P L D 1958 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)
SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE, LYALLPUR‑Petitioner Versus Ch. FAQIR MUHAMMAD‑Respondent
| Citation | P L D 1958 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | Single Bench |
| Parties | SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE, LYALLPUR‑Petitioner Versus Ch. FAQIR MUHAMMAD‑Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1958 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1958 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: Honorable Judges.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1958 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP) (SUPERINTENDENT OF CENTRAL EXCISE, LYALLPUR‑Petitioner Versus Ch. FAQIR MUHAMMAD‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- Bashir Ahmad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (Ihsanul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed .by Iftikharuddin Ahmad, Attorney for Petitioner.
- M. B. Zaman, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by M. Siddiq, Attorney for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 10th February 1958.
Headnotes / Summary
(On appeal from the judgment and order dated 26th March 1957 of the High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore in Writ Petition No. 471 of 1956). Limitation‑Cause for extension of time‑Petition for special leave to appeal by Government‑Time needed for consultation in several offices and for engaging special counsel‑Held, not con vincing reasons‑Question involved of public importance affecting other cases‑Time extended‑Supreme Court Rules, 1956, O. XIII, A Petition for Special Leave to Appeal by the Superintendent of Central Excises, Lyallpur, was time‑barred by 57 days. Among the reasons for condoning delay it was claimed that extra time was needed for consultation in a number of offices including the Ministry of Law of the Pakistan Government, and for the engagement of special counsel. At the hearing it was pleaded that questions of public importance were involved affecting a great number of other similar cases. Held, that Governments did not need any greater latitude in respect of limitation than the ordinary litigant and that the reasons mentioned for extension of time were not convincing. The Court, however, granted extension of time, as the view put forward in the order appealed against in regard to the question in dispute required to be re‑examined. Moreover, if leave was refused and the Government brought up the matter before the Supreme Court in another case, as it was open to it to do and if the decision in that case went in favour of Government, the decision which was the subject of present petition for leave to appeal would remain as an anomaly in the licensing system, which result, it was desirable to avoid.
Judgment & Decree
The Court, however, granted extension of time, as the view put forward in the order appealed against in regard to the question in dispute required to be re‑examined. Moreover, if leave was refused and the Government brought up the matter before the Supreme Court in another case, as it was open to it to do and if the decision in that case went in favour of Government, the decision which was the subject of present petition for leave to appeal would remain as an anomaly in the licensing system, which result, it was desirable to avoid. Bashir Ahmad, Senior Advocate Supreme Court (Ihsanul Haq, Advocate Supreme Court with him) instructed .by Iftikharuddin Ahmad, Attorney for Petitioner. M. B. Zaman, Advocate Supreme Court instructed by M. Siddiq, Attorney for Respondent. Date of hearing: 10th February 1958. CORNELIUS, J.-This petition by the Superintendent of Central Excises, Lyallpur, is time‑barred by no less than 57 days. In the petition for condonation of the delay, it is explained that the time was needed for consultation in a number of offices including the Ministry of Law of the Pakistan Government, and for the engagement of special counsel. At the hearing, it was pleaded that questions of public importance are involved affecting a great number of similar cases. No extended period of limitation is provided for Governments, as litigants before this Court. This is because it is felt that enjoying unusual facilities for preparation and conduct of their cases, as against those available to private litigants, Governments do not need any greater latitude in respect of limitation than the ordinary litigant. The reasons advanced for the delay are not, in our opinion, convincing, and we wish to emphasize the necessity for as great vigilance on the part of Governments in these matters as the Court is entitled to expect from, and enforces against, private litigants. The question here is whether the calendering of mill‑made cloth for the purpose of sale is a process of manufacture. The Central Excise authorities claim that it is, and demand that such a process should be performed under a licence, which the no applicant, Ch. Faqir Muhammad, a calenderer, has not taken out. Upon a petition by Ch. Faqir Muhammad, the High Court of West Pakistan has issued a prohibition to the Superintendent of Central Excise, Lyallpur, against demanding that Ch. Faqir Muhammad should take out a licence. It is said that there are many other persons engaged in the same trade, and in other trades such as dyeing, printing etc., which appertain to the preparation of cloth for sale, whose occupations might he covered by the finding of the learned Judges in the High Court that :‑ "If the contents of the cloth do not change by the process of calendering . . . . . . I fail to see how that process can be deemed to be a process in the manufacture or production of the cloth". We consider that this view requires to be re‑examined. It is of course, open to the Government to bring up the matter before this Court in another case, but the decision in such a case, if favourable to the Government, will leave Ch. Faqir Muhammad's case as an anomaly within the licensing system. It is desirable that, this should be avoided, and we accordingly condone the delay in, the present petition, and grant special leave to appeal as prayed, but at the same time direct that the appellant shall bear the costs of this petition, as well as the respondent's costs in the appeal, irrespective of the result thereof, as a condition of the appeal being admitted. A. H Delay condoned.