1984 PLP 1137 (CLC)

‑‑‑S. 15‑Scrutiny of testimony‑Believing or disbelieving a witness or drawing inference from his testimony, held, normally not open for scrutiny in second appeal unless Courts below have gone against some established principles or violated law or procedure‑None of such ingredients found in appeal‑Appeal dismissed. [Evidence]. ‑‑S. 13‑Personal 'requirement‑Positive assertion made in respect of landlord and evidence to show him disqualified‑Such assertion, held, cannot be met by statement of any of landlords.‑ ‑‑S. 13‑Eviction proceedings‑Enhancement of rent‑Landlord's own evidence showing that real purpose for institution of eviction proceedings was only to enhance rent‑Proposition that once requirement of landlord of his personal need established, plea of enhancement of rent automatically fails, held, not applicable to circumstances of case. This is a second appeal against the order of a learned Additional District Judge at Jhang whereby the appeal of landlords was dismissed after upholding the order of Rent Controller.

2. This S. A. O. was admitted only to consider the findings of two Courts below on issue No. 2 which relates to the personal requirement of the landlords and their children. This is vide order, dated 8‑10‑1979. The eviction application was filed on 28‑6‑1972 on the grounds of personal need, default in payment of rent and damage to the property. The Rent Con troller found all these issues against the landlords and dismissed the eviction application on 14‑11‑1977.

3. Then there was an appeal and the appellate authority dismissed the same on 31‑1‑1979. The appellate authority found that the appellants' own witness Salamat Ali who appeared as P. W. 1 had deposed that the landlords/appellants wanted to enhance the rent and this has led to the dispute between the parties. A further circumstance taken into consideration by the appellate Court was that appellants 1 and 3 namely Khadim Hussain and Tassaduq Hussain had suppressed a material fact that they do not own any agricultural land although it was proved from the record that they had purchased 257 Kanals and 17 Marlas of agricultural land. From suppression of this fact adverse inferences were drawn against them. The land was under self‑cultivation of the appellants 1 and

3. It was further held that Tassaduq was alleged to be a teacher and he did not appear in the witness‑box to rebut that assertion so to say that he needed the shop in question for his genuine need.

4. Learned counsel for the appellants has argued that for the purpose of Rent Restriction Ordinance, it was wholly irrelevant if a landlord' who was asking for eviction of his tenant on the ground of bona fide personal need also owns agricultural land. The proposition as advanced is unexcep tionable, but looking at the facts of present case, this would not help the appellants. In the present case what has happened is that the Courts below were of the view that by suppression of fact that the appellants had pur chased agricultural land, the Courts were not taken into confidence for the fear of an adverse inference. The learned Additional District Judge, therefore, took the view that this conduct of the appellants to suppress the material fact reflected on the credibility of the appellants and also on their plea of bona fide need. So in fact, the learned Additional District Judge is 4 not holding that owning agricultural land had disqualified the appellants and thus has not misapplied the law. He has merely taken this as a circum stance not to believe the evidence of appellants coupled with other circum stances listed by him. The argument advanced, thus, has not impressed me and fails.

5. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that in so far as bona fide personal need was concerned, application ought to have been allowed even if the case of one of the landlords was establish ed. This is not a case where there are many landlords and one of them has sued. This is a collective case being put up by three landlords and the two Courts below after appreciation of their pleas and evidence have come' to the conclusion that their plea did not inspire confidence ; they had acted in a manner supplemented to each other. In arriving at the conclu sions on which the two Courts below arrived, they could not be said to have misdirected themselves and acted illegally. Believing or disbelieving of witnesses or drawing proper inference from their testimony would no normally be open for scrutiny in second appeal unless it could be shown that the Courts below while doing so have gone against some established principle or violated the law or procedure. None of these ingredients are found to be present in this case.

6. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is that the finding of the learned Additional District Judge to the effect that one of appellants Tassaduq Hussain had not appeared in the witness‑box to deny the assertion that he was a teacher and thus not free to indulge in business or trade has been met only with the plea that it is not alway necessary for a landlord to appear in the witness‑box. The general state ment, in certain cases, may be true but not in such like cases where the positive assertion is being made in respect of a landlord and evidence has been led to show that be was disqualified. I think the Courts below were fully justified in drawing adverse inferences against the said Tassaduq Hussain.

7. It is true that once the requirement of personal need has been established by the landlord the plea regarding enhancement of rent en automatically fails, but in the present case the appellants' own witness Salamat Ali who appeared as P. W. 1. has delivered a fatal blow by stating that the real dispute between the parties was for the enhancement of rent. In this case the appellants have been held to have failed to establish their bona fide personal need and on the contrary their own evidence showed that real purpose for the institution of eviction proceedings was only to enhance the rent.

8. Taking into consideration all these facts and circumstances, the two Courts below have rightly drawn the inference that the appellants do not need the premises in dispute for their bona fide personal need. The findings of the Courts below do not suffer from any infirmity so as to call for my interference under section 100 of the C.P.C. This S. A. O. is accordingly dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. M. Y. M. Appeal dismissed.