1992 PLP 1856 (CLC)

BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.‑‑‑The appellant, Kh. Ejaz Ahmad, was working as a Town Planner in BPS‑17 in the Mirpur Development Authority when on Ist of April 1990 the Chairman of the Authority ordered the termination of his services with one month's pay in lieu of notice period in accordance with the terms and conditions of his appointment. Feeling aggrieved Kh. Ejaz Ahmad filed a writ petition in the High Court. The writ petition has been dismissed by a learned single Judge in the High Court vide his order dated 23‑11‑1991. With leave of this Court he has appealed against that order. In the writ petition filed in the High Court the main plank of attack was that the order of termination was without jurisdiction because under the Mirpur Development Authority Establishment Service Rules, 1988, the appointing authority of the appellant was the Mirpur Development Authority and it is only the Authority which could terminate his services. The High Court found that the members of the Mirpur Development Authority had by a resolution delegated all the powers of the Authority to the Chairman and that the phraseology of the resolution was comprehensive enough to include the power of appointment and termination. The High Court also formed the view that the appointment of Kh. Ejaz Ahmad was made by the Chairman subject to approval of the Mirpir Development Authority but there was nothing on the record to show that the appointment had been approved by the Authority. It was also held that a temporary employee could not seek relief from a Court of law if his services are terminated in conformity with the terms of agreement. Before us the learned counsel for the appellant, Kh. Noor‑ul‑Amin, vehemently contended that the conclusions drawn by the learned Judge in the High Court are unsustainable. He submitted that the resolution delegating the powers of the Authority to the Chairman was passed in the year 1977 while the Mirpur Development Authority Establishment Service Rules, 1988 were made by the Government on 3rd of December 1988 and the power to appoint a Grade 17 Town Planner was vested in the Authority by virtue of these Rules. He submitted that the resolution mentioned above can only have the effect of delegating only those powers which were vested in the Authority on the date when the resolution was passed. He, therefore, contended that any power which came to be vested‑ in the Authority after the aforementioned delegation could not by any rule of interpretation of construed to have been already delegated. As a broad principle this proposition appears to have force, but has no application to the present case. Section 23 of the Mirpur Development Authority Ordinance deals with the appointment of Officers and servants and lays down as follows:‑ "

23. Appointment of Officers and servants etc. (1) The Authority may, from time to time, appoint such officers, servants, experts or consultants as it may consider necessary for the performance of its functions, on such terms and conditions as it may deem fit: Provided that salaried officers and servants of Grade 19 and above shall not be appointed except with the previous sanction of the Government. (2) Subject to the proviso to subsection (1), the Chairman may, in cases of urgency, appoint such officers, servants, experts or consultants and on such terms and conditions as he deems fit: Provided that every appointment made under this subsection shall be reported to the Authority without unreasonable delay." A plain reading of this provision of law shows that the power of appointment of officers, servants, experts and consultants, always stood vested in the Authority from its very inception with one exception which is contained in the proviso that officers and servants of Grade 19 and above could only be appointed by the Authority with the previous sanction of the Government. It is, therefore, clear that the Rules mentioned above did not vest in the Authority any new power so far as the appointment of Town Planner in BPS‑17 is concerned. It. only resulted the method of appointment.‑. The argument, therefore, fails. It may also be observed that the appointment order of the appellant was made by the Chairman of the Authority on 6‑2‑1989 when the Mirpur Development Authority Establishment Service Rules mentioned above had already been promulgated on 3rd of December, 1988. Under these Rules the power to appoint a Town Planner in BPS‑17 was vested in the Authority and not in the Chairman. If the Chairman did not have the power to appoint or remove the Town Planner then the order of appointment was bad in law. If so, it creates no right and does not entitle the appellant to file a writ petition in order to have an illegal order revived. Finding no force in the appeal, it is hereby dismissed. A.A/338/S.C.A Appeal dismissed.