the appellant from the premises in question. He vehemently contended that the direction issued under section 13(6) of the Ordinance and subsequent order of eviction due to default in the compliance of such an order being without jurisdiction and nullity in the eye of law were liable to be ignored by the present appellant.. While developing his arguments further he submitted that it was not incumbent upon the appellant to deposit the past and, future rent in compliance of such a void direction. and consequently he was not liable to eviction under section 13(6) of the Ordinance. He placed reliance on decisions given in Muhammad Ismail v. Israr Ahmad (1) and E. A. Evans v. Muhammad 'Ashraf (2). On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondent adverted my attention towards the certified copies of judgments and statements made in S. A. O. No. 53/1966 which were placed by the respondent in support of her case before the Rent Controller. Original file pertaining to S. A. O. 53/1966 was also requisitioned by me at the request of the learned counsel for the appellant and the same was also gone through by me with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. Relevant extracts from these documents may be quoted advantageously for ready reference as under :- (1) P L D 1961 Lah. 601 (2) P L D 1964 S C 536 (a) Ground No. 5 (ii) appended with S. A. O. No. 53/1966 filed by the appellant reads as under : "That the acceptance of the service of the notice given by the applicant-respondent does not and cannot make the appellant as her tenant. (b) An extract from the order dated 2-3-1966 passed by the Additional District Judge in earlier appeal filed by the appellant is as under :- . "All the requirements of section 30 of Act No. XXVIII of 1958 under which statutory tenancy is brought about between the occupant and transferee of the formally evacuee property appear to be satisfied." (c) Relevant extract from the judgment dated 18-4-1967 passed by this Court in S. A. O. 53 of 1966 is as under : "The joint statement stipulates that the appellant will deposit all arrears of rent at the rate of Rs. 45 per month from 26-3-1960 up to 31st May, 1967 by 1st May, 1967, in the Court of Mi. Muhammad Islam Bhatti, Rent Controller, Lahore, and on this deposit being made, the ejectment application of the respondent will stand withdrawn. 1n default of such deposit by the stipulated date, the present appeal will stand withdrawn. It is therefore ordered accordingly.

2. On the amount of arrears of rent being deposited in Court as aforesaid, the same will be paid to the respondent ........................

5. There is no denying of the fact that in pursuance of the above referred judgment the present appellant deposited the specified rent and the same was withdrawn by the present respondent towards the satisfaction of rent due to her with regard to the premises in question.

6. In the given circumstances of this case, in my opinion, the learned Rent Controller committed no error in coming to the conclusion that their existed a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Moreover i is manifest from the above that the service of requisite notice under section 3 of Act No. XXVIII of 1958 had been admitted by the present appellant i his previous litigation and now it does not lie in his mouth to say otherwise Evidently all the disputes between the parties regarding service of requisite notice and existence of relationship of landlord and tenant stand resolve and concluded by the decision given in S. A. O. 53 of 1966. Once it is held that the appellant is a tenant of the respondent he will always be demeed to be a tenant under her. The moment, a complete relationship of landlord and tenant is established, the rule of estoppel comes into operation an prevents a tenant from denying the authority and title which he admitted to rest in the landlord. Moreover the acceptance of rent by a landlor treates the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and after such acceptance either of them is not entitled to make the denial of it subsequently. In the instant case the position, therefore, is that the appellant contested the first eviction petition on the footing that he was not a tenant and was also not served with a notice under section 3 of Act No. XXVIII of 1958 and when the eviction order was passed again him he assailed it in first appeal before the Appellate Authority and on it dismissal went in second appeal before the High Court where h submitted himself to a compromise and made payments of rent for quite a considerable length of time. Now it is not open to him to turn round a this stage and avoid the result of the default which he has admittedly committed by setting up the plea of non-existence of relationship of landlord and tenant on account of non-service of requisite notice under section 30 of Act No. XXVIII of 1958.

7. The policy laid down in section 13(6) of the West Pakistan Urba Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 seems to be that the Legislature is no minded to protect a tenant who will not even pay the. monthly rent regularly. If the tenant on being directed to pay the arrears of rent as well as the future rent month by month, does not do so, the said Ordinance quite clearly provides that he will by his own conduct and behaviour forfeit the special protection which the Ordinance confers on tenants.

8. Facing this, the learned counsel for the appellant argued that the respondent only owned 84 per cent. share in the premises in question and the remaining 16 per cent share belonged to the appellant. He further contended that no effective ejectment order can be passed with respect to a joint and undemarcated premises. I am afraid that this contention has no force and can easily be repelled by referring para. 7 of the memo of this appeal wherein it has been specifically admitted by the present appellant that the respondent had acquired the ownership with regard to the remaining 16 per cent share of the suit premises on the basis of decree for specific performance of the contract passed in her favour. Resultantly the respondent had become the owner of the entire premises in question exclusively. This contention too has no force and the same is hereby repelled.

9. The case-law cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is not relevant and cannot be attracted to the facts of this case as the appellant evidently himself had admitted the acceptance of a requisite notice under section 30 served upon him on behalf of the respondent. Section 30 of Act No. XXVIII of 1958 does not postulate the service of notice by a transferee as a condition precedent for filing subsequent ejectment petitions every time. It only provides one notice after the transfer of property by the Settlement Department.

10. The upshot of the above discussion is that the impugned orders are not contrary to law. The appeal has no merit and the same is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.