PLC 1978

1978 PLP 429 (PLC)

MESSRS ZEENAT SHIRT FACTORY Versus WALI MOHAMMAD

Jurisdiction / Court
High Court
Decided Date
N/A
Honorable Judges
Ghulam Rasool Shaikh, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1978 PLP 429 (PLC)
Forum / Court High Court
Bench Members Ghulam Rasool Shaikh, Appellate Tribunal
Parties MESSRS ZEENAT SHIRT FACTORY Versus WALI MOHAMMAD
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1978 PLP 429 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1978 PLP 429 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the High Court bench comprising: Ghulam Rasool Shaikh, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1978 PLP 429 (PLC) (MESSRS ZEENAT SHIRT FACTORY Versus WALI MOHAMMAD). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • All Ahmed for Respondent

Judgment & Decree

All Ahmed for Respondent Date of hearing: 27th July 1977. DECISION. This is an appeal against the order of the Labour Court ordering re instatement of the respondent on an application made under section 25-A, I. R. O.

2. The respondent was in the permanent employment of the appellant. On 22nd October, 1975 be had abused the owner of the factory and, therefore, he was charge‑sheeted on the same date. He submitted a reply on 24th October, 1975 denying the allegations and pleaded that, on the contrary, the owner had abused him and the workman took exception to this conduct of the owner, and, therefore, the, owner expressed his regret and the matter ended. The reply was found unsatisfactory sad, therefore an inquiry was ordered: The respondent failed to attend the inquiry in spite of repeated adjournments and intimations to him. Consequently, an ex pare inquiry was held and two witnesses, viz. Mohammad Ashraf and Mohammad Hanif were examined. On the basis of their evidence the respondents was found guilty. A second show‑cause notice along with the inquiry report was served upon him but he failed to submit any explanation. Thereafter he was dismissed from service by a letter dated 3rd December, 1975.

3. The respondent served a grievance notice upon the appellant and thereafter approached the Junior Labour Court. On its abolition the case was transferred to the Labour Court. After the evidence was recorded, re‑instatement was ordered. An appeal eras filed against that order. The appeal was allowed and the case was remanded for evidence but the case was decided ex parte. On remand, evidence was recorded.

4. On the assessment of the evidence the Labour Court allowed the application and set aside the order of dismissal. Consequently, he ordered re‑instatement with back beoe5ta. The learned Presiding Officer passed the order on three grounds. The first ground stated by him was that first show‑cause notice cans issued by Mr., Durrani, Labour Officer, but he was not competent to issue the first shots‑cause notice and, therefore, it was bad in law.

5. The second ground‑ was that there was no evidence to prove that the second allot‑cause notice and the inquiry report were served upon the respondent and, therefore, the respondent was deprived of the opportunity e to explain any thing contained adversely in the inquiry report.

6. The third ground was that no specific allegation has been made in the charge‑sheet and, therefore, that could not form the basis of holding the respondent guilty of the charge. He also referred to the evidence of Yakoob Tabani arid Syed Feroz Ali and pointed out that their evidence did not show that any misconduct, was committed by the respondent and, in fact, the alleged act of misconduct was shrouded in mystery. By referring to the reply statement, he observed that there was an allegation that the respondent had abused Seth Saheb, but the name of that Seth Saheb was not disclosed and it was a riddle, which could not be solved.

7. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the present appeal had been filed. It was pleaded before me on behalf of the appellant that the ground which had been relied upon by the learned Presiding Officer and formed the basis of his decision were never pleaded either in the grievance notice served upon the appellant or in the application made under sec tion 25‑A,I. R. O: or the affidavit which was filed slang with the application and consequently, no consideration could be made to these grounds and learned Presiding Officer was not justified in leasing his decision on these grounds. I find considerable force in this contention. It is a settled principle of law needing no authority that a plea of fact, which has not been set or disclosed in the pleadings cannot be looked in to nor any evidence can be led to introduce a fresh ground of facts. The learned Presiding Officer completely disregarded this legal position and based his decision on the grounds, which could not be permitted to be raised at a later stage. The learned representative for the respondent has not succeeded In assailing this legal position nor he had quoted any authority. It is the duty of the party to disclose the grounds on which it relies, in the pleadings in order to allow the other party to lead evidence in order to meet those grounds. I may r further state that there was no vague allegation in the charge‑sheet. It was clearly stated that the respondent had abused Seth Saheb, which clearly means the owner of the concern. The respondent clearly understood this and in his reply he denied that he hid abused Seth Saheb. He also used the words *'"' "Seth Saheb" in the reply statement. It was, therefore, clear from the fact that by the use of the words "Seth Saheb" in the charge‑sheet, it was meant to be the owner of the concern and no other person. The evidence, of the two witnesses examined in the inquiry fully supported the fact that the respondent had abused the responsible man of the Management.

8. In result the impugned order is not sustainable. I, therefore, allow B the appeal and set aside the Impugned order. The application made under section 25‑A, I. R. O. elands dismissed.