1996 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

In seeking leave to appeal, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the learned Tribunal was not justified in modifying the penalty of compulsory retirement of respondent from service as the departmental authority had found him guilty after holding thorough enquiry in accordance with the rules. It is accordingly, contended that the case deserves to be remanded to the Tribunal for reconsideration of its decision in view of the decision of this Court in the case of Water and Power Development Authority v. Zulfiqar Ali and others (PLD 1988 SC 693) and WAPDA, Lahore and 2 others v. Manzoor Ahmad Arif (1994 SCMR 1042). The cases relied by the learned counsel for the petitioners are quite distinguishable and are not of any assistance to the petitioners in the present case. In the case of WAPDA, Lahore v. Manzoor Ahmad Arif (supra), this Court while allowing the appeal of Water and Power Development Authority against the decision of Service Tribunal converting the punishment of respondent in that case from reduction in rank to stoppage of one increment only, observed as under: "

5. As noted in the leave granting order it appears that even the gravity of the charges proved was not kept in view while making the genera observations which form the basis of the Tribunal's order. This Court has pointed out in sufficient detail the Constitutional responsibility of the Service Tribunal in the case of Muhammad Ibrahim Khan Secretary, Ministry of Labour and others (1984 SCMR 1014). Being a final Court of the fact the Service Tribunal is under duty to examine thoroughly and finally the questions of fact involved and dispose them of by reasoned observations and ‑conclusions. The judgment given b, the Tribunal in this case is as pointed out in Muhammad Ibrahim's case to a model of what a judgment should not be." It is, therefore, quite clear that in the above case, the Tribunal‑had not examined the gravity of charges against the respondent in that case while converting the punishment of reduction of rank to stoppage of one increment. Similarly, in the other case reported as Water and Power Development Authority v. Zulfiqar Ali and others (supra), this Court while allowing the appeals observed as follows:‑‑ "After carefully examining the nature of each case and the orders of reduction of punishment, when maintaining the finding of guilty by the Tribunal; we are constrained to hold that no sufficient legal justification was shown for altering the penalty. These cases are, therefore, to be remanded to the Tribunal for re‑examination of the quantum of punishment. Accordingly we will not go into details of merits in this behalf in each case, lest it might prejudice the determination by the Tribunal as result of remand. It is, however, necessary to highlight some questions of law of public importance. It is now well‑settled that the Service Tribunals are forums of appeal on questions of law as also facts; with all the necessary powers to uphold, set aside or vary the orders, impugned before them. It is subject to the limitations imposed by any law‑‑like section 17(1‑A) of the WAPDA Act, 1958, as interpreted by this Court. That being so, the power to alter the punishment in appropriate cases has also been conceded to the Tribunals in a number of judgments by this Court. We, therefore, do not agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that they have no such power. It is now to be seen whether there is any limitation on this power particularly in cases dealt under section 17(1‑A) of WAPDA Act. One limitation is that the decisions of Tribunals being subject to appeal to this Court it is proper that, as do other questions, cogent reasons should be given for altering the punishment. This is also necessary so as to avoid criticism of arbitrariness on the part of the Tribunal itself. The other obvious limitation is that in fact also it should not be arbitrary. The reasons to be stated in the order should satisfy the standards of reasonableness. Guidance in this behalf can be sought from the case of similar nature decided by the superior Courts. For example, in matters of corruption and/or bribe the recent judgments by this Court on quantum of punishment in criminal cases, can be kept in mind. See Malik Muhammad Khan v. The State PLD 1987 SC

500. See also the same case on review, re‑heard and decided on 10‑5‑1988." From the above quotations, it is quite clear that the Service Tribunals are forums where questions of law and facts both can be agitated by the aggrieved persons. The limitation while hearing service appeals on the power of the Tribunals is only to the extent that while interfering on question of fact, the Tribunal has to state the reasons in the order which should Satisfy the standards of reasonableness. This Court, therefore, while hearing the appeal arising from the decision of Service Tribunal would only interfere if the order passed by the Tribunal lacked application of mind or suffered from arbitrariness. In the case before us, the Tribunal gave the following reasons while accepting the appeal of the respondent:‑‑ "

4. From the documents placed on record, it transpires that the appellant being Assistant Superintendent, Post Offices had a supervisory role but was not directly concerned with the renewal of arm licences, it is alleged that at the instance of the appellant Mr. Muhammad Rashid renewed the licences and on the record there is no direct evidence against the appellant and there is word of Muhammad Rashid. Whatever may be the circumstances, the appellant could not be absolved of his supervisory role, but he could not be made responsible for renewal of licences but at the most, he could be charged for ' negligence' as he was supposed to check the entries of the licences and he should have been vigilant. The appellant and the other co-?accused Muhammad Rashid, have made good the loss proportionately and the loss alleged to have been sustained for renewal of‑ 79 licences has been recovered, whereas actual loss is for 7 licences. It is also surprising that Mr. Muhammad Rashid, who was the Incharge of the Post Office and had renewed the arm licences, has been treated leniently by awarding the penalty of stoppage of two annual increments, while the appellant has been imposed the penalty of compulsory retirement, which has deprived the appellant and his family members from their livelihood and‑ particularly when he had only put in 18 years' service and hall to serve the department up to the age of superannuation. We are of the view that the punishment of compulsory retirement is not commensurate with the charge of negligence and there is glaring discrimination in the case of the appellant as the main responsible person has been awarded penalty of stoppage of two increments. We, therefore, accept the appeal, set aside the impugned order of compulsory retirement of the appellant made on 30‑11‑1994, and instead impose the penalty of stoppage of two increments for a period of two years from the date of passing of the impugned order dated 30‑11‑1994 without cumulative effect. The appellant shall be reinstated in service with all benefits. With regard to excess payment of Government loss, there is no prayer by appellant and as such no order is required." 'The above reasoning given by the Service Tribunal shows full application of mind by the learned Tribunal to the facts of the case and it does not suffer from any legal infirmity so as to justify interference by this Court under Article 212 of the Constitution. There is no merit in this petition which is accordingly, dismissed and leave to appeal is refused. A.A./P‑273/S ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? Leave refused.