P L D 1989 Azad J&K 47 (PLP)

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner has admitted that the residential quarter stands allotted in the name of the petitioner but his contention is that this fact does not attract the above provisions of the Regulations in the case of the petitioner as the petitioner was not an allottee of any residential WAPDA quarter or bungalow when he had applied for the. allotment of the plot to the M. D. A.

5. I have given my due consideration to the above respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties in respect of the above preliminary objection, after which I am of the opinion that this writ petition it incompetent as it has not been filed by a person aggrieved by the order allotting the plot to the respondent No.2. It is undisputed that the residential WAPDA quarter No.84‑D in Mirpur Town already stood allotted to the petitioner when the impugned allotment was made to the respondent No. 2 in view of which fact the petitioner had become ineligible for applying for the allotment of a plot in Mirpur Town to the M.D.A. under the provisions of clause d(iv) of Regulation 8 of the Regulations which replaced the previous one through an. amendment carried in the Regulations by the Government Vide its letter No. Coord 77/MDA‑19/2434, dated 7‑11‑1978 which reads as follows:‑ "In the Mirpur Development Authority Regulations for Development and Disposal of Estates, 1977, for clause (d) of Regulation 8, the following shall be substituted:‑ "(d) The following conditions for eligibility of applying for allotment shall be adhered to:‑ (i) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (ii) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (iii) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (iv) For residential plot, the applicant or head of the family or dependent must not, have been allotted any residential WAPDA quarter/ Bungalow.

6. A perusal of the above provisions of the Regulations would show that an allottee of residential WAPDA quarter/ Bungalow, was ineligible for allotment of any residential plot in the Housing Scheme of the M.D. A. in Mirpur town from the date the clause (d) of Regulation 8 of the Regulations was substituted vide the aforesaid Government Notification, and in this view of the legal position, the petitioner being an allottee of the residential WAPDA quarter in the Mirpur Town, had ceased to be eligible for allotment of any residential plot in Mirpur Town from the date of coming into force the aforesaid provision of the Regulations.

7. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that clause (d) of Regulation 8 of the Regulations was not applicable in the case of the petitioner on the ground of his having applied for allotment of the plot in question prior to the coming into effect the same, it is devoid of any force. In the first place, it is a settled law that an entitlement of the applicant to anything or right is determined in accordance with the law prevalent at the time of making such determination and not under any previous law. Thus, the law which held the field at the time of passing the impugned order would determine the eligibility or otherwise of the petitioner to an allotment of residential plot in Mirpur Town and not the one which was in force before that. Thus, even if the petitioner was under no disability to apply to M.D.A. for allotment of a plot in Mirpur Town before 7‑11-1978 but he had become ineligible to any such allotment after the said date on which the new clause (d) of Regulation 8 was substituted by way of the amendment referred to above and, secondly, there is nothing on the record to show that the petitioner had, in fact, submitted an application in prescribed form as was required under the Regulations, for allotment of the plot in question before the coming into force of the above provision of Regulations. He has filed with the writ petition a photocopy of the application as Annexure 'C but the perusal of‑the same would show that it is dated 19‑5‑1980 whereas the impugned order was made on 16‑4‑1985, which means that the formal application for allotment of plot by the petitioner was made even after the allotment of plot in the name of the respondent No.2. Thus, the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner` had applied for allotment of plot in question before the coming into effect the law debarring an allotee of the WAPDA quarter/Bungalow in Mirpur, for applying for allotment of plot in any Housing Scheme of Mirpur Town, does not stand substantiated by the material on the record of the case. However, even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the petitioner had been moving the Government or the M.D.A. for allotment of plot by submitting applications not in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Regulations, before the coming into existence of the aforesaid provisions of the Regulations, that fact itself had not made him a formal applicant for allotment of plot within the meaning of the Regulations or an eligible person for such an allotment because, as said earlier, his eligibility to such an allotment was to be determined according to the provisions of the Regulations in force at the lime of making the impugned order.

8. Under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974, it is only on the application of any aggrieved party that the High Court is empowered to make an order declaring that an act done or proceedings taken by a person performing functions in connection with the affairs of the State or a local authority, has been done or taken without lawful authority and is of no legal effect which means that a person who has suffered a legal grievance or against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or affected his title to something, can only invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. In this case, as said earlier, the petitioner was not even eligible for applying for allotment of the plot in question and, as such it cannot be said that the impugned order, in its effect, entails any direct injury to him to make him a person aggrieved' by it. In this view of the matter, even if the impugned order is assumed to be illegal having been passed in violation of the provisions of the Regulations, the petitioner is, in no way, aggrieved by it within the meaning of the aforesaid Section of the Constitution and as such, he has no locus standi to institute this writ petition.

9. For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary objection of the learned counsel for the respondents that this writ petition is un-maintainable by reason of the petitioner being not a person aggrieved by the impugned order, prevails in view of which I need not go into the merits of the case.

10. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed on the sole ground of its having been filed incompetently, with no order as to costs. A.A./360/H.C.A. Petition dismissed.