PLD 2011

P L D 2011 Lahore 265 (PLP)

KHAWAR IQBAL — Petitioner Versus NADIA KHAN and others — Respondents

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
N/A
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation P L D 2011 Lahore 265 (PLP)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members N/A
Parties KHAWAR IQBAL — Petitioner Versus NADIA KHAN and others — Respondents
Primary Law Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 2011 Lahore 265 (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 2011 Lahore 265 (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: N/A.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 2011 Lahore 265 (PLP) (KHAWAR IQBAL — Petitioner Versus NADIA KHAN and others — Respondents). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (VIII of 1961)

Representation

  • Sohail Mehmood for Petitioner.
  • Hassan Raza for Respondent.
  • 4. On the other band the learned counsel for respondent No.1 has contended that she has exercised the right of divorce delegated through 'Nikahnama' with her free consent and had given an intimation of the same to the Arbitration Council and the petitioner by sending them the copies of divorce deed dated 5-11-2010. It is thus urged that no illegality has been committed and now the matter is pending with respondent No.2 and if no reconciliation takes place, it would automatically become effective after expiry of period of 90 days of the receipt of notice even without formal order in this regard. It is urged that the notice could have not been assailed through constitutional petition. In this respect reliance is placed on Ch. Muhammad Javed V. The Chairman, Union Committee (Arbitration Council), Lahore Cantt. and another (1999 YLR 2399).

Headnotes / Summary

Ss. 7 & 8

Constitution of Pakistan, Art.199

Constitutional petition

Talaq

Wife had been delegated the rights of talaq

Validity and effect of pronouncement of `talaq'--Petitioner/husband challenged the initiation of proceedings for confirmation of divorce by the Chairman, Arbitration Council in the wake of exercise of delegated right of divorce by the wife

Petitioner contended that without formal pronouncement of talaq, reconciliation proceedings could not be initiated by the Arbitration Council

Validity

Where wife exercised the delegated right of divorce, S.8 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 provided that provisions of S.7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 would apply mutatis mutandis

No formal mode for exercise of the right was prescribed

Notice in writing to the Chairman, Arbitration Council about the exercise of the right was the only requirement

Wife had duly made the pronouncement by executing the deed and transmitting the. copies to the husband and the Chairman, Arbitration Council

Petitioner's contention that divorce was not `talaq' so the execution of divorce deed did not amount to `talaq' was misconceived

Divorce meant dissolution of marriage (talaq) and separation

Under S.7(3) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, notice of 'talaq', if not revoked, will become effective after expiry of 90 days of its delivery to the Chairman, Arbitration Council

Constitutional petition was dismissed.

Judgment & Decree

RAUF AHMAD SHEIKH, J.

The petitioner has assailed the vires and legality of notices issued by respondent No.2 under section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance. 1961 and the impugned order for initiation of proceedings of confirmation of divorce given to the petitioner by respondent No.1, through exercise of the right of divorce delegated to her by contending that the same are illegal, against the provisions of Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961 (Ordinance No.VIII of 1961); without authority and as such are of no legal effect/consequence.

2. The brief facts as emerge on perusal of the record are that the petitioner and respondent No.1 entered into the contract of ' Nikah' as per 'Nikahnama' registered at Rawalpindi on dated 14-8-2000, where-under the petitioner had delegated the right of divorce to respondent No.1 respondent No.1 by exercising her right, executed divorce deed dated 5-11-2010, whereafter the proceedings commenced before the Chairman Arbitration Council and the impugned notices were accordingly issued to the petitioner.

3. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that under section 8 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, the pronouncement of 'Talaq' must be made by the wife while exercising her delegated right of divorce otherwise the Arbitration Council cannot take any step towards reconciliation proceedings and also cannot declare that the divorce has become effective. In support of the contentions raised, he has placed reliance on Dr. Qambar Murtaza Bokhari v. Mst. Zainab Bashir (PLD 1995 Lahore 187). It is further urged that without formal pronouncement of 'Talaq' no action whatsoever could have been taken and as such all proceedings conducted before respondent No.2 are void ab initio. It is further contended that previously respondent No.1 had given a notice of 'Talaq' through divorce deed dated 26-11-2004 but then the compromise had taken place and the proceedings were held in abeyance so the right to divorce could have not been exercised for the second time and as such the divorce deed dated 5-11-2010 has no value in the eyes of law. It has then been urged that the divorce deed dated 5-11-2010 does not amount to pronouncement of 'Talaq' because 'Talaq' and 'divorce' are not synonymous and as such the whole proceedings before respondent No.2 are vitiated.

4. On the other band the learned counsel for respondent No.1 has contended that she has exercised the right of divorce delegated through 'Nikahnama' with her free consent and had given an intimation of the same to the Arbitration Council and the petitioner by sending them the copies of divorce deed dated 5-11-2010. It is thus urged that no illegality has been committed and now the matter is pending with respondent No.2 and if no reconciliation takes place, it would automatically become effective after expiry of period of 90 days of the receipt of notice even without formal order in this regard. It is urged that the notice could have not been assailed through constitutional petition. In this respect reliance is placed on Ch. Muhammad Javed V. The Chairman, Union Committee (Arbitration Council), Lahore Cantt. and another (1999 YLR 2399).

5. Admittedly the right of divorce was delegated to respondent No.1 through 'Nikahnama' dated 14-8-2000. This, was unconditional delegation. In case the wife exercises the right delegated to her, the provisions of section 7 of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, apply mutatis mutandis as provided under section 8 of the Ordinance ibid. No formal mode for exercise of the right is prescribed and the only requirement is that a notice in writing must be given to the Chairman about exercise of the right. Admittedly respondent No.1 executed the deed dated 5-11-2010 and transmitted the copies of the same to the petitioner and the Chairman so the pronouncement is duly made by her. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the divorce is not 'Talaq' so the execution of divorce deed does not amount to pronouncement of 'Talaq' is absolutely misconceived. The divorce means dissolution of marriage (Talaq) and also separation. Respondent No.1 has exercised the right, which was unconditionally delegated to her in the ' Nikahnama'. No formal order to give effectiveness to it is required rather in view of section 7(3) of the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance, 1961, if not revoked, it will become effective 'after expiry of 90 days of its delivery to respondent No.2. The contention that the similar notice was given in 2004 and a compromise had taken place in regard thereto and the proceedings were postponed so the second notice could have not been issued is also ill-founded because admittedly after the service of notice in 2004, the parties joined hands and started living together so the notice stood revoked automatically and the said proceedings came to an end.

6. For the reasons supra, the writ petition is without merits and the same is hereby dismissed. A.R.K./K-7/L Petition dismisse