1995 PLP 918 (MLD)

5. The learned appellate Court vide its judgment, dated 28‑5‑1994 affirmed the findings of the learned trial Court and dismissed the appeal holding that the mutation had duly been sanctioned in the general assembly; that the defendants had uninterrupted possession for the last fifty years and that a presumption of truth is attached to the revenue record.

6. A pre‑admission notice was issued to the respondents but they were not turned up.

7. Petitioners' learned counsel has mainly urged the following pleas:‑‑ (i) That both the learned Courts below have decided the issue of adverse possession against the petitioners although they have held that petitioners are in possession of the land in joint Khata. According to the learned counsel having found the petitioners to be in possession of the suit land in joint Khata, the learned Courts could not have decided the issue against them; (ii) That the learned appellate Court has wrongly held mutation to be a proof of title; (iii) That the learned Courts have non‑suited the petitioners‑plaintiffs by invoking the principle of estoppel although there was no evidence to support this finding; and (iv) That the learned Courts below have totally ignored the, documentary evidence tendered in Court vide Exhs.P.l to. P.11 and Exhs.D.1 to D.12.

8. I have gone through the certified copies of the evidence led before the learned trial Court and attached with this petition with the assistance of the learned counsel for the petitioners.

9. In the impugned mutation Exh.P.5, the report of the Patwari in the last column is dated 5‑11‑1930 which reads as under:‑‑‑ There is an order, dated 22‑1‑1932 to the effect that Tilu etc. were in possession and that the vendor was not traceable. A proclamation was issued in June, 1932 but the matter was adjourned as proclamation fee had not been deposited. The last order is dated 15‑9‑1932 wherein it is mentioned that Mewa had not appeared despite proclamation. Ghulam Peeran Shah; Rahim Bak4sh and Allah Wasaya all residents of the same Mauza had testified the correctness of the entry made by the Patwari. Bahadar Shah and Allah Wasaya are shown to be present in the general assembly on 22‑1‑1932 and the mutation was sanctioned in common assembly on 15‑9‑1932. Exh. P.4 is a copy of the Jamabandi wherein it has been shown that the predecessor‑in‑interest of the defendants were owners of the two shares while Mews was owner of five shares. The defendants thereafter are continuously shown as owners in possession in the successive revenue record. The defendants have produced Exhs.D.5, D.6 and D.2 to show that their possession is uninterrupted. The mutation in question had admittedly been sanctioned under section 34 of the Land Revenue Act, 1887 which is being reproduced below:‑‑ (1) Any person acquiring, by inheritance, purchase, mortgage, gift or otherwise, any right in an estate as a landowner, assignee of land revenue or tenant having a right of occupancy, shall report his acquisition of the right to the Patwari of the estate, ' (2) If the person acquiring the, right is a minor or otherwise disqualified, his guardian or other person having charge of his property shall make the report to the Patwari. (3) The Patwari shall enter in his register of mutations every report made to him under subsection (1) or subsection (2) and shall also make an entry therein respecting the acquisition of any such right as aforesaid which he has reason to believe to have taken place and of which a report should have been made to him under one or other of those subsections and has not been so made. (4) A Revenue Officer shall from time to time inquire into the correctness of all entries in the register of mutations and into all such acquisitions as aforesaid coming to his knowledge of which, under the foregoing subsections, report should have been made to the Patwari and entry made in that register; and shall in each case make such order as he thinks fit with' respect to the entry in the annual record of the right acquired."

10. Unlike section 42 of the Land Revenue Act, the old provision did not require the presence of the person whose right is being acquired at the time of mutation. It was only the person who had acquired the right who was to make the report and the Revenue Officer was to decide about the correctness or otherwise of the said report.

11. In the instant case, the Lumberdar of the said Mauza and some respectables were present when the Revenue Officer finally sanctioned the mutation. This was, I think, sufficient compliance with the relevant provision of the Land Revenue Act and a presumption of truth would attach to such an entry made in the Revenue Record. Such a presumption is further strengthened if any entry remains unchallenged over a considerable length of time i.e. five decades. This view finds support from a judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in Abdul Ahad and others v. Roshan Din and 36 others PLD 1979 SC 890 wherein it has been observed:‑‑ "West Pakistan Land Revenue Act (XVII of 1967)‑‑‑ S. 44 read with S.41‑‑‑Mutation getting incorporated in Jamabandi, held, carries a presumption of truth‑‑‑Evidence Act (I of 1872), Ss.35 & 114." Similarly in a recent judgment reported in 1995 SCMR 85(86) it was held:‑‑ ‑‑‑‑S. 52‑‑‑Entries of Jamabandis‑‑‑Presumption of truth is attached to entries of Jamabandi‑‑‑Where ownership column of record of rights showed land as ownership of Shamlat Deh viz. proprietary body of the village, presumption would be, that it was owned by the proprietary body of the village." The petitioners‑plaintiffs are estopped by their own conduct to challenge the mutation so late in the day and even the suit was time‑barred.

12. The concurrent findings of fact of the learned Courts below did not disclose any jurisdictional defect or material irregularity to warrant interference in the revisional jurisdiction of this Court. The revisional jurisdiction can only be invoked if the assumption of jurisdiction is illegal or there is none exercise of the jurisdiction or the said exercise has occasioned an irregularity. It has, however, to be borne in mind that the jurisdiction. under section 115 of the C.P.C. is discretionary in nature and it is not every irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction which would justify interference. It is only that irregularity in the exercise of jurisdiction which, if not interfered with; may lead to injustice or hardship which would mandate interference.

13. For what has been discussed above, there is no merit in this petition which is hereby dismissed in limine. H.B.T./A‑772/L Petition dismissed.