2004 PLP 764 (YLR)

2. During the pendency of the suit respondents/defendants filed an application under Order VII, rule 10, C.P.C. read with section 20, C.P.C. before the Civil Judge 1st Class, Gujranwala. The petitioner plaintiff filed reply of the application and controverted the stand taken by the respondents/defendants in the said application. Learned trial Court accepted the application vide order, dated 13-11-2002. The petitioner being aggrieved filed appeal before the Additional District Judge, Gujranwala who dismissed the same vide judgment and decree, dated 8-3-2003. Hence the present revision petition.

3. Learned counsel of the petitioner submits that impugned judgment of the rust Appellate Court and order of the trial Court are not in accordance with mandatory provisions of C.P.C. as the case of the petitioner/plaintiff falls under section 20(c) of C.P.C. He further submits that petitioner/plaintiff received notices from the respondents at Gujranwala; the head office of the petitioner-Company is at Gujranwala and cause of action has accrued to the petitioner/plaintiff at Gujranwala. Therefore, both the Courts below erred in law to accept, the application of the respondents/defendants. He further submits that judgment and order of both the Courts below are not in accordance with law laid down by the superior Courts. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments:-- Hitachi Limited and others v. Rupali Polyester 1998 SCMR 1618; Provincial Industrial Development Corporation v. Sh. Muhammad Amin & Co. (PLD 1975 Karachi 707); Messrs Gharibwal Cement v. Messrs Universal Traders (PLD 1977 Lahore 481) and Ch. Muhammad Yasin v. Ch. Abdul Aziz PLD 1993 SC 395.

4. I have given my anxious, consideration to the contentions of the learned counsel of the parties arid perused the record.

5. It is better and appropriate reproduce the admitted fact chronological order to resolve controversy between the parties:-- (i) Respondents invited tenders qua the work in question at Rawalpindi/Islamabad. (ii) The petitioner-Company submitted its tenders at Rawalpindi/Islamabad. (iii) Bids of the petitioner were accepted by the respondents at Rawalpindi/Islamabad. (iv) Respondents/defendants Corpora tion is situated at Islamabad and none of his subordinate office is at Gujranwala District. (v) All the construction works were to be carried out in Rawalpindi/Islamabad. (vi) The respondents had sent final notice to the petitioner regarding cancellation of the contract and recommendations for the blacklist of the firm of the petitioner/ plaintiff at Gujranwala. It is better and appropriate to reproduce section 20(c), Explanation II, C.P.C.:-- "Section 20(c), Explanation II.--A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in Pakistan or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office at such place." It is settled principle of law that section 20 makes no distinction between a statutory corporation and a corporation registered under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 and I there is, therefore, no doubt that Islamabad Electric Supply Company Limited and Project Director, LESCO, Islamabad fall within the provisions of Explanation-II of section 20(c). In arriving to this conclusion I am fortified by the law laid down by this Court in Mian Ghulam Bari v. WAPDA (1991 MLD 313). This Court has relied upon the dictum laid down by the Indian Supreme Court in Hakam Singh v. Messrs Gammon (India) Ltd. (AIR 1971 SC 740). Explanation-II was firstly interpreted by this Court in Bhola Nath Aggarwal and another v. The Empire of India Life Assurance Co. Ltd. (AIR 1948 Lahore 56; and laid down the following principle:-- "It is therefore, clear that the Corporation can be said to carry on business at the head office or at the place where it has a branch in respect of a cause of action which arises, wholly or in part, at the place where the Branch office is situated. If no part of the cause of action arises at the place of the branch office, the Corporation cannot be said to transact business at that place. This is the only possible interpretation of Explanation II, and not a single case cited before me has taken the contrary view. Therefore, the Courts at Lahore, can only have jurisdiction if it can be shown that the cause of action, wholly or in part, arose within the jurisdiction of the Lahore Courts, otherwise the suit must be instituted at Bombay where the head office is situated or at some place where the cause of action, wholly or in part arose." The aforesaid view of this Court was approved by the Honourable Supreme Court in Messrs Rehmania Trading Company v. Messrs Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd. (PLD 1960 SC 202). The aforesaid judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court was followed by the Karachi High Court in S.M. Abdullah & Sons v. Burewala Textile Mils Ltd. (1988 MLD 1). The aforesaid proposition of law is also supported by the law laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in WAPDA and others v. Mian Ghulam Bari (PLD 1991 SC 780). Mere reading of the aforesaid Explanation of section 20(c) clearly shows that a Corporation can be sued elsewhere apart from its principal office only if part of cause of action arises at that place and it has also subordinate office at such place. In arriving to this conclusion I am fortified by the law laid down by the Quetta High Court in Registered Firm Sheikhan Industries, Quetta v. West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation, Karachi (PLD 1976 Quetta 94). Bhola Nath Aggarwal's case supra (AIR 1948 Lahore 56) was also followed by the Honourable Supreme Court while interpreting Explanation-II of section 20, C.P.C. in Messrs Brady & Co. (Pakistan) Ltd. v. Messrs Sayed Saigol Industries Ltd. (1981 SCMR 494). In the present case all the transactions between the parties including the construction work in question were concluded at Islamabad/Rawalpindi except that the termination notice was received by the petitioner/plaintiff at Gujranwala. Coupled with the fact that respondents have no sub office at Gujranwala, therefore, cases relied upon learned counsel of the petitioner are distinguished on facts and law and the case is fully covered by the law laid down by this Court in Bhola Nath Aggarwal's case supra (AIR 1948 Lahore 56) which view was consistently followed by the superior Courts in the aforesaid judgments. In view of what has be discussed above, this revision petition has no merit and the same is dismissed. S.A.K./W-86/L Petition dismissed.